

**"Post-Cold War U.S. National Security Decision-Making:
The Cases of Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda"**

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Post-Cold War U.S. National Security Decision-Making:

The Cases of Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda

By Richard J. Norton

Abstract

This study explores U.S. National Security Decisions involving the use of military force that were made during the post-Cold War era in cases where there was general agreement among the decision makers that traditional U.S. security interests were not involved. Eight separate decisions in three distinct cases (Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda) are analyzed using four recognized models of decision-making in an effort to explain the decision-making process. These models are the Rational Actor Model, the Organizational Model, the Government-Politics Model, and the Human Factors Model.

The central hypothesis of this study is that applying any single model, which can provide some degree of explanatory power, will result in an incomplete understanding of the decision-making process. This result is due to the fact that each model examines only a small sample of the various forces acting on the decision-maker. Since all the forces usually operate simultaneously, the application of a single model will usually result in an incomplete understanding of the decision. Accordingly, a new integrated model of decision-making is proposed.

After each decision and case is analyzed, each individual model is applied, the model which provides the majority of explanatory power for the decision is identified and the decision is then analyzed using the integrated model. In every case the integrated provided significantly greater explanatory power than did any single model alone.

A conclusion of this study confirms what practitioners have long felt naturally, that the process by which national security decisions are reached is complex one and multiple forces impact the decision-making process simultaneously. Sometimes these forces propel the process to a single alternative, while at other times these forces act in opposition to each other. Using the integrated model of decision-making gives both scholars and practitioners an improved ability to recognize and explain the singular and synergistic impact of these forces.

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AMIO - Alien Migration Interdiction Order

APC - Armored Personnel Carrier

CDR - Coalition pour la Defense de la Republic

CENTCOM - Central Command

CIA - Central Intelligence Agency

CNN - Cable Network News

CRS - Congressional Research Service

DOD - Department of Defense

DMZ - Demilitarized Zone

DPS - Domestic Political System

EUCOM- European Command

FRAPH - Revolutionary Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti

GAO - Government Accounting Office

GCC - Gulf Cooperative Council

ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross

IMC - International Medical Corps

INS - Immigration and Naturalization Service

IPS - International Political System

IWG - Interagency Working Group

JTF - Joint Task Force

LST - Landing Ship Tank

MRND - Mouvement Democratique Republicain

MSF - Mediciens Sans Frontieres
MOOTW - Military Operations Other Than War
NCA - National Command Authority
NSA - National Security Advisor
NSC - National Security Council
NGO - Nongovernmental Organization
NSS- National Security System
OAS - Organization of American States
OAU - Organization of African Unity
OFDA - Office of Disaster Assistance
OPLAN - Operations Plan
PCC - Policy Coordinating Committee
PCL - Perry, Christopher, Lake
PDD - Presidential Decision Directive
PRM - Population, Refugees and Migration
RAM - Rational Actor Model
RPF - Rwanda Patriotic Front
SOF - Special Operations Forces
SOP - Standard Operating Procedure
TRO - Temporary Restraining Order
UN - United Nations
UNICEF - United Nations Children's Fund
UNOSOM - United Nations Operations in Somalia

USACOM - United States of America Command

USAID - United States Agency for International Development

**UNDPKO - United Nations Department of Peace Keeping
Operations**

UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNOMIR - United Nations Observer Mission in Rwanda

**UNOMUR - United Nations Observer Mission in
Uganda/Rwanda**

UNSC - United Nations Security Council

UNSCR - United Nations Security Council Resolution

WFP - World Food Program

Chapter One

Scholars specializing in international relations and policy specialists in the government face together the challenging task of improving the knowledge base required for more effective foreign policy. This objective will be furthered by a better understanding of the gap between the theory and practice of foreign policy.

Alexander George, *Bridging the Gap*¹

Introduction

Few decisions during a crisis can be more difficult for a U.S. president than to commit U.S. military forces to potential combat situations. Even when U.S. national interests are clearly at stake, there may be concerns about the impact of the intervention on U.S. national prestige. Additionally, the decision-makers, who could be either elected or appointed, are potentially risking their political futures in the event that public opinion turns adverse. Perhaps above all, these decisions are difficult because both U.S. and foreign lives may be lost and significant amounts of resources may be squandered

Since the 1990s and the end of the Cold War, decisions on whether or not to intervene militarily have become, in many ways, more complex. Yet, paradoxically, it is easier for the United States to intervene. For example, any U.S. intervention in the territory that once comprised the state of Yugoslavia would have been highly unlikely

¹ Alexander George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 135.

during the Cold War, as there was always the significant risk that U.S. intervention would be likely to trigger a Soviet response.

A further complication has been the on-going debate over what truly constitutes "national security." During the Cold War era, "national security" was viewed as being advanced through such activities as "detering attacks by the Soviet Union" ... "containing and reversing Soviet control and military presence throughout the world," and "to limit Soviet military capabilities."² In the decade following the Cold War, the United States no longer had the logic of the Cold War logic to rely up. In addition, the traditional definition of national interest itself came under renewed discussion.³ Some argued that what constitutes a "threat" to national interest should be broadened to include new threats such as environmental problems, migration flows, and cyber-terrorism, to name a few.⁴

In the decade following the end of the Cold War and in the midst of this broader debate, U.S. forces were deployed to confront several "complex humanitarian emergencies," "military operations other than war," and "non-traditional missions." These operations dealt with situations that were quite distinct from "traditional" military operations. None involved a direct threat to the security of the United States that could only be solved by the use of military force. None reflected a struggle between the United States and a large peer competitor. Each situation was dominated by intra-state conflict, and U.S. motivations were depicted as being, at least in part, altruistic in nature. These

² Ronald Reagan, *National Security Decision Directive Number 32* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1982), 1-2.

³ William Jefferson Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, July 1994), i.; Seyom Brown, "World Interests and the Changing Dimensions of Security," *World Security: Challenges for a New Century*, 3rd ed., eds. Michael T. Klare and Yogesh Chandrani (New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1998), 1 - 17.

⁴ William Jefferson Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2000), iii - iv.

and U.S. motivations were depicted as being, at least in part, altruistic in nature. These types of conflicts have been among the most visible and numerous over the past decade. It does not appear likely that the next few decades of the twenty-first century will be any less plagued by calls for U.S. military intervention in such situations.

Of course, given the high political stakes and lasting domestic consequences of intervention with military force, it is not surprising that national security decision-making in times of crisis has been studied extensively by scholars of U.S. foreign policy and international relations. Several unique theoretical approaches to explaining the decision-making process have been developed, with each of the resulting decision-making models has attempted to explain the decision-making process; and further research has shown that each of the four major approaches has some utility and explanatory power. However, scholars or practitioners have not accepted one model as providing “the” explanation of the decision-making process. In effect, there exists no unified theory of decision-making.

Since no one approach has proven to be completely satisfactory in explaining the decision-making process, the practitioners, who must grapple with these issues and eventually make a decision, do not view these theoretical models of decision-making as particularly useful aids. One possible reason for this reaction is that many practitioners have a distrust of academic products, and automatically hold such products in disregard.⁵ Alternatively, many practitioners may not be familiar with the theoretical models of decision-making. However, many practitioners who *are* familiar with the theoretical models discussed in this study are convinced that actual decision-making cannot be explained by any single approach or model, but rather by a combination of multiple

⁵ George, 7 - 11.

models.⁶ Indeed, the unanimity of this reaction is striking. As someone who came to the academic discussions in U.S. foreign policy decision-making regarding issues of national security after having observed and participated in the process the author was drawn to the debate surrounding the “practical” applications of theory to policy. To phrase the matter differently, how could theory improve practice? Thus, the initial search in the study was for a framework that offered an integrated model of decision-making within the national security decision-making process that could be used to explore decisions to intervene in the non-traditional conflicts in the early post-Cold War period. As there was no fully satisfactory framework in existence, there was a need to explore whether we can bridge the gap between the experience of practitioners and the theoretical contributions of scholars. It is to this task to which this study is dedicated.

The primary set of questions explored by this study relate directly to an on-going debate in the field of U.S. foreign policy—how do we understand the process of U.S. national security decision making? Using three case studies from the 1990s, this study will compare four of the most well known theoretical approaches to the study of U.S. national security decision-making with an integrated approach to the topic. The central question is does a particular model best explain the factors dominating the decision-making process? If not, does an integrated approach toward U.S. national security decision-making offer a deeper understanding of the process?

The second set of five questions address the concern over whether an integrated model can be developed which is potentially useful to both practitioners and theorists.

⁶ The author has conducted an informal survey of more than 50 individuals who participated in the U.S. national security decision-making process. Each was asked if any single approach to decision-making accurately captured the decision-making process. Each responded that the process is a mixture of the decision-making approaches discussed in this chapter. None thought any one approach was complete enough on its own.

While the study is not designed to produce a definitive response to each of the questions, the intent is to lay the framework for future research using an integrated approach by demonstrating that an integrated model can be developed which is potentially useful to both practitioners and theorists.

These five secondary research questions are: 1) To what extent did the duration of the crisis affect the dominance of forces acting upon the decision-making process described by the various models? 2) To what extent did success or failure of the decision making and outcome of the preceding crisis affect the decision-making process under examination? 3) Which elements of the international political system had the most impact on the decision-making process? 4) Which elements of the domestic political system had the most impact on the decision-making process? 5) Given that these interventions were thought by many to be only tenuously linked to traditional notions of U.S. national interests, what common elements may be found in these three cases? For example, did inputs from the domestic or international political systems dominate the decision-making process? The hope is the study will not only help fill the gap between academic theorists and foreign policy practitioners, but also point the way to a broader research agenda for an integrated approach to U.S. foreign policy decision-making.

In order to answer these questions, the remainder of this chapter will examine four major existing models/approaches to decision-making, and then present an alternative, and more integrated, approach to performing this task. For each of the four approaches, a detailed explanation of each decision-making model will be offered, followed by a discussion of its strengths and weaknesses as indicated in the literature. This section will be followed by a description of research to date on developing an integrated approach to

understanding U.S. decision-making. It establishes the approach that will be used in this study to discuss its strengths and weakness. To complete the theoretical discussion and literature review, the chapter will then look at two additional bodies of literature that are relevant to this subject: theories of intervention and theories of crisis. It returns to a review of the main research questions and hypotheses with a presentation of the types of evidence that would support or undermine each of the five approaches explored in this study. This chapter continues with a description of the cases and accompanying rationale for their selection and concludes with a discussion of the significance and limitations of the study and an overview of the following chapters.

Principal Models of U.S. Foreign Policy Decision-making

The U.S. national security decision-making process has been the focus of major scholarly studies since the 1960s,⁷ and much of the research as well as the development of the models themselves took place during the Cold War. It should be noted from the outset that while these studies examined different events, administrations, and policies, there was little, if any, disagreement during the Cold War as to what was meant by the term "national security." The looming threat of active hostilities between the superpowers and the constant presence of the Cold War set the parameters of national security decision-making for the period. All U.S. national security decisions, especially

⁷ This list includes, but is by no means limited to: Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikov, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed., (New York: Longman, 1999); Morton Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1974), Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Spain, eds. *Foreign policy Decision-Making* (New York: Free Press, 1963), John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), Charles F. Hermann, *International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research*, (New York: The Free Press, 1972), Max G. Manwaring and Wm. J. Olson, eds., *Managing Contemporary Conflict*, (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1996), James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*, (New York: Basic Books, 1989), Carnes Lord, *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*, (New York: The Free Press, 1988), and Irving Janis *Victims of Groupthink*, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).

those involving the planned or potential use of force, had to take the East-West confrontation into account. In fact, the structural constraints imposed by the bipolar world were so severe as to curtail dramatically the range of options available to decision-makers. Moreover, the U.S. policy of containment, proposed in 1947 and maintained throughout the Cold War, provided a high degree of consistency in U.S. policy. While debates concerning the implementation and viability of individual programs were often conducted fiercely, there was minimal opposition to overall U.S. goals.

The four approaches that will be described below are: the Rational Actor model, the Organization model, the Government Politics model, and the Human Factors model. These are generally considered the major approaches to U.S. foreign policy as indicated by the reviews of international relations theory that dominate in graduate and undergraduate textbooks.⁸ Among the most valuable studies of decision-making is Graham Allison's seminal work, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*.⁹ Although the first edition of this work was written more than thirty years ago, it still commands respect and attention.¹⁰ More significantly, even Allison's critics recognize his work as "... a critical turning point in the study of international politics."¹¹ In this volume (and an updated one co-authored with Phillip Zelikow in 1999), Allison sets out three of the four main approaches to the study of decision-making, and then

⁸ A partial listing of such works would include: Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*, 2nd Ed., (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993); James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations: Comprehensive Survey* 5th ed., (New York: Longarm, 2001), Glen H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 340 - 408.

⁹ Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1971.)

¹⁰ Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 571.

¹¹ David A. Welch, "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms," *International Security*, 17, no.2, (Fall, 1992) : 138.

applies them to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Particularly with regards to the description of the first three models, this study relies heavily on Allison's (and Zelikow's) characterizations of the models.

Rational Actor Model

This model, which is the oldest of the approaches this study will examine, stems from a concept that has dominated most attempts to explain international events.¹² The Rational Actor model attempts to "explain international events by recounting the aims and calculations of nations or governments."¹³ The approach rests on several core concepts. To begin with, the unitary state or national government may be seen as the decision-maker, and the state, in effect, is anthropomorphized as if it were an individual person. The state has clear goals and objectives that it will pursue when faced with issues requiring decision(s). In fact, the state acts as if it were one person with but one set of choices and a single set of alternatives that flow from each choice. Furthermore, the necessity of making a decision is thrust upon the state through circumstances stemming from activity in the international political system. These circumstances present the state with threats and opportunities that must be addressed.¹⁴

The presumption that the state is able to rank possible decision outcomes in order of preference is essential to the Rational Actor model because the state will choose its decision options in order to either maximize gain, minimize loss, or both.¹⁵ In the perfect theoretical world, every possible alternative would have been weighed in this cost-benefit

¹² Allison and Zelikow, 15.

¹³ Ibid., 13.

¹⁴ Ibid., 24 - 26.

¹⁵ Note: Allison and Zelikow argue that state actors will operate from a calculus of value maximization. The author contends that, under some circumstances risk minimization is an equally rational objective which may be sought after by the state.

analysis, thus ensuring the "best" (most gains / least losses) possible decision was reached. Such a mythical environment is described as pertaining to "comprehensive" or "substantial rationality."¹⁶ However, proponents of the Rational Actor model recognize that it is simply not possible to possess such all-encompassing knowledge. Due to a variety of factors ranging from time limitations to competing national interests, such a perfect universe of alternatives simply cannot be achieved. Accordingly, the concept of "bounded rationality" recognizes that the decision-maker has "inescapable limitations and computational ability."¹⁷ Within those bounds, however, it is argued that decision-makers continue to act and make decisions in accordance with the rational choice approach.¹⁸

Since all states are assumed to use a rational choice approach to decision-making, the Rational Actor model would seem to offer tremendous explanatory power. If one observes a particular state's actions, one can identify what values and interests it is trying to maximize. Or, inversely, if one knows what a state values, it should be possible to predict the outcome of state decision-making before it occurs.¹⁹ It also follows that if a different actor were able to gain such an understanding it could take actions designed to change the costs or benefits associated with a particular state's decision alternatives. Consequently, the decision-making state could be influenced to make decisions in accordance with the preferences of another party.

However, as Allison and Zelikow note, it is relatively easy for an imaginative observer to construct a set of values that an observed state is attempting to maximize.

¹⁶ Allison and Zelikow use the term comprehensive rationality, Allison and Zelikow, 20. However, Herbert A. Simon uses the substantial rationality to describe the same concept. See Herbert A. Simon, "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science," *American Political Science Review*, 79, no. 2, (June 1985) : 294.

¹⁷ Allison and Zelikow, 20.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 21.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 24 - 25.

Unfortunately the constructed values might bear no resemblance to those actually being pursued by the state. Thus, the problem for analysts using the Rational Actor model is, therefore, not simply to find an objective or cluster of objectives around which value-maximizing choices can be constructed. Rather, the analyst must insist on rules of evidence for making assertions about governmental objectives, options, and consequences that permit him to distinguish among the various accounts.²⁰

Strengths

There is much to recommend the Rational Actor model (RAM). Its proponents argue that it has significant explanatory power because it is parsimonious.²¹ Also, the Rational Actor model does not require incredibly detailed knowledge of the minute workings of a government's innermost bureaucracies, domestic issues, or political infighting.²² Furthermore, the Rational Actor model is "relatively well developed."²³ This model is also blessed with great clarity, is easy to grasp and to apply. The Rational Actor model is also compatible with the works of such scholars as Hans Morgenthau, Andrew Schelling, George Keenan, Kenneth Waltz, and many others.²⁴ While these works use rationality as the main assumption guiding state behavior in the international arena, the rational model of foreign policy making operationalizes that assumption to show how it is 'played out' or processed within the state. The notion of the rational state is also central to the realist and neo-realist schools of international relations thought, as well as the field of game theory, and the associated development of deterrence theory. Some

²⁰ Ibid., 24 - 26.

²¹ Allison and Zelikow, 54.

²² Ibid., 21.

²³ Welch, 142.

²⁴ Allison and Zelikow, 27 - 45.

scholars have gone so far as to state that the assumption of rational behavior is central to most international relations theory.²⁵

There is yet another reason why this model should be carefully examined in any work studying a particular U.S. national security decision. The decision-making architecture that supports the president and his or her key advisors duplicates the essential components of the Rational Actor model. The National Security Council, its supporting staff, and associated personnel are supposed to function in accordance with the precepts of the Rational Actor model. This organization is tasked to solicit the widest possible range of options and to carefully weigh the costs and benefits associated with each option before recommending a course of action to the president. Thus, the option recommended to the president is deemed to best advance the interests of the United States for the cost involved.²⁶

Weaknesses

Perhaps the greatest weakness of the Rational Actor model is that, notwithstanding the study of game and deterrence theory, states do not always act in a rational manner. The historical record is replete with examples in which states embarked upon a course of action without seeking to explore alternatives, weigh costs and benefits, or perform any apparent calculus prior to acting. One example of this behavior would be the re-insertion of U.S. Marines into Lebanon following the massacre of Palestinian non-combatants in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in 1983. Another drawback is that

²⁵ Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 560.

²⁶ See Carnes Lord, *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*, (New York: The Free Press, 1988.), 85 - 114.

RAM over-simplifies what is an inherently complicated process. Parsimony is a highly desired attribute of any theory, but not at the cost of producing theoretical sterility.²⁷

There are other criticisms of the Rational Actor model that are worth mentioning. One of the most obvious is that states are simply not unitary actors.²⁸ Modern states, even totalitarian ones, are complex structures of cabinets, departments, and associated sub-organizations. They are layered bureaucratic entities. Each of these entities has its own appreciation of national security as well as a tendency to protect and preserve its own existence.²⁹ Bargaining and compromise between these organizations can lead to sub-optimum decisions.³⁰

It is now appropriate to examine the second approach to explaining national security decision-making.

Organizational Model

The Organizational model's explanation of national security decision-making takes as its point of departure the fact that governments are not unitary, but are complicated conglomerations of multiple organizations and sub-organizations. These organizations process and package the data which senior government leaders will use to make or recommend courses of actions.³¹ Thus, governmental behavior is less a result of deliberate choice than outputs of large organizations that function according to a standard pattern of behavior. The growth and existence of these different organizations is a

²⁷ Put another way, "When you simplify nuclear physics past a certain point, you are no longer talking about nuclear physics." Interview, Admiral David Jeremiah, former Vice Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs, interviewed by author, via telephone, Newport, RI Nov 9, 1999.

²⁸ Allison and Zelikow, 143.

²⁹ James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Governments Do and Why They Do It*, (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 90 - 93.

³⁰ As noted in Alexander George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy, *American Political Science Review*, LXVI (September 1972), 751 - 785.

³¹ The principal components of the Organizational model are discussed in Allison and Zelikow, 143 - 145.

function of governmental size. Faced with a myriad of issues, governments create organizations with primary responsibility for discrete areas in which responsibility for creating government policy is divided among these organizations. Within their areas of expertise, organizations are fairly independent.

In order for these large organizations to operate successfully, the efforts of their membership must be coordinated. This requires the establishment of standard operating procedures (SOPs) and routines. Thus, the behavior of an organization at any given time is determined primarily by pre-existing routines. In the Organizational model, these large organizations are the key actors whose behavior may be explained in terms of common organization behavior and practices.

These behaviors and routines impact the flexibility of the organizations and the leaders they support. Over time organizations develop their own culture, values, and norms.³² These organizational attributes are perpetuated through the socialization of new members. Organizational values and beliefs will also affect the manner in which the organization processes information and reacts to its external environment.³³

As mentioned, the Organizational model does not accept the premise that the state is a unitary actor. Accordingly, governmental action is organizational output, which forms the basic unit of analysis of this model.³⁴ This occurs in three ways. First, events in the international political system are the result of organizational outputs.³⁵ Second, organizational capabilities form the range of effective choice open to decision-makers.³⁶

³² Wilson, 61-63.

³³ See Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Research Programs," *International Studies Quarterly* 32(1988) : 379 - 382. See also Morton Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1974), 28.

³⁴ Allison and Zelikow, 164.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

Third, organizational outputs form the information upon which leaders must make decisions.³⁷ As responsibilities are divided between organizations, some mechanism must address the complex issues that overlap organizational areas of responsibility. In the United States, this is done by assigning a particular organization primary responsibility or "the lead" for a given issue.³⁸

Government organizations also share several characteristics which affect the decision-making process.³⁹ First, these organizations tend to be risk adverse. They seek to avoid decreases in budget lines, reduction in human resources, loss of assigned areas of responsibilities and missions, and inferiority to potential organizational opponents. Second, they tend to solve problems in a sequential fashion, in that the sub-units dealing with the issue will "deal with it in terms of targets and constraints they take to be most important. When the next problem comes along another cluster of subunits deals with it, focusing on a different set of targets and constraints."⁴⁰ Third, organizations could not efficiently function without the establishment of SOPs. But, SOPs do not change easily or adapt readily to new demands, thus limiting their flexibility. Associated with SOPs are "programs" and "repertoires." An organizational repertoire consists of a number of programs. The number of programs is limited as is the number of repertoires. "The more complex the action and the greater the number of people involved, the more important are programs and repertoires as determinants of organizational behavior."⁴¹

³⁷ Ibid., 164 - 165.

³⁸ Allison and Zelikow, 166. Within government circles such an organization would be known as the "lead."

³⁹ Discussed in Allison and Zelikow, 169 -171.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

To a government organization, uncertainty is equated with risk.⁴² As these organizations are risk adverse they are also adverse to uncertainty and will seek to avoid it. Organizations work to create and maintain environments that are stable and predictable. When such an environment cannot be structured in advance, a set of standard scenarios will be established. These scenarios form pre-programmed responses that the organization can execute when faced with uncertainty.

While government organizations are normally slow to change, change is most likely to occur under three sets of conditions. The first is during times of budgetary richness and high levels of resources. The second is during times budgetary austerity and cutbacks. The third is in the face or wake of significant organizational failures. In the first case, there are enough funds to add new capabilities without posing a threat to the organization. In the second case, a lack of resources will force change as the organization will no longer be able to afford a business as usual approach and in the third, the uncertainties of change are seen as preferable to the certainty of organizational collapse.

Large government organizations resist and at times defy the efforts of leaders to change the way these organizations act and interact. This is not a new observation. This complaint has been voiced as far back as during the Administration of Franklin Roosevelt and as recently as 31 July 2001.⁴³ This is not to imply that government leaders are

⁴² For the purposes of this study, uncertainty may be defined as not knowing the objective probabilities for an outcome or condition. Risk is defined as knowing the objective probabilities for an outcome or condition. The author would like to thank Dr. William Martel of the Naval War College for clarifying this point.

⁴³ Sidney Hyman, ed., *Beckoning Frontiers: Public and Personal Recollection*, (New York: Knopf, 1951), 336 and Thom Shankar, "Pentagon Leaders Debate Readiness and Risk for a Report to Congress," *The New York Times*, 31 July 2001, A1.

powerless to affect the behavior of these organizations, but that to do so successfully, the routines and attributes of the organizations must be understood and taken advantage of.⁴⁴

Strengths

When faced with apparently inexplicable outcomes, applying the Rational Actor model may result in the conclusion that the decision-makers were prey to either confusion or conspiracy.⁴⁵ The Organizational model provides additional clarity and often reveals that neither confusion nor conspiracy was to blame, but rather the operation of different SOPs, repertoires and routines. Nor are Allison and Zelikow the only ones to tout the efficacy of this model. David Welch argues that "the existing repertoire of organizational routines *can* restrict the range of available options prior to a decision in special circumstances: namely when complex operations are involved and time is short."⁴⁶ Welch also agrees that organizations do at times blindly follow routines, resulting in outcomes that national leaders would not have chosen. He calls this fact "undeniable."⁴⁷

As noted, many practitioners have complained about the resistance of government organizations to change. Francis Rourke has dubbed this phenomenon "the law of bureaucratic inertia."⁴⁸ He further notes that the resistance of these organizations may have the positive benefit of keeping a president or senior decision-maker from over-hasty and premature decisions. Alexander George has offered a refinement to this "law". George argues that governmental organizations are likely to come to agreements between

⁴⁴ Allison and Zelikow, 174 - 175.

⁴⁵ Allison and Zelikow, 175.

⁴⁶ Welch, 124. (*Italics in original.*)

⁴⁷ Welch, 127.

⁴⁸ Francis E. Rourke, *Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1972) 62 - 65.

each other and present decision-makers only with alternatives that meet the approval of the organizations, rather than those that might carry maximum value for national security.⁴⁹

Numerous case studies have highlighted how the flow of information to the chief executive has shaped the decision process. The timing of information, how it is packaged, and which data are included and excluded all combine to aid in shaping the decision. Each of these factors may be heavily influenced or controlled by one or more governmental organizations. Some of the better known examples include the failure of the Soviets to initially camouflage their nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba, intelligence relating to Arab intentions presented to the Meir "kitchen cabinet" on the eve of the 1973 Arab-Israeli-War, and the decision to launch the space shuttle Challenger in 1986.⁵⁰ In short, case studies have identified that, in accordance with the precepts of the Organizational model, bureaucracies do shape national security decisions. Thus, proponents of the Organizational model argue that failure to include the role and impact of this model results in an understanding of the decision making process that is less than complete at best, or badly flawed at worst.

Weaknesses

David Welch has presented perhaps the strongest criticism of the Organizational model.⁵¹ Welch notes that while this model may explain deviations from ideal rationality in the formulation of options and in the implementation of decision, it "has nothing to say

⁴⁹ Alexander George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, LXVI (September 1972), 751 - 785.

⁵⁰ Allison and Zelikow, 211 - 214, Avi Shalim, and Diane Vaughan, *The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996) 400 - 401.

⁵¹ Another well known critique of Allison's earlier work was produced by Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H. Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Models," *American Political Science Review*, 86 (June, 1992), 301 - 322. As this critique addressed only the first edition of *Essence of Decision*, it is not dealt with in depth here.

about the decisions themselves."⁵² Thus, the Organizational model of decision-making supplements rather than replaces other approaches that more directly focus on decisions.

Welch also criticizes Allison and Zelikow for downplaying national leaders' ability to modify, halt, or initiate new organizational routines and SOPs. His examples of such actions include the speed with which the United States Army Air Corps put together the Doolittle raid in April of 1942, the ability of the President of the United States to countermand a preauthorized counterstrike against a surface to air missile site which shot down a U.S. U-2 aircraft, and Robert Kennedy canceling planned *Operation Mongoose* missions in Cuba once he learned of them.⁵³

A third criticism leveled specifically at Allison and Zelikow's analysis of the Organizational model in the Cuban Missile crisis was that the examples cited are wrong for one of three reasons: either they are "straw men," created to be easily refuted, or there are other equally plausible or preferable explanations, or the examples are based on factual errors.⁵⁴ It is now appropriate to examine a third approach to decision-making.

The Governmental Politics Model⁵⁵

While acknowledging that governments are not unitary, this model additionally takes note of the fact that individuals sit at the apex of the various organizations and agencies that make up the United States national security system. These individuals are

⁵² Welch, 117.

⁵³ Welch, 124 - 125.

⁵⁴ Welch, 134. An extensive table of these examples are provided on pages 143 -146. It is beyond the scope of this study to deal with each of these examples, but the author believes Welch may be guilty of setting up his own straw men and of downplaying the role of the Organizational model. For example, the Doolittle raid could not be mounted until significant time and training has taken place, producing, in effect new operational routines and SOPs that supported this mission. Welch fails to take into account that, in the wake of Pearl Harbor the U.S. Army and Navy had experienced just the type of failure that Allison and Zelikow argue *is* conducive to change, as was the suddenly increased fiscal resources available to the American military machine and the accelerated pace of change that is frequently found in a crisis. The author would argue that, at best, Welch has succeeded in introducing alternative explanations, but that is a far cry from proving that these alternatives are more plausible than those of Allison and Zelikow.

⁵⁵ In the original "Essence of Decision," this was referred to as the "Bureaucratic Politics Model."

not automatons, and while their organizations' biases, norms, and values may have influenced their perceptions, they are not slaves to those influences. These powerful men and women are the actors in this model who engage in a series of bargaining games and national security decisions that represent the outcome of those games.⁵⁶

These actors come to the table representing multiple interests. Each may define the national interest in a different manner, each represents a large organization and each, to a greater or lesser extent is personally invested in the decision. The eventual decision or choice is not truly an analytical attempt to maximize national security. Rather, it is an outcome of the interaction between the actors.

It is important to note that while the actors could be motivated by venal concerns and desires to aggrandize themselves, such as increasing their personal wealth or power, other reasons are more likely explanations for the struggle over decisions at this level of government. To begin with, the issues addressed by these senior advisors (heads of military services, cabinet departments, executive agencies and so on) are complex. Disagreement over stakes, costs, risks and outcomes are more likely to be based on differing but equally sincere beliefs associated with the issue. The actors' personal beliefs, values, and the role as a representative of large organization may all lead to different courses of actions being preferred. These individuals also realize that the stakes are often high and that, as a result of the decision, U.S lives, prestige, and interest as well as the lives of other nationalities, regional stability are at stake. To be blunt, they take their responsibilities seriously. The give and take by which a decision is reached is a political process. Actors form coalitions among themselves; they indulge in power plays

⁵⁶ The discussion of the Government Politics model which follows is taken from Allison and Zelikow, 255 - 257.

and various other attempts to overcome their opposition, and frequently work out compromise solutions.

To further complicate matters this model recognizes that national security decision-making is not a series of sequentially determined discrete issues. Rather "hundreds of issues compete for players' attention each day." Government decisions and actions are thus seen as "collages." A decision collage is made up of such things as "authorizing action by a department, to make a speech or refrain from acquiring certain information, the results of minor games such as the wording of a cable or decisions from lower level players." Also included are decisions, actions, and speeches bargained out among central players as well as "foul-ups." It is a "messy" process. Allison claims that it is nowhere else that the gap between participants and academics is widest. Many practitioners would and do agree.

One of the more controversial aspects of this model is the relegation of the president to the status of just another actor. Much of the insights contained in this model can be traced to the writings of Richard E. Neustadt, former member of the Kennedy transition team, the subsequent Johnson Administration as well as the Clinton Administration.⁵⁷ Several characteristics of the model envisioned by Neustadt include: 1) Power (effective influence over outcomes) is shared;⁵⁸ and 2) Decisions cannot be dictated. Even the president must persuade his advisors to do what he wants;⁵⁹ and 3) The game of persuasion is not played at random. Certain processes structure the play.

⁵⁷ Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan*, 5th ed., (New York: Free Press, 1990), 25 - 29.

⁵⁸ Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, 5.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

(Processes are regularized channels for bringing issues to the point of choice;)⁶⁰ 4) Power equals impact on outcome. The measure of a President is his (or her) ability to impact an outcome.⁶¹ There may be an international component to these games, and when such involvement occurs, this model provides the analysis needed to explain the resulting policy.⁶²

Thus, the following aspects of the Governmental Model emerge. Governmental action is the result of political bargaining. Actors, who are usually the most senior and closest advisors to the President and the President himself, conduct the bargaining. The eventual decision emerges through compromise, conflict and confusion, which make up the political bargaining process.⁶³ It may not be an outcome that any of the actors had especially desired.

The actors' perceptions, preferences, and stands are shaped by a variety of factors. These include: parochial priorities and perceptions; goals and interests; stakes and stands in a given issue or group of issues; deadlines and the "face" or aspect of an issue that is most important to the particular actor.⁶⁴ The relative weighting of these factors will change from issue to issue. The ability of any given actor to influence the decision outcome is dependent on how much bargaining advantage the actor has over other actors, the will to use this bargaining advantage, and the skill at which the advantage can be applied. Bargaining advantage is obtained through formal authority and responsibility, actual control over needed resources, expert knowledge and/or control over required

⁶⁰ Testimony, Richard E. Neustadt, before the Senate Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, *Conduct of National Security Policy*, 89th Congress, 1st session, 29 June 1965, 126. Cited in Allison and Zelikow,

⁶¹ Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, 154 - 155. Cited in Allison and Zelikow, 260.

⁶² Neustadt testimony, 126. Cited in Allison and Zelikow, 260

⁶³ Allison and Zelikow, 295.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 296 - 300.

information, the ability to affect players' objectives in other games, personal persuasiveness and connectivity, and the ability to persuade other players with bargaining advantage.⁶⁵ However, since there will always be another game, actors are unlikely to engage in bridge-burning or especially brutal infighting, because they might permanently alienate a future ally.⁶⁶

Having established the nature and identity of the actors, it is now necessary to identify how the game is played. To begin with it is important to note that bargaining games have structure. At the level of national security decisions much of this structure is provided by what Allison and Zelikow refer to as "action-channels." An action-channel is "a regularized means for taking government action on a specific kind of issue. These are often formal processes. The activation of action-channels pre-selects the majority of the actors, determines their points of entrance into the game, and distributes particular advantages and disadvantages for each game. Most important, according to Allison and Zelikow, the channels determine which of the actors will have "action," or the "lead" on the action.⁶⁷

The bargaining game has rules. Some are found in documents such as the constitution, executive orders, and so on. These have the effect of declaring some actions out of bounds. Other rules are likely to be less concrete. They represent custom, conventions, even the culture of the group. The result of the existence of the rules is to set boundaries on acceptable behavior.⁶⁸ Actors violate these boundaries at their own risk. Once the game is underway, the actors are plunged into the political maelstrom as

⁶⁵ Ibid., 300.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 310.

⁶⁷ Allison and Zelikow, 300 - 301. Note how the activation of the action-channel could be the result of organizational SOP.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 302.

powerful individuals try to push and pull others into supporting their positions. As there is always another game looming on the horizon, records of "wins" and "losses" are important. So too are rivalries - some of which may be based of personality clashes, while others come from deep rooted disagreements about what is needed to advance national security. Even when the decision is made, the game is not over. Actors can simply refuse to carry out the tasks associated with the decision. Decisions can sometimes be reversed. In any event, decisions must be implemented. The implementation phase also gives actors chances to impose their own preferences on he the decision outcome.

Strengths

Perhaps the greatest strength of this model is the strong evidence of its existence and role in decision-making found in the memoirs and accounts of the men and women who were senior presidential advisors and cabinet leaders. Such actors as Colin Powell, Roger Hillsman, Hamilton Jordan and George Stephanopoulos have each given vivid accounts of what is essentially the Government Politics model in action.⁶⁹ While these accounts, of course, must be viewed with skwpticism, actual recordings of the Excom during the Cuban Missile crisis lend further credibility to the existence, role and accuracy of the Government Politics model.⁷⁰

Another strength of the Government Politics model is sometimes depicted as a weakness. Allison and Zelikow postulate that: "where you stand depends upon where

⁶⁹ Roger Hilsman, *To Move A Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1967), 159 - 213.

⁷⁰ Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside The White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis*. (Cambridge, MA and London: the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997).

you sit."⁷¹ Taken to the extreme this might imply that the Government Politics actor was merely an extension of a represented organization, espousing organization values, and norms. If so, this would seem to imply that the Government Politics model was nothing more than a facet of the Organizational model. Yet, Allison makes it clear that an actor's stand is not *always* determined by where he or she sits, only that this is one potential force impacting these individuals and that it may be stronger in some situations than others.⁷² Thus, the Government Politics model is robust and flexible enough to account for an environment that is highly dynamic.

Weakness

Again, the most recent critic of Allison and Zelikow's work is David Welch, who makes several points about the Government Politics model. The first is that it is unlikely that a deep enough understanding of other states national security decision-making processes to be able to successfully predict those states' decision using this model.⁷³ While this observation could be debated, it is not applicable to this particular study that is concerned only with U.S. decision making. Welch, citing the work of Roger Hillsman, Jiri Valenta, and Karen Dawisha, also concludes that it is impossible to make out any meaningful bureaucratic pattern in the distribution of preferences among government politics actors.⁷⁴ In part this may be due to the fact that the cases studied were not those that would be most likely to produce the sought after relationships. More likely the cases to do so would involve structural issues such as budget and procurement issues.⁷⁵ Welch also offers the observation that some cabinet leaders have enjoyed tremendous influence

⁷¹ Allison and Zelikow, 307.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Welch, 129.

⁷⁴ Welch, 130.

⁷⁵ Allison and Zelikow, 307.

while others have not. He cites Henry Kissinger's observation that presidents listen to people who views they think they need, not because that person has a particular job.⁷⁶ This is a potent argument and yet, is not enough to cast off the Government Politics model. Remember, the model does not say that all actors will be equally influential all the time, and that position is but one component of an actor's clout, power, and influence.

While Welch may not have proven that the Government Politics model never works, he does a good job in showing that, at least sometimes, it does not explain how national security decisions are made. The President is not merely another actor. He is the senior decision maker and has the final say. Welch points out that in the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy successfully retained decision-making authority. Thus, the only persuasion that was required was that of the president.⁷⁷ The power of the president makes for a convincing argument. The power of the president to retain decision-making authority and to make the decision brings us to the fourth mode - that of Human Factors.

Human Factors Model

The Human Factors model is overwhelmingly based on John Steinbruner's cybernetic model of decision-making. Steinbruner, who possessed a strong background in psychology, was not impressed with the explanatory power of the Rational Actor model. Among the events he felt the model failed to explain were the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the British refusal to negotiate peace terms with Germany in 1940, and the Egyptian mobilization of its Army in 1967.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Henry A Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979) 31; cited in Welch, 132.

⁷⁷ Welch, 133.

⁷⁸ John Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), xi, 47.

At the heart of the cybernetic paradigm is the observation that decisions are made, in the final accounting, by individuals. As Steinbruner puts it, "the human brain is the ultimate locus of decision making."⁷⁹ The basic assumption is that all human beings possess limited cognitive capacity and must necessarily simplify complex problems. These individuals, indeed all humans, learn to perform highly complex, decision-intensive functions through adaptation. Functions such as driving a car in traffic, playing match tennis, or flying a fighter plane in combat require decisions be made at such speed as to negate any possibility that the rational decision paradigm is at work.⁸⁰ However, the large amounts of complexity and uncertainty inherent at the level of national security decision making requires a "proliferation of decision makers."⁸¹ The result is something very similar to the Organizational model.⁸²

Steinbruner notes that while theoretical complexity - such as normally encountered at this level of decision-making - should breed indecisiveness, that is not what is observed. Presidents do make decisions under conditions of uncertainty and complexity.⁸³ In short, they make decisions as all humans do. They simplify problems,⁸⁴ they strive for consistency among beliefs, expectations and perceptions;⁸⁵ and they develop a relatively stable structure of belief.⁸⁶ These structures, in turn influence how decision-makers define a problem. Very often, the way a problem is defined will affect the eventual decision, especially if the decision triggers an associated action or set of

⁷⁹ Ibid, 91.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 49 - 53.

⁸¹ Ibid., 69 - 70.

⁸² Steinbruner, Chapter 3.

⁸³ Ibid., 88 - 89.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 95 - 96.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 101- 103. See also, John R. Anderson, *Cognitive Psychology and Its Implications* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1980), especially Chapters 1, 4, 6, 8, 11.

⁸⁶ Steinbruner, 97 - 100. See also Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperceptions," *World Politics* Vol. 20, No. 3 (April, 1986), 420.

actions.⁸⁷ When faced with a complex problem, the decision-maker may simply reduce the problem into a set of simplified definitions.⁸⁸ A decision-maker's individual skills, convictions, and preferences also affect the willingness to absorb and weigh information about various courses of actions and associated consequences.⁸⁹

These tendencies on the part of decision makers tend to lead to ignoring key information that does not fit pre-conceived mental notions, or the filling in of information gaps with existing assumptions.⁹⁰ The result is that a variety of mental traps await decision makers. These include, but are not limited to giving more mental weight to the first set of data received, having a strong bias to perpetuating the status quo, justifying past choices, seeking only evidence which confirms existing assumptions, overconfidence concerning the accuracy of analysis, and a tendency to being overcautious.⁹¹

As the cybernetic model of decision-making is aimed at the individual making the decision, it is appropriate to expand the model to include information relevant to the other factors affecting the decision maker. It is this addition that has prompted the author to label this fourth approach "human factors." These new factors include stress, emotion, and physical condition. The tendency of the human mind to satisfice and simplify is increased when accompanied by strong emotions, fatigue, or stress. Emotions trigger chemical changes in the body that are generated in the same area of the brain that handle

⁸⁷ Steinbruner, 125 - 126. See also Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 217.

⁸⁸ Taylor Cox Jr. *Cultural Diversity in Organizations* (San Francisco: Barret-Kohler Publisher, Inc. 1998), 88. Steinbruner also applies his cybernetic model to organizational behavior. The triggering of organizational routines based on definitions is titled "grooved thinking." Steinbruner, 126.

⁸⁹ Steinbruner, 119. See also Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack* (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1982), 126.

⁹⁰ John S. Hammond, Ralph L. Keeney and Howard Raffia, "The Hidden Traps in Decision Making," *Harvard Business Review*, (September - October 1998), 47.

⁹¹ Hammond et al, 47 - 56.

reasoning and decision-making.⁹² As a result, strong emotions may physically interfere with normal cognitive processing.

Stress is also frequently encountered during the decision-making process. Among the potential affects of stress is the increasing acceptance of pre-existing perceptions, and an increase in satisficing decisions. Among a group of advisors, stress can lead to bickering and emotional outbursts, if the group is inexperienced in dealing with stressful situations and in working with each other.⁹³ The role of stress in the decision-making process needs to be included in an analysis, especially if, as some have stated, stress may degrade decision-making capabilities.

Strengths

According to Steinbrunner, this model offers a convincing alternative to that of the Rational Actor model to explain many decisions that would otherwise be considered.⁹⁴ Steinbruner's findings are supported by other scholars including, Zeev Maoz and Robert Coulam.⁹⁵ This approach recognizes that decision-makers are not calculating machines, but human beings. To ignore the mechanics of thought and the realities of stress, fatigue, and emotion is to ensure that some decisions will not be accurately analyzed. This approach not only captures these elements, but also on the role

⁹² Sandra Blakeslee, "Tracing the Brain's Pathways for Linking Emotion and Reason," *The New York Times* 6 December 1994, C1.

⁹³ This information is supported by data provided by the "Tactical Decision Making Under Stress (TADMUS) investigations carried out by ALPHATECH, INC. on behalf of the Naval Air Warfare Center.

⁹⁴ Steinbruner, 369.

⁹⁵ Zeev Maoz, *National Choices and International Processes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 330 - 336; Robert Coulam, *The Illusion of Choice: The F-111 and the Problem of Weapons Acquisition Reform* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 132 - 166.

of images which decision makers have formed, which may become crucial in the decision-making process.⁹⁶

Weakness

According to Steinbruner, the Cybernetic paradigm operates as a substitute for Rational Actor model.⁹⁷ However, he also admits that the two may be somehow connected, because the analytical process might be built upon more primitive cognitive operations.⁹⁸

The Human Factors model is not parsimonious. To be effective, a great deal of information about the decision-maker must be obtained. Although much data is available in the form of other people's perceptions, writings, speeches and memoirs, its reliability can be challenged. Furthermore, David Welch's concerns with the Government Politics model also partially apply to this model. Given the vast differences in culture and experience among other factors, is it reasonable to expect to understand the unique individual make-ups of world decision leaders - especially those of other, radically different cultures? It is also worth noting, that despite the infusion of some cognitive elements into the discipline of economics and related fields, "the rational actor-maximizing model still dominates ..."⁹⁹

Integrative Approaches to Decision-Making

As has been pointed out, these approaches to understanding decision-making have had both significant strengths and weaknesses.

⁹⁶ Richard K. Herrman and Michael P. Fischerkeller, "Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive-Strategic Research After the Cold War," *International Organization*, 49 (3) (Summer 1995) 421.

⁹⁷ Steinbruner., 329.

⁹⁸ Ibid. Unfortunately Steinbruner does not pursue this insight further.

⁹⁹ Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz, eds. *Decision-Making on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate* (Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1997) 3.

This study argues that similar integration is needed for the study of decision-making. This point was raised by Alex Mintz, who has written that decision makers use a mix of approaches to make a decision.¹⁰⁰ In fact, a good number of political scientists have suggested ways in which theories may be compatible or combined. For example Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing suggest that the concept of bounded rationality and maximizing are "not as incompatible as they seem to be."¹⁰¹ They offer the simple approach that "one can take one theory as basic and the other as supplemental."¹⁰² In this instance, either theory could be considered as basic.¹⁰³ Snyder and Diesing then go on to add that the "Bureaucratic Politics theory plainly supplements rather than competes with utility-maximizing and bounded rationality theories."¹⁰⁴ It is also important to note that Snyder and Diesing saw two "components" in the Bureaucratic Politics theory. One component - a non-rational component - looks at how an individual's consciousness could be adapted to an official role. These ways include: selective recruitment, role socialization, learning by experience, and the rational need to develop common value and cognitive orientation with colleagues.¹⁰⁵ Much of this theory clearly has elements in common with the fourth approach this study has identified, that of human factors. Although Steinbruner proposed his model as substitute for the Rational Actor model, it may be possible that it may act as a supplement to other decision-making approaches.

¹⁰⁰ Geva and Mintz, 5.

¹⁰¹ Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and Systems Structure in International Crisis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 345.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 345 -346.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 345 - 358.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 355.

¹⁰⁵ Snyder and Diesing, 352.

Graham Allison, after serving as senior member of the first Clinton Administration, admitted that the practice of decision-making seemed to be more of a combination of theoretical models than his first book on the subject would suggest.¹⁰⁶ He further offered that the most complete understanding of a particular decision would be through the integrated application of all the models discussed in his book¹⁰⁷

Integrated Approach Used in the Study

In order to more fully understand the process, this study will apply an integrated approach to decision-making utilizing all of the four main approaches described above. Following the path indicated by Snyder and Diesing, it will begin with the assumption that the Rational Actor model represents a process that most decision makers would wish to be used. However, given the assumption that this process is supplemented and affected by the other approaches, the question becomes how to capture these interactions or influences and what would be some of the characteristics of such a layered, or integrated approach.

As a starting point, it is assumed that there would always be a decision-maker. That is to say, in the decision-making process there is an individual who, at some point, approves or rejects a particular course of action. This approval or rejection may be made in a perfunctory manner or after intense study and debate. The decision-maker may care deeply about the issue involved or may not consider the subject to be at all important. Nevertheless, someone will make a decision.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Graham Allison, Harvard University, Boston, MA 18 February, 1999.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. In Allison's opinion, the result would be something akin to a hologram, a three-dimensional image that is formed by projecting 2-dimensional images from multiple cameras. Just as a single camera can provide the viewer with a useful depiction of the subject, so too can utilizing one approach to decision-making. And, just as the image achieves greater realism with the addition of more cameras so too does decision-making become more explicable through the application of multiple approaches.

It is also assumed that more than the forces which only one model or process of decision-making try to account for are likely to be active at any one time.¹⁰⁸ Decisions that may be explained completely through the application of only one model and by no other models will be rare. Furthermore, it is quite possible that the forces examined by each approach to decision-making could propel a decision-maker to the same conclusion. When multiple models produce an identical decision, it is believed that the decision will be easy to reach and difficult to reverse or change. Conversely, if the models are working at cross-purposes, it is assumed that a decision will be hard to reach and easier to change or reverse. Although this study's proposition that multiple models of decision-making are at work simultaneously goes beyond many efforts at integration, some scholars of decision-making have endorsed its theoretical underpinnings.¹⁰⁹ Graham Allison's comments comparing this approach to a holographic image are a case in point. Also, when advised of this study, Dr. Margaret Herman stated that she and a colleague were conducting research in a similar venue and that the time had come to seriously approach integration of existing theories of decision-making.¹¹⁰

Therefore, by comparing the ability of these different approaches to analyze post-Cold War national security decisions, it should be possible to determine what approach provides the most accurate depiction of the decision-making process. It should also be

¹⁰⁸ The very term "Model" may be misleading. It is used in this study in order to confirm to much of the existing decision-making literature. A more appropriate term might be "process."

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Dr. Margaret Herman, via telephone, Newport, RI, 17 February 1999. Interview with Dr. Graham Allison, 18 February 1999.

¹¹⁰ Interview with Dr, Margret Herman, 17 February 1999.

possible to determine if a particular process appears to be dominant across the cases or at a common time as the cases evolve.¹¹¹

The Integrated Model


Figure 1-1 builds on the work of David Easton and depicts an integrated model of decision-making.¹¹² Unlike Easton's model, a feedback loop has been added as well as a visual representation of the four decision-making processes. The model is obviously U.S.-centric and oriented toward decisions made at the presidential level, but with minor modifications the model can be used for any decision-making entity.

¹¹¹ One potential drawback to this method is that two separate analysts might reach differing conclusions as to which model was dominant in any given decision. This would most likely occur when two or more models are seen as having nearly equal importance in the decision-making process.

¹¹² Easton, 112. A similar model is also used at the United States Naval War College. It should be noted, however, that the war college model was not used in an effort to integrate various models of decision-making. Rather it was used to facilitate the unitary application of discrete decision-making models.

Figure 1-1

INTEGRATED MODEL



Cite: United States Naval War College; modified by the author

The model is divided into three major components: The International political system (IPS), the Domestic political system (DPS) and the National security system (NSS). Each of these systems provides inputs to, and receives inputs from, the other systems. Although the line diagram used to denote these systems might imply impermeability, actors can often belong to more than one system. For example, the U.S Secretary of State can be an actor in both the domestic and international political systems.

The International political system is composed of all states, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental actors with cross border activities or membership. The last category is extremely diverse, encompassing everything from armed resistance groups to religious organizations; from the international media to multi-national corporations. The state is given primacy of place in this system because, although other actors exist within and exercise influence upon the IPS, the state remains this system's most powerful actor. The inputs to the decision-making process from the IPS cover a vast spectrum of discrete actions, but generally fall within the broad categories listed. The term "international rules" refer to international laws, customs, and agreements that are taken into account when reaching a decision. Examples could include restrictions on violating another state's territorial integrity, the need to follow specific treaty provisions, and prohibitions on a variety of military actions.

The domestic political system is likely to be no less complex than the IPS. Especially in a participatory democracy, when public opinion and core societal values

may form significant inputs to members of the national security system.¹¹³ Interest groups form another rich source of inputs as does the legislative and, to a lesser degree, the judicial branches of the government. The news media is represented as a domestic actor as well as an international one, since most countries still have a relatively identifiable and distinct national press and media. Some of the key inputs to the decision-makers from the DPS include resources (e.g., financial and political support), missions and requirements, as well as restraints on the activities of organizations belonging to the national security system. Other inputs include information and intelligence from sources as disparate lobbyists or congressional staff members returning from a fact-finding mission.

For this study, the national security system (NSS) lies at the heart of the decision-making process. It is here where the models of decision-making are active. Broadly speaking, membership in the NSS is comprised of the individuals and organizations that work for the decision-maker. For example, in the case of the Haitian intervention, the NSS would consist of the entire executive branch of the U.S. government. However, this is not to imply that every member of the NSS participates in the decision-making process. Nor do members and organizations that are involved play an equal role. The following are among the central tasks of the NSS:

- Obtaining resources from the International and domestic political systems.
- Once obtained, allocating those resources.

¹¹³ William C. Adams, "Opinion and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Service Journal*, Vol.6, No.5, May 1984. Adams identifies seven major consistent values that shape U.S. public opinion. These values are: a belief in universal human decency, hope in communication, a belief in human rights, an opposition to foreign combat, a belief in an unoffensive (sic) defense, economic self-interest and a desire for strong executive leadership. Adams does not deny that these values can work at cross-purposes, nor that some might appear incongruous in light of U.S. history.

- Planning and deciding U.S. national policy.
- Organizing and directing agents to implement those policies.
- Motivating, evaluating, modifying and changing both agents and policies as implementation occurs and feedback is processed.¹¹⁴

The outputs of the NSS are decisions, which, in turn, are translated into actions. Sometimes the decision and the subsequent action are to "do nothing." These outputs then directly and indirectly influence all three systems of the model. Thus, the model incorporates a feedback loop and can be used as a tool to analyze a series of decisions, rather than producing one decision-making "snapshot."

Before discussing how the decision-making process can be analyzed it is necessary to briefly touch on the role of situational factors and informational uncertainty in the model. These aspects of the decision-making process affect every portion of the model. Failure to take them into account increases dramatically the possibility of flawed analysis.

Situational factors are elements that contribute to the unique nature of each decision. At the level of the IPS such factors could include the polarity of the IPS, whether or not a particular actor possessed weapons of mass destruction, a global dependency on oil, geographical or climatic conditions and so on. At the domestic level, an impending national election, the current state of the national economy, the time elapsed since the last major conflict, and the degree to which populations in the state possess a shared, cross-border identity, are all examples of situational factors. Within the

¹¹⁴ Allan Ricketts and Richard Norton, *National Security, Volume 1: Case Studies in Policy Making and Implementation*, (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1994), 5.

NSS situational factors might include the availability and competence of certain military units, the age of the participants in the decision-making process, and the amount of time available to the decision-makers to select a course of action.

Informational uncertainty also occurs at every point of the model. Decision-makers rarely, if ever, have all the information which they could want. Even when inputs to the decision-making process are clearly perceived, as would be the case for a documented movement of foreign troops to a contested international border, the rationale behind these inputs may be unclear. Are the troops in the example there as merely a show of force, or are they moving into pre-invasion jump-off points? On the domestic level, outcomes of votes taken in Congress are often laced with uncertainty as is the predicted duration and strength of public support for a given course of action, or the manner with which the media will handle a given story. Nor are inputs the sole domain of uncertainty. Outputs are fraught with uncertainty. Among the most powerful uncertainties is often the inability to fully answer the question, "will this decision solve or improve the problem?"¹¹⁵

As noted earlier, the failure to identify crucial situational factors and important uncertainties can result in ineffective and flawed analysis. In some cases situational factors and uncertainties can assume enormous importance. Furthermore, at times a combination of situational factors, such as an impending presidential election and a severe downturn in the economy, can have a positive or negative synergistic effect on the decision-making process.

Applying the Integrated Model

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 7.

The integrated framework can be used to map the components of each of the main models and then look for evidence. The Rational Actor model serves as the logical first point of analysis. As discussed, this model still holds pride of place among most explanations of the decision-making process and is the ideal aspired to by decision-makers. Examining this model first is especially warranted if the National Security Council was involved in the decision-making process. A major component of the National Security Council's mission is to collate and evaluate, in terms of strengths and weaknesses, alternate policy proposals and decisions.¹¹⁶ It is true that different Presidents, or their Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, commonly referred to as the National Security Advisor (NSA), have shaped the NSC in accordance with their own preferences. However, the mechanisms that generate multiple alternatives and the subsequent cost-benefit analysis of those alternatives are crucial to the NSC process.

Given the size of the U.S. national security decision making system, identifying the components of the Organizational model is often a highly complex task. At a minimum it is necessary to note which organizations were involved in gathering data, organizing information, generating decision options, and contributing to the decision-making process. Part of this examination must include an understanding of the manner in which the organization packaged and transmitted the data, as well as an appreciation for

¹¹⁶ Joseph G. Bock and Duncan L. Clarke, "The National Security Assistant and the White House Staff: National Security Policy Decision Making and Domestic Political Considerations, *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 16(1986) 258 - 279. See also Alexander George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981), Chapter 3, Peter W. Rodman, "The NSC System: Why Its Here To Stay, *Foreign Service Journal*, February 1992, 25, and Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Structure, Function and the NSC Staff: An Officer's Guide to National Security Staff*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), 56.

the organization's culture and bias.¹¹⁷ As has been noted, it is rare that organizational inputs will "make" the decision, but they do tend to play a critical role in shaping the information that other models of decision-making act upon.

The next step is to consider the components of the Governmental Politics model in order to estimate their impact on the decision. In order to properly apply this model it is necessary to identify the individuals active in the decision-making process, as well as their "stakes and stands." Analysts must be particularly sensitive to the role of informal processes, which is frequently the method by which powerful members of the decision-making inner circle negotiate compromises, conduct power plays, and generally pull other key members to their desired point of view. An example of the importance of informal processes would include the evaluation of U.S. options vis a vis Iraq by George H.W. Bush, and Brent Scowcroft in the summer of 1990.¹¹⁸

The last set of information that is needed is that related to the Human Factors model.¹¹⁹ Having identified the actual decision-maker, it is important to ascertain, as far as possible, the role that personal human characteristics played in the decision-making process. To do this, one must understand, as much as possible, the values and belief system of the decision-maker. It is also important to take into account other "human factors," such as fatigue, stress, physical injuries and the presence of strong emotions.

Finally, when analyzing a series of decisions, it is necessary to examine how each decision impacted the IPS, DPS and NSS. As a result, new inputs from these systems can be identified and, in turn, examined to determine how they influence future decisions. As

¹¹⁷ Wilson, 92, Steinbruner, 124 - 132.

¹¹⁸ Steinbruner., 274 - 275, Ricketts and Norton, 234, 289-290.

¹¹⁹ This model draws heavily on the work of John Steinbruner, but also incorporates the work of Robert Jervis and others.

this analysis is being conducted, care must be taken to ensure that changes in situational factors and uncertainty are also noted and included.

What this integrated approach does is to facilitate identifying and evaluating the role and importance of each of the forces examined through the use of the four models. The factors critical to each model are included and processes such as feedback can be captured. In brief, this integrated approach offers analysts a method for obtaining a more complete picture of the decision-making process.

Strengths

The strengths of this approach center on its ability to more fully capture the various and complex array of actors and forces that may be simultaneously present in a given crisis. It provides a mechanism to examine the impact of feedback from earlier decisions. Because the integrated model examines more than one set of factors, it does not present a "snapshot" of the decision, but rather a three dimensional hologram - a far more revealing and therefore useful product. Furthermore, the model can be used to examine decision making over time. This enables analysts to capture multiple dimensions of decision-making and spot the presence of forces that are active at different times in a crisis. Finally, for the practitioner, the integrated approach will result in a better awareness of the forces surrounding the decision. Forearmed with this awareness, a practitioner should enjoy an improved ability to predict the impact of these various forces and to make better decisions.¹²⁰

¹²⁰ Initially the author was concerned that given the imprecise nature of the model, only a slight gain in predictive ability would result for those adept in its use. However, in an interview with Graham Allison on the subject, Allison noted that individuals who are thrown out of casinos for counting at Blackjack increase their odds of winning by less than two percent. But that is all that it takes to be perceived as a threat to the house. At times relatively small improvement have substantial effects.

Weaknesses

In many ways, the weaknesses of the approach are a mirror image of its strengths. The model is not parsimonious. It requires a significant level of understanding of the organizational influences on the decision-maker; the relationship among the decision maker's key advisers, as well as the individual foibles of the decision maker. The model does not make an argument for any one aspect of decision-making as being superior to others. It makes no judgment between the validity of the theories supporting the various models examined in this study. It does not lend itself to precise quantifiable measurements as much as it does subjective judgments.

A Return to the Research Questions, Main Hypotheses and Types of Evidence

Having now reviewed the models and relevant literature, it is appropriate to revisit the main research questions, set out the study's hypotheses and types of evidence that would support or undermine the hypotheses.

Question One: Does any one of the four models presented best explain the

Decision-making process described in the three cases?

Study hypothesis: No. The study asserts that no one model will be dominant in providing the best explanation for all three cases.

Type of Evidence that would support or undermine this conclusion:

The following paragraphs summarize the types of evidence or observable processes that would support the claim for dominance in the case of each individual model.

1. Rational Actor Model

If the decision-making process is dominated by forces explained by the Rational Actor model, several items should be observed. First, there should be a clear articulation of and universal agreement about the goals and objectives. Second, there should be an identification of multiple options or alternatives. Evidence that the National Security Council Staff is generating and evaluating these options through the formal national security process would suggest that a rational decision making process was at work. Third, evidence that some form of cost-benefit analysis should be present. In some cases, observed attempts to execute a series of options over time might be taken as evidence of both the generation of alternatives and the use of cost-benefit analysis. Fourth, the eventual decision should clearly be one in which national interests are advanced to the maximum extent or damaged to the minimum extent, preferably at the least possible cost required to achieve the desired goals and objectives.

Observations that would indicate that a rational decision making process was not dominant would include the following:

- A failure of the National Command Authority to articulate a well-defined set of goals and objectives for a given situation. Writings and statements from subordinate organizations and individuals would reveal confusion or conflict between the goals and objectives being pursued by other units of government.
- Failure to produce or consider a list of alternatives for dealing with the situation. Evidence of this failing could be seen in a rush to make a decision before alternatives could be developed, failing to consider alternatives, and failure to staff a decision issue through the formal NSC process.

- A decision that clearly did not advance the national interest, or one that did so at an excessive cost, when that fact should have been apparent to the decision maker. In some cases the choices available to the decision maker may literally range from bad to worse. When this occurs, rational choice may still dominate the decision-making process, but the decision will clearly seek to minimize damage to the national interest.

2. The Organizational Model

If the Organizational forces dominate the decision-making process, several aspects revealed by the Organizational model should be present.

First, there will be a variety of organizational actors involved. The organizations that have the most to lose or the most to gain will be the ones that are the most deeply involved. Second, each organization will view and approach the issue from the perspective of organizational survival, and there will be attempts to minimize risk to the organization. Organizations will attempt to protect resources, while equally strong efforts will be made to reduce uncertainty. Organizations would also be expected to take advantage of any opportunities that might present themselves in the course of the decision-making process, including gaining more resources, adding missions that the organization would view favorably, or shedding or transferring responsibilities that were viewed as risky or marginal. Third, the eventual outcome will be one that reflects the organization's willingness to satisfice - that is, the solution will be one that the involved organizations can live with, rather than one that most advances the national interest. Fourth, organizational procedures, SOPs, and routines will play heavily in selecting, filtering and forwarding data to the decision-making unit. After the decision is reached,

organizational procedures, SOPs and routines will be used to carry it out. In the process, the original intent of the decision may be substantially altered by the use of these procedures.

Evidence that the organizational process was not dominant in the decision-making process would include such items as:

- The decision maker and key advisors not belonging to, or having separated themselves from the organizations they represent. For example, although James Baker was the Secretary of State, he was not seen as an "organizational" man. Likewise, in the Cuban Missile Crisis, many of the most influential members of the Excom represented organizations with little involvement in resolving the crisis, or, as in the case of Dean Acheson, did not represent organizations at all.
- Extensive use of the NSC process. Through the imposition of a process that focused on advancing the national interest, vice those of a given organization, the chance of organizational biases dominating the decision-making process are substantially lessened.
- Instances in which senior leadership ignored or denied organizational desires and preferences.
- Decisions that were clearly "emotional" in character. This would be especially telling if the decision was made with such rapidity that organizational SOPs and routines had no time to generate data, produce recommendations, or, in short, to tilt the decision-making field in a favorable direction.

- Another sign that the organizational process was not dominant would be extensive debate and conflict among the decision-maker's key advisors. This would indicate these individuals were using their personal power and influence to steer the decision-making process to their desired outcomes, not necessarily an outcome desired by a particular organization.

3. The Government Politics Model

Among the more important signs that this process was dominant would be clearly seen attempts by key advisors to influence other advisors and the decision maker to adopt a preferred option. Other signs would include:

- The use of informal meetings and processes to arrive at a decision.
- Evidence of bargaining among key advisors
- Evidence of power groups, such as the "hawks and doves," of the Cuban Missile crisis, among key decision advisors.
- References to "track records" and "standing" among these advisors.
- Reliance by the decision-maker on advisors who, by their job description, would not normally be involved in the decision-making process.

Evidence that the Government Politics process was not dominant would obviously include indicators pointing to the dominance of other processes. Additionally, one might also see:

- Decisions made with little or no input from key advisors.
- A lack of informal meetings or other methods by which an advisor might attempt to sway the decision maker or the decision maker's key advisors.

- Evidence that the decision-maker did not value the input of advisors as a matter of routine or in a particular case.
- Evidence that a recommended course of action, based on an analysis of decision options, or organizational considerations was selected over the opposition of the majority of key advisors, especially if that majority contained the advisors who had traditionally held the most influence with the decision-maker.

4. The Human Factors Model

Evidence supporting the dominance of human factors in a decision-making situation would include the following items:

- A decision made in the "heat of the moment," with little or no time given to develop options, pre-planned responses or to allow advisors the chance to build coalitions and gain the support of their peers.
- A decision made when the decision-maker is clearly working under conditions of stress, fatigue, or physical impairment.
- A decision concerning a situation in which the decision-maker is personally connected, such as Senator Robert Dole's historical support for the Americans with Disabilities Act.
- A decision which ignored recommendations based on cost-benefits calculations, the advice of usually influential advisors and the preferences of subordinate organizations. President Reagan's decision to initiate a series of bold disarmament moves following his meeting with Premier Gorbachev at Reykjavik, Iceland provides one example of such a situation.

- A decision in which the decision maker admits to "trusting his or her gut," "following instincts," or similar saying.
- A decision in which the behavior of the decision maker indicates a clear departure from the norm.

Evidence pointing toward a lack of dominance of human factors would include:

- Extensive and deliberate cost-benefit analysis that clearly favors the eventual decision.
- The lack of personal connection or history to the issue.
- A period of deliberation long enough to allow any initial passions and emotions to dissipate.
- A decision that clearly goes against the personal preference of the decision-maker. This could result from key-advisors moving the President away from a desired decision, or such a decision being set aside due to organizational limitations that would make it impossible to carry out.

Question Two: Does an integrated approach toward U.S. national security decision-making offer a deeper understanding of the process?

Study hypothesis: Yes. The study asserts that the factors central to each of the four models are likely to be present in each of the cases and that their interactions will be significant in shaping the final decision.

Type of Evidence that would support or undermine this conclusion:

If any one model were shown to be dominant along the lines described above, then clearly this hypothesis is questionable. However, if the process tracing in each of the cases can demonstrate the importance and interaction of a variety of factors on the

decision-maker and the process, then this hypothesis can be supported.¹²¹ The most simple and compelling evidence to support this hypothesis would be a comparison of the understanding and utility gained through analysis of a decision using one model and an analysis based on an integrated approach. If the use of a single method of analysis consistently provides an equal or deeper level of understanding, then this hypothesis is false.

Supplemental Research Questions and Hypotheses:

Question 1): To what extent did the duration of the crisis affect the dominance of forces acting upon the decision-making process described by the various models?

Study Hypothesis: Some forces and factors require more time to impact the decision-making process than others. As crises grow in duration these forces will manifest themselves and may be examined through analysis.

Evidence: If this hypothesis is true, different forces and factors may be dominate the decision-making process at different times. It should be possible to detect a shift in the influence of these forces over the duration of a crisis. For example, the emotional content of the debate as to an appropriate course of action may diminish or escalate. More processing and evaluation may be dominated by organizational SOPs and routines. In crises of lengthy duration, new routines and SOPs might even be developed. There could be increased political bargaining among the decision-maker's key advisors or the formation of coalitions and alliances within the decision-maker's inner circle that come to dominate the decision-making process. Evidence refuting this hypothesis would include

¹²¹ Process tracing is methodology for identifying causal mechanisms and is highly useful in conducting empirical analyses. For a more complete description see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 85 - 87.

that which showed no shift in the domination of forces and factors over time, or which showed such shifts not to be time dependent.

Question 2): To what extent did success or failure of the decision-making and outcome of the preceding crisis affect the decision-making process under examination?

Study Hypothesis: Prior decisions and the perception of their success or failure will steer a decision maker to try to duplicate past success and avoid past failure.

Evidence: References to past outcomes by organizations, advisors or the decision-maker, or the use of analogies involving these operations that are intended to serve as policy guidelines, would be one type of evidence that this hypothesis was correct. However, should such analogies be invoked and ignored, that would provide evidence that this hypothesis is not valid.

Question 3): Which elements of the international political system had the most impact on the decision-making process?

Study Hypothesis: In the case, of the international political system, it will be possible to identify a limited number of key inputs that most affected the decision-making process.

Evidence: Inputs that had a clear impact on the decision making process should emerge through evidence. If, however, all or even most factors seemed to have equal importance on the decision-making process, this hypothesis would not seem to be accurate.

Question 4): Which elements of the domestic political system had the most impact on the decision-making process?

Study Hypothesis: In a fashion similar to the international political system, a limited number of inputs will have most affected the decision-making process.

Evidence: The same type of evidence that would support or the deny the role of key inputs for the international political system, but obviously coming from the doemstic political system, would support or deny this hypothesis.

Question 5): Given that these interventions were thought by many to be only tenuously linked to traditional notions of U.S. national interests, what common elements may be found in these three cases?

Study Hypothesis: While each crisis and decision-making event is unique, points in common may yet be found between these post-Cold War cases.

Evidence: Similar events, inputs, forces, factors, reactions and so on across the three cases would support the idea that there are elements in common. Clearly, if the cases emerge as completely unique events, this hypothesis would be revealed to be incorrect.

Answers to these questions should increase our understanding of decision-making in general and post-Cold War crisis decision-making in particular. More importantly, they will indicate whether the proposed integrated approach to analysis is a viable tool for scholars and practitioners. It is now appropriate to discuss the methodology that will be used in this study.

Methodology

This study will examine three post-Cold War crises where the central issue facing decision-makers was to either engage in or refrain from "humanitarian" intervention. The study will focus specifically on instances where such intervention might have required the use of U.S. military forces.

The three cases selected for this study -- Somalia in 1992, Haiti 1994, and Rwanda 1994 -- were chosen for several reasons. First, all of these cases occurred clearly after the Cold War was over, and in each case, humanitarian issues were portrayed as dominant.¹²² However, the actual circumstances of these cases varied significantly. The cases involved more than one administration of different political parties. In several of the cases, notably the Haitian and Rwandan crises, the initial decisions were not to intervene with U.S. ground units. These decisions were later reversed. In the Haiti and Somalia cases sufficient time existed for involved organizations to change routines and procedures. Each case involved discussions at the most senior levels of U.S. decision-makers. Each case received at least a measure of media attention.

In order to support the case analysis, a qualitative review of primary and secondary source materials was conducted. In addition over two dozen interviews were also conducted with many of the participants. One of the added benefits in using the three cases in questions is that most of the senior participants, as well as their supporting staff, are still alive, available, sentient, and in some instances participated in more than of the crises.

Significance of Findings

This study makes several contributions to the field of international relations. In the area of theory, the study tests four alternative theories of decision-making under post-Cold War conditions. More significantly, this study provides a method to integrate the previously distinct models of decision-making, thereby delivering a greater understanding of the decision-making process. Additionally, the case studies in themselves will expand the number of analyses for students to draw upon.

¹²² Norton and Miskel, 267 - 171.

Perhaps of even greater value is the contribution the study makes to the area of practical and applied international relations theory. Using the techniques presented in the study, both scholars and practitioners will be able to conduct better analysis of past and current events. In the classroom, students new to the field of international relations should find this method of analysis and the integrated model of decision-making useful in understanding this element of the discipline.

Study Limitations

There are, of course, limits to this study's findings. Much material concerning these cases remains highly classified and unavailable, and future revelations could impact some of the conclusions reached in this work.¹²³ It must also be recognized that the study of decision-making is subject to a wide variety of factors that do not lend themselves to being objectively quantified. Indeed, few works on decision-making claim to be able to weigh, with mathematical precision, the relative importance of the various inputs to the decision-making process.¹²⁴ Furthermore, since much of the study of decision-making must rely on upon the recollections of those involved in the decision-making process, there will always be a certain degree of uncertainty as to the accuracy of the actors' self-described motivations and perceptions.

Overview of the Study

Chapter One has provided the reader with an introduction to the problem, research questions and theoretical models and framework that will be used throughout this study

¹²³ Although this is by no means certain. After all, Graham Allison did not have access to either Soviet or U.S. classified files and tapes when he wrote *Essence of Decision*. Thirty years later, literally thousands of documents from both sides have been made public. Remarkably, Allison's work still stands.

¹²⁴ Several authors, notably in dealing with the issue of bargaining during crises have attempted to produce such precise findings. These include: Raymond Tanter, *Modeling and Managing International Conflicts: The Berlin Crisis*, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974), and Irmatrude Gallhoffer and Willem E. Saris' *Foreign-Policy Decision-Making: A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Political Argumentation*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996)

to analyze the three cases. Chapter Two presents the Somalia case and an accompanying analysis. Chapter Three examines and analyzes the case of Rwanda, while Chapter Four does the same for Haiti. Chapter Five will be devoted to a comparative analysis of the results of the case analyses, and Chapter Six will present conclusions.

Chapter 2: Somalia

Introduction

As 1992 drew to a close, combat-loaded United States Marines clambered into their amphibious vehicles and came ashore on the beaches of Somalia. Their mission could legitimately be described as unique, at least in the recent memory of that institution. The Marines were in Somalia in order to establish a secure environment in which non-governmental organizations and other humanitarian actors could successfully carry out relief efforts. In order to create this environment the Marines were expected to use force against any Somalia militiamen who threatened the distribution of relief supplies, especially foodstuffs. The catalyst for the Marine's presence was a large scale humanitarian emergency that resulted from a massive famine and starvation. The Marines were engaging in the first major U.S. Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW) since the end of the Cold War. For the first time in at least a half-century neither the bi-polar nature of the international political system nor economic self-interest had played a role in a U.S. decision to use force. By any yardstick, this decision would have to be considered remarkable.

But the early 1990s were remarkable times. Events in the first two years of the decade included the demise of the Soviet Union and the first UN authorized use of force against a sovereign state since the Korean War. The United States and its coalition partners had achieved a smashing victory against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. U.S. President George Herbert Walker Bush had publicly committed the nation to the creation of a "New World Order."¹ This new world order, if not precisely a "Pax Americana," would

¹ "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit, September 11, 1990," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 26, No. 37, (Washington, D.C.:

none-the-less feature a United States willing to do its share - and more than its share - in preserving global peace and encouraging global prosperity. Also remarkably, 1992 had witnessed that same president lose a bid for re-election after having achieved the highest popularity ratings in living memory only several months before.

The decision to intervene in Somalia, initially viewed as widely successful, would eventually result in a brief and violent battle on the streets of Mogadishu between the militia fighters of Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid and a combined force of U.S. Army Rangers and members of the Delta Force, which claimed the lives of 20 U.S. servicemen. In the aftermath, the decision to intervene in Somalia and the subsequent handling of the Somali mission would be seen by many in the United States, including some of President Clinton's senior advisors as a major U.S. policy defeat.² As a result, and as argued in succeeding chapters, the U.S. experience in Somalia would cast a long shadow across the entire decade of the 1990s. The intervention in Somalia as part of the mosaic of a watershed period in history that deserves scrutiny for purposes of this study.

This chapter will analyze events leading up to the December 1992 U.S./UN Somalia intervention. In order to set these decisions in context, a very brief discussion of Somali political history will be provided, followed by a chronological history of the actions taken by the United States and other actors to deal with the Somalia humanitarian crisis. It will focus on two decisions made by the Bush Administration; the authorization of *Operation Provide Relief*, which was a major airlift of relief supplies in August of

Government Printing Office, 1990), 1359. Also, all mention in this study, unless specifically noted otherwise, of "President Bush" refer to George Herbert Walker Bush, forty-first president of the United States.

² Although articles, reports and analyses citing Somalia as a foreign policy failure are common, it is worth noting that both former Clinton National Security Advisors Anthony Lake and Samuel Berger also agree that Somalia was a failure. "Transcript: Interview with Anthony Lake;" *ABC News: Frontline: The Clinton Years*, (New York: ABC, 2000), 7; "Transcript: Interview with Samuel Berger, " *ABC News: Frontline: The Clinton Years*, (New York: ABC News, 2000), 6.

1992, and most important the December 1992 decision to initiate *Operation Restore Hope*, which was the U.S. military's forcible humanitarian intervention into Somalia.

With this background and the empirical data on presidential decision-making to the case, the chapter will then analyze the two highlighted decisions using the Rational Actor model, the Organizational Politics model, the Government Politics model and the Human Factors model. Then these decisions will be analyzed using the Integrated Model of Decision-Making.

In preparation for addressing the secondary research questions, the chapter will discuss the role of the international political system, the domestic political system, and the national security system, in that order. It will then be possible to answer the secondary research questions with regard to Somalia, specifically:

- How did the duration of the crisis affect the dominance of forces acting on the decision-makers?
- To what extent did success or failure of prior decisions affect the decision-making process?
- Which elements of the international political system had the most effect upon the decision-making process?
- Which elements of the domestic political system had the most effect upon the decision-making process?

Finally, the roles and importance of situational factors and uncertainty will be examined. Having completed the full analysis of the Somalia case, conclusions will be discussed and a summary of the chapter presented.

Somalia - The Road to Disintegration

Prior to 1960, the modern state of Somalia consisted of the former colonies of Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland. These two colonial possessions were merged with British and Italian consent and, as was happening elsewhere on the African continent, colonial rule ultimately gave way to self-governance. Unlike many other African states, the new country of Somalia appeared to have at least one strong reason to hope for national viability. The population was nearly all of Somali origin - sharing the same language, customs and religion.³ The linguistic and ethnic fault lines, which had split other African polities and caused them so much trouble, had no counterpart in Somalia. And so, in 1960, Somalia began its independent existence under a parliamentary system of government, but the hopes for Somali unity proved to be premature. Although there were no ethnic fissures, Somali loyalties lay along clan lines.⁴ This was reflected in a steady growth of political parties which numbered as many as 60 in 1969.⁵

The Somali experiment in democracy ended in 1969 when President Abdriashid Ali Sharma'rke was assassinated. This was followed by an Army-led coup and the rise of General Mohammed Siad Barre to power. For the next 21 years Barre would rule Somalia. During this time he would claim to be a Marxist, but his political philosophy was more related to retaining power than any particular ideology. Given Barre's Marxism and Somalia's geo-strategic position in relation to the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, it is not surprising that the Soviet Union became a Somali ally. A predictable outcome of this

³ United Nations Department of Public Information *The United Nations and Somalia: 1992 - 1996*, (New York: United Nations, 1996), 9.

⁴ As *The United Nations and Somalia* notes, there were other dividing lines within Somali society. These included, but were not limited to: urban vs. rural as well as "social and occupational stratifications." *The United Nations and Somalia*, 9. For an excellent overview of clan identities and activity see Walter S. Clarke, *Somalia: Background Information For Operation Restore Hope 1992 - 1993*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992), 5 - 16.

⁵ *Ibid.*

relationship was the creation of a well-armed Somali military.⁶ The Soviet - Somali friendship lasted until the mid-1977 when it disintegrated over the issue of conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia.

Somalia Falls Apart

In 1977 Mengistu Haile assumed leadership of Ethiopia, following the violent death of Chief of State Taferi Bante. The Soviets were quick to recognize Haile and to support his regime.⁷ In an attempt to moderate tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, Fidel Castro, on behalf of Moscow, tried to broker the creation of a "Socialist Union of the Horn of Africa." Barre immediately rejected the proposal.⁸

Seeking to capitalize on Ethiopian confusion in the wake of the transfer of power, Barre's army invaded Ethiopia in July 1977. The United States, United Kingdom and France announced that they would supply arms to Somalia.⁹ The Soviet Union was placed in a position of having to choose between two client states and, in September 1977, it halted arms shipments to the Barre regime, while increasing the supply of Soviet armaments and advisors to Ethiopia. Relations between the former allies continued to worsen. In November 1977 Barre expelled the few remaining Soviet advisors in Somalia, and abrogated the 1974 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union.¹⁰

Soviet arms shipments to Ethiopia went into high gear and culminated in what would be "the largest sea and airlift in African history, moving \$1 billion in arms, 12,000

⁶ Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Partial Reconstruction*, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 14 - 15.

⁷ Clarke, 25.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid. France's willingness to participate in any activity which would disrupt the possibility of a "Socialist Union of the Horn of Africa" is understandable, given that Castro's plan included the former French possession of Djibouti which gained its independence in June 1977.

¹⁰ Ibid.

Cuban troops and 1500 Soviet military advisors to Ethiopia."¹¹ The effect was predictable. By April 1978 Somali forces had been soundly defeated. Barre's failure effectively doomed any efforts to create a pan-Somali nationalism and internal conflict broke out in several areas.¹² A low-level civil war broke out in 1981 and gradually escalated throughout the decade. As the Barre government's power steadily eroded, it progressively relied more heavily on the use of "force, terror and clan manipulation" to stay in power.¹³ It was during these years that the United Nations first became involved in Somalia.¹⁴

By 1989 Somalia was in the grip of full-fledged civil war. At least four major opposition movements were in the field. Cities were lost and re-taken by government forces. The use of artillery and airpower was common. Losses were heavy, especially among the civil populace. For example, in 1988 fighting over the city of Hargesia was estimated to have killed as many as 50,000 people and driven as many as 500,000 from their homes.¹⁵

Diplomatic Exodus

By the end of 1990 the forces of Siad Barre controlled little more than the capital city of Mogadishu. The United States embassy had advised U.S. citizens living in Somalia to evacuate, and implemented a helicopter evacuation of the U.S. embassy in January 1991.¹⁶ Once evacuated, embassy personnel were returned to the United States

¹¹ Clarke, 26.

¹² Lyons and Samatar, 15.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ *United Nations in Somalia*, 15. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) all had missions in Somalia from the late 1970s on.

¹⁵ *United Nations in Somalia*, 11.

¹⁶ Clarke, 31-32. The forces which conducted the operation had been diverted from duties in support of *Operation Desert Shield*, a component of the Persian Gulf War.

or sent to other diplomatic posts. Diplomatic responsibility for Somalia was assigned to the U.S. embassy staff in Kenya. By November 1991 only two members of the Somalia embassy staff remained in Nairobi.¹⁷ Rejoicing over the safe evacuation of its personnel, the U.S. State Department, in the words of the then Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, "dropped Somalia from our radar screens."¹⁸

Other countries evacuated their diplomatic personnel, eventually leaving only an Egyptian diplomatic presence in Mogadishu. By the end of January Barre had lost Mogadishu. An orgy of looting followed.¹⁹ Barre fought on as just another warlord for some time, but he would eventually wind up as an exile in Kenya.

At the time of the fall of Mogadishu, there was an attempt to establish a leader of one of the three largest rebel movements, Ali Mahdi Mohammed, as interim president.²⁰ The attempt immediately failed and so began months of internal battles between warlords in what might be described as territory formerly known as the state of Somalia.

Somalia collapses

In the best of times, Somalia is poor country. From 1988 - 1990, years in which there were no famine, it was believed that the daily calorie consumption was only 81% of minimum requirements.²¹ During the same period of time only 27% of the population had access to health services and only 60% has access to safe drinking water.²² Given these conditions, it needed only a very small disruption to cause a human catastrophe

¹⁷ Jan Westcott, *The Somalia Saga: A Personal Account: 1990 - 1993* (Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, 1994),13.

¹⁸ Herman S. Cohen, *Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, LLC, 2000), 203.

¹⁹ Ibid.4 - 8. See also John G. Sommer, *Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid in Somalia 1990 -1994* (Washington, D.C: Refugee Policy Group, 1994), 12.

²⁰ Cohen, 204.

²¹ *The United Nations in Somalia*, 13.

²² Ibid.

among the Somali population. The civil war was a huge disruption. For starters, significant fighting had occurred in Somalia's southern agricultural region. Grain stores were looted and farming populations uprooted.

Given the degree of agricultural vulnerability, it is not surprising that the warring factions quickly discovered the utility of what might be described as agrarian warfare. Food was a both a source of power and a weapon. Eliminating an enemy's ability to feed his dependent population was embraced as a valid tactic. Opposing clans found their livestock was killed, wells polluted, and irrigation systems destroyed.²³ Militia leaders found it easy to pay their soldiers with a portion of captured loot, including foodstuffs. This made stealing from humanitarian sources attractive on two counts. First, the aid supplies were extremely valuable, and second, robbing aid workers tended to produce fewer casualties than taking on other militia fighters. The result was to make food, "the coin of the realm."²⁴

Armed conflict also produced secondary effects that adversely impacted the ability of Somalis to help themselves. These events included the elimination of veterinary services and the closing of traditional nomadic migratory routes. Furthermore, as hunger gripped the population ever more seed stocks and breeding livestock began to be consumed.²⁵ In turn the effects of combat and agrarian failures set massive population flows into motion. 1.7 million Somalis were estimated to have been displaced by the war. 700,000 Somalis became refugees fleeing to Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and

²³ Ibid, 14.

²⁴ Cohen, 205.

²⁵ Steve Hansch, Scott Lillibridge, Grace Egeland, Charles Teller and Michael Toole, *Lives Lost, Lives Saved: Excess Mortality and the Impact of Health Interventions in the Somalia Emergency*, (Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, 1994), 3.

Yemen.²⁶ At the same time, as many as 250,000 displaced persons fled to the dubious safety of Mogadishu, which was being bitterly fought over by Mohammed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohammed.

U.S. Actions

The Bush Administration

Despite a tremendous thawing in the U.S. -Soviet relationship, nearly all of the Bush Administration's foreign policy was dominated by the bi-polar divide. President Bush was a seasoned cold warrior. His past experiences, which included service as a Congressman, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and vice-president seemed to be perfect for grooming a chief executive. The president's national security staff were seasoned professionals who had earned his respect and confidence.²⁷ They had been steeped in the strategic realities of the Cold War. Some, such as National Security Assistant Brent Scowcroft were former generals. Others, such as Secretary of State Baker, had a long association with the president. On the surface there was little to suggest that such a team would commit U.S. troops to combat operations on support of a humanitarian mission in a country that was not of strategic importance to the United States. At first, U.S. responses followed a somewhat predictable pattern.

Early U.S. Actions

In 1991, Herman Cohen, an Assistant Secretary of State, declared Somalia to be suffering a civil strife disaster.²⁸ This declaration activated the U.S. Office of Disaster

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Interview with Admiral David Jeremiah, USN (ret.), former Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the author via telephone, 9 November 1999, Newport, RI. .

²⁸ Andrew Natsios, "Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos," in *Learning From Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, eds. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, (Boulder: Westview, 1997), 80.

Assistance (OFDA), which had already 'got a jump' on the situation by assigning Jan Westcott, one of the two remaining Mogadishu embassy staffers, who was then in Kenya, as U.S. emergency relief coordinator for Somalia. Armed with both the declaration of disaster and possessing an observer on scene, OFDA began to supply relief funding to the ICRC and other NGOs. More U.S. aid was provided through the Food for Peace and Refugee program offices. In 1991 the United States would provide \$29.6 million in emergency assistance to Somalia.²⁹

In June and July, security and safety in Mogadishu had improved to the point where the United States allowed the sole remaining staff member of the former U.S. embassy in Somalia - a USAID contract employee- to return for a series of short, highly protected visits.³⁰ Even this limited return to Somalia was sufficient to allow her to accurately predict a renewed outbreak of fighting between the Mahdi and Aidid factions.³¹ This put an end to even the smallest U.S. government presence in Mogadishu until March 1992.³²

In November 1991 OFDA's Andrew Natsios attempted to raise international and public awareness concerning the plight of Somalia. He pressed the ICRC to enlarge its activities in Somalia. He convinced Assistant Secretary Cohen to "re-issue" the declaration of a civil strife disaster in Somalia. Working with the U.S. representative to the UN, he urged increased funding levels for Somalia. His efforts met with minimal success.

²⁹ Sommer, 13.

³⁰ Westcott, 14 - 15.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid., 29.

For neither impending famine, stealing from aid agencies, nor mass refugee flows focused world attention on the troubles in Somalia in 1991. In Washington, there was little more than "the usual State Department and CIA tracking of political change in a relatively minor corner of the world."³³ The most obvious reason for this was that global eyes were focused on the Gulf War and its aftermath.³⁴ World attention would take notice of Somalia in 1992, in large part due to the efforts of a new UN Secretary-General and the predictable outbreak of famine in Somalia.

1992 - Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the UN Attempts to Deal with Famine in Somalia

Boutros Boutros-Ghali assumed duties as Secretary-General when at last it seemed the UN could achieve its full potential. Without the Security Council gridlock of the Cold War, all the organization needed was a leader who would take advantage of the moment. Boutros-Ghali, a polished diplomat with extensive experience in Africa, as Egypt's deputy foreign minister for the upper Nile, seemed to be that man. His *Agenda for Peace* made it clear that he had an expansive vision of what peace operations should be and could do in the future.³⁵ In contrast with the former UN Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar, who had all but ignored Somalia, Boutros-Ghali was proactive from the start.³⁶

On 23 January 1992, in response to a report made by Boutros-Ghali, the Security Council adopted UNSCR resolution 733, thereby imposing an embargo of all arms

³³ Walter H. Kansteiner, "U.S. Policy in Africa in the 1990s," in *U.S. and Russian Policymaking With Respect to the Use of Force*, Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin, eds., (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 108.

³⁴ Westcott, 9.

³⁵ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992), 1 - 12.

³⁶ Walter Clarke, "Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates," in *Learning From Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, Walter Clarke and Jeffery Herbst, eds., (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 6.

delivery to Somalia. At the same time, the Secretary General urged that an immediate cease-fire be put into effect.³⁷ The resolution was doomed to fail. Practically speaking, stopping the arms flow into Somalia would have had little impact on the on-going war. Somalia was already massively over-armed, first as a result of Soviet patronage and, later, as a result of the patronage of the United States. Moreover, possession of a firearm had long been a sign of status in the Somali culture. The situation was made worse when the failure of civil order drove the comparatively few unarmed Somalis to acquire weapons in order to provide some measure of personal security.³⁸ Not surprisingly, arms and ammunition also became the main commodities desired by the various Somali warlords and militias. Throughout the crisis, despite efforts to the contrary, arms shipments continued to flow into Somalia.³⁹

Through the late Winter and Spring of 1992, efforts were made to establish some form of cease-fire in Mogadishu. In New York, representatives from the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference met with Ali Mahdi and General Aidid. On 3 March the two warlords reached agreement. Ali Mahdi then stated that a UN peacekeeping force would be required in Mogadishu to ensure that the cease-fire was successful. Although less enthusiastic about the presence of the UN's blue helmets in his city, Aidid did agree to a small number of UN observers and security personnel.⁴⁰

Developments in the United States

³⁷ S/RES/733 (1992), 23 January 1992, cited in its entirety in *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992 - 1996*, 116.

³⁸ Vance J. Nannini, *Decisions in Operations Other Than War: The United States Intervention in Somalia*, (Leavenworth: United States Army Command College And General Staff College, 1994) 114 - 118.

³⁹ Clarke, 36.

⁴⁰ *The UN and Somalia*, 18-19.

Although Somalia did not command a great deal of interest in the United States, there were some individuals who did their best to place the issue before the American people. Among these was Andrew Natsios, the assistant administrator for the Agency for International Development (USAID) and Assistant Secretary of State (African Affairs) Herman Cohen. Testifying before congress, Natsios stated that 90 percent of Somali children under the age of five were malnourished, and that although NGOs such as the ICRC and MSF were making heroic efforts, food was not being delivered to starving people.⁴¹ During 1991 and through much of 1992 USAID and the State Department's Africa Bureau were by far the most vocal advocates for U.S. involvement in Somalia. Their tactics included testifying before Congressional committees, meeting with NGOS and filing press releases.⁴² Cohen also called meetings of the Policy Coordinating Committee on Africa to discuss Somalia.⁴³

A Policy Coordinating Committee was the title of a Bush Administration Inter-Agency working group. The PCC on Somalia was staffed by representatives from the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and USIAD. The purpose of the group was to track developments in Somalia, analyze their impact on U.S. national interests and generate recommended courses of action to the Deputies Committee of the NSC. An NSC staff representative chaired the PCC.

⁴¹ House, *Humanitarian Tragedy in Somalia: Hearing Before the Select Committee on Hunger*, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., report serial No. 102 - 20, 30 January 1992, 5.

⁴² Cohen, 207.

⁴³ Ibid.

Other government sub-organizations became involved as the crisis deepened. For example, the State Department's Bureau of Human Rights aligned with the Bureau of African affairs in calling for a security operation in Somalia.⁴⁴

Cohen and Natsios were by far the most vocal U.S. senior leaders of 1991 when it came to urging involvement in Somalia.⁴⁵ They were opposed within the State Department, by John Bolton, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs.⁴⁶ Bolton believed that the operation was a job for the United Nations, and that the cost to the United States of such an operation would be excessive. Secretary of State James Baker was also reported to be concerned with the potential costs of the UN mission.⁴⁷ There was some justification to Baker and Bolton's objections. As the Somalia crisis grew, the UN was already involved in a dozen peace operations.⁴⁸ The United Nations had authorized peacekeeping operations in Namibia in 1988 and Angola in 1991. In October 1991, a peacekeeping mission for Cambodia was authorized. The total costs of these operations and the 30 percent portion that was the U.S. share had steadily been increasing.⁴⁹ The budget for this mission was set at \$U.S. 2 Million, making it the most costly peace operation to date.⁵⁰ In response to the State Department's Bureau for African Affairs contention that Somalia was a security crisis, requiring a UN intervention, the State Department's International Organization Bureau disagreed. Somalia was, in their opinion, mainly a food problem. The appropriate role for the UN would be to coordinate

⁴⁴ Interview with Herman Cohen, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and the author, via telephone, Newport, RI, 15 November 2002.

⁴⁵ Cohen, 206.

⁴⁶ John R. Bolton, "Wrong Turn in Somalia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 1, January - February 1994), 56 - 59.

⁴⁷ Sommer, 20.

⁴⁸ Cohen, 206.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

the shipping of relief supplies.⁵¹ Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Advisor was also against involvement in Somalia, seeing it as a situation that did not involve the national interest of the United States. The Defense Department supported this position.⁵²

Even Jim Kunder who, having assumed the directorship of OFDA in December 1991, and might have been expected to be a strong advocate of action, initially believed Somalia was of relatively low priority.⁵³ Kunder's assessment was not that difficult to understand. Other crises had potential claims on OFDA. These included Sudan, Ethiopia, Bosnia, and the former Soviet Union.⁵⁴ Some of these other crises, especially those in Bosnia and the former Soviet Union, were argued to have direct security implications for the United States.⁵⁵

Kunder changed this initial view of Somalia rather quickly. In late February to early March 1992 he visited Somalia. By the time Kunder returned, he was convinced there was a need for the United States to find a method to help Somalia.⁵⁶

Many observers have criticized the U.S. government for either failing to notice or intentionally turning a blind eye to the widespread suffering in Somalia. In fairness it is worthwhile noting that Somalia was far from the only issue on the foreign policy agenda of the Bush Administration - an administration that was also in the middle of a presidential election campaign. There was the on-going effort to deal with a post-war Iraq -- including the establishment of various no-fly zones; the issue of the Kurds in northern Iraq; and an inspection regime to deal with Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Cohen, 207.

⁵³ Sommer, 20

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Interview conducted by the author with James Woods, former Deputy Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, via telephone, Newport, Rhode Island, 15 November 2002.

⁵⁶ Somers, 20.

On-going problems in the Balkans, especially Bosnia, also placed demands on the time of U.S. decision-makers. This conflict, although clearly of primary concern to Europe, certainly involved a greater degree of U.S. national interests than did Somalia. To increase the level of difficulty facing the administration, public opinion polls indicated that the U.S. public was far more interested in domestic than foreign issues. The president's chief electoral opponent, Governor William Jefferson Clinton, was focusing his campaign on just such issues.

While the official U.S. position remained that Somalia was a "food problem," and not a "security issue," both Andrew Natsios and Herman Cohen continued their public assertions that this was not the case. They were joined in this effort by James Bishop, former Ambassador to Somalia and, at this time, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights. Cohen has publicly admitted that these efforts were undertaken to "undermine official policy," and to gain support for a more proactive approach to Somalia.⁵⁷

Boutros-Ghali Gets Results - UNOSOM I

On 21 April 1992 UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali formally requested that a UN force of 50 military observers and 500 infantry be sent to Somalia.⁵⁸ Three days later the Security Council unanimously passed UNSC Resolution 751, authorizing the establishment of the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNISOM).⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Cohen, 207.

⁵⁸ "Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, recommending the establishment of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM; first addendum (Add.1) includes Consolidated Inter-Agency 90-Day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, S/23829, 21 April 1992; and addenda: S/23829/Add.1, 21 April 1992, and S/23829/Add.2, 24 April 1992," cited in its entirety in *The United Nations in Somalia*, 135 - 166.

⁵⁹ "Security Council resolution establishing UNOSOM, requesting the immediate deployment of a security force for humanitarian operations as soon as possible and calling on the international community to support

On 28 April 1992 Boutros-Ghali appointed Mohamed Sahnoun as the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Somalia. Sahnoun was an Algerian who had formerly served as the deputy secretary-general of the OAU. He was well versed in the affairs of the Horn of Africa, having lived in Addis Ababa for nearly ten years, and he was eager to take on the task.⁶⁰

Attempts to Beat the Famine in Somalia Continue

By the time the UNOSOM mission arrived in Somalia, famine had already begun to take a heavy toll on the Somali population. 300,000 had died of hunger and hunger-related diseases. Seventy percent of the country's livestock had been destroyed. More than 3,000 people - mostly the old, the infirm and the very young - were dying every day.⁶¹ The UN estimated that 4.5 Million Somalis, or 65% of the population, required external assistance, and that 1.5 million of these people were at immediate risk.⁶²

As UNOSOM began operations, a growing number of non-governmental organizations were becoming increasingly active in Somalia. These included the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF), International Medical Corps (IMC), Save the Children, Irish Concern, and CARE.⁶³ When compared to the activities of these NGOs, the progress of the UN was slow and Sahnoun did not refrain from reporting this to the Secretary-General.⁶⁴

Part of the problem rested on the fact that the cease-fire was never better than shaky at best and that the number of blue helmets was simply too small to form a

the 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance S/RES/751 (1992), 24 April 1992, cited in its entirety in *The United Nations and Somalia*, 166 - 167.

⁶⁰ Mohamed Sahnoun, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute Of Peace Press, 1994), vii.

⁶¹ Sahnoun, 16.

⁶² *United Nations In Somalia*, 21.

⁶³ Sahnoun, 18.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 19 - 20.

stabilizing presence. Among the more egregious violations was the shelling of a merchant ship bearing relief supplies to Mogadishu.⁶⁵ Since food remained a highly valued commodity, the looting of warehouses and convoys remained common. This was placing a tremendous strain on NGOs such as the ICRC. By August nearly 33 percent of the ICRC's budget was being spent on relief supplies for Somalia.⁶⁶

There was some progress as well. Although a UN security force of 500 UN troops had been accepted, and authorized, it took Sahnoun three months to get Aidid to finally agree to the deployment of these troops. However, the price of his permission was agreeing that the troops would not be heavily armed.⁶⁷

U.S. Public Awareness Increases

Although the government of the United States was aware of the UN's activities in Somalia, there was little or no direct knowledge of conditions on the ground in Mogadishu. U.S. personnel had not returned to the capital since July 1991. There was only limited travel through other portions of the country conducted by a very small number of U.S. government personnel.⁶⁸ Yet, if the amount of attention the U.S. government paid to Somalia was small, that paid to Somalia by the American people was much less. For example, Somalia had been received no significant media or congressional attention. That was about to change.

In March Senator Nancy Kassenbaum (R-KS) proposed a nonbonding resolution calling upon President Bush to lead a worldwide humanitarian effort in Somalia. From

⁶⁵ *United Nations in Somalia*, 21.

⁶⁶ Susan D. Moeller, *Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death*, (New York and London: Routledge, 1999), 131.

⁶⁷ "Letter dated 23 June 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security-Council informing the Council that the principal factions in Mogadishu have agreed to the immediate deployment of United Nations cease-fire observers," cited in its entirety, *The United Nations in Somalia*, 171.

⁶⁸ Westcott, 29. From this point on Kunder became increasingly more supportive of involvement in the Somali crisis. See Somers, 20.

this point on Kassenbaum would become an increasingly vocal and effective advocate of the use of U.S. power in Somalia.⁶⁹ By April her efforts were already showing results when the Senate Subcommittee on Africa requested that the Congressional Research Service (CRS) conduct a seminar on Somalia.⁷⁰

In May, , the U.S Ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone, filed a cable entitled "A Day in Hell" to the Secretary of State. Hempstone, a former reporter with the *Washington Times*, knew how to tell a story and painted a devastating picture of life in the refugee camps along the Somali - Kenyan border. Deputy NSA Jonathan Howe presented a copy to the president.⁷¹ The president's copy was returned to the NSC staff's director of African Affairs with President Bush's questions and comments scribbled on the margins.⁷² The president had long been interested in Africa, where he had often visited as vice-president; from this point on, Somalia would be "on his radar screen."⁷³

U.S. concern about Somalia had reached the point where, in June, for the first time, Somalia was a topic of discussion at a Deputies Committee meeting.⁷⁴ Prior to this discussions of Somalia had been dealt with at interagency meetings. These had been attended by representatives from the Department of State, Defense, USAID, and CIA. The focus of these meetings had been on humanitarian relief issues.⁷⁵ Now, at the Deputies Meeting the possibility of U.S. intervention was being discussed, although no one was recommending that such an intervention be conducted.⁷⁶

⁶⁹ Cohen interview.

⁷⁰ Harry Johnston and Ted Dagne, "Congress and the Somalia Crisis," in Clarke and Herbst, 192.

⁷¹ Sommer, 21.

⁷² Kansteiner, 107.

⁷³ Ibid..

⁷⁴ Kansteiner, 110; Sommer, 22.

⁷⁵ Kansteiner, 110.

⁷⁶ Kansteiner, 110; Woods interview.

The fact that the Deputies Committee was now discussing Somalia did not lessen the level of debate at the more junior PCC. Both Andrew Natsios, now the newly appointed U.S. special coordinator of Somali relief, and Cohen attended these meetings.⁷⁷ In early July, after Natsios had provided an account of how desperate the situation had become, Cohen asked the representative from the Joint Chiefs of Staff how difficult it would be to mount an airlift to the interior of Somalia. The answer was that the U.S. military did not plan for operations that could be less expensively conducted through the use of civilian charters.⁷⁸ Cohen then asked the representative from International Organizations "about the possibility of introducing a resolution in the Security Council authorizing all necessary means to break the blockade of food distribution."⁷⁹ The answer was no, citing negative fallout from a similar decision involving Bosnia.⁸⁰

Elsewhere in July, the situation in Mogadishu had reached a level of stability that Sahnoun believed would allow some media presence in the city. Accordingly, he invited several press representatives to the city.⁸¹ Among these was Jane Perlez, at the time the Nairobi-based correspondent for *The New York Times*, who is usually given credit for breaking the story of the Somali famine.⁸² Prior to seeing Mogadishu with her own eyes, she had asked, "Why don't Somalis take more responsibility for themselves?"⁸³ After

⁷⁷ Natsios, in Clarke and Herbst, 82; Cohen interview.

⁷⁸ Cohen, 208. This response clearly indicates the U.S. military's reluctance to become involved in Somalia. Rather than answer the question with an assessment of difficulty and cost - information that would have been relatively easy to obtain, the military representative in effect said that this was someone else's job.

⁷⁹ Cohen, 208.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Sahnoun, ix. Ambassador Robert Oakley, former U.S. ambassador to Somalia, credits Sahnoun with establishing an exceptional spectrum of contacts and mounting an extremely cohesive diplomatic campaign in Somalia. Ambassador Robert Oakley interview with the author, telephone, Newport, RI, 6 December 2001

⁸² New York Times reporter Jane Perlez, interview with the author, telephone, Newport, RI, 29 September 1999.

⁸³ Sommer, 21.

responding to Sahnoun's invitation, Perlez' stories of horror and famine were the stuff of front-page news.

Perlez' reports were just part of the story. Senators Nancy Kassenbaum (R-KS) and Paul Simon (D-IL) visited Somalia in July and came away convinced that urgent action by the United States was required.⁸⁴ Each introduced non-binding resolutions calling for greater U.S. involvement. Reporters from other papers poured into Mogadishu and headlines around the world began to speak of the famine in Somalia. More high profile visitors followed, including Mary Robinson, then the president of Ireland, and Audrey Hepburn, UN spokesperson for UNICEF.⁸⁵ Also by July Somalia had become the primary object of OFDA's attention.⁸⁶ As the de facto "lead U.S. Agency" on Somalia, OFDA had drawn up a strategic plan to deal with the famine in Somalia. There was no role in this plan for the U.S. military.⁸⁷

OFDA would gradually lose its exclusive status as the lead agency on Somalia. The State Department, the Department of Defense, the NSC, and the CIA were all becoming interested in the issue. By July DOD and State had both stood up internal working groups on Somalia.⁸⁸ Eventually, although DOD would have to provide the most material and manpower to the effort, while the State department, despite some internal divisions, became the strongest advocate for taking action in regard to Somalia.⁸⁹

Increased press coverage of Somalia encouraged U.S special interest groups to become more active in their efforts to get the U.S. government to take up the cause of

⁸⁴ Moeller, 134.

⁸⁵ Lyons and Samatar, 30-31.

⁸⁶ Sommer, 21.

⁸⁷ Natsios in Clarke and Herbst, 87.

⁸⁸ James L. Woods, "U.S. Government Decision-making processes During Humanitarian Operations in Somalia," in *Learning From Somalia" Lessons Of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, eds., Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, (Boulder: Westview, 1997), 155.

⁸⁹ Woods interview; Cohen interview.

Somalia. Among these groups was Randall Robinson's *TransAfrica*, a powerful Washington-based lobby.⁹⁰

More Pressure from the Secretary-General

Increased public awareness and scrutiny focused on Somalia brought increased criticism of the manner in which the United Nations was dealing with the crisis.

Frustrated, and perhaps seeing an opportunity to spur developed states into action, Boutros-Ghali referred to ongoing conflict in the Balkans as a "rich man's war," because it was drawing a disproportionate share of the UN's resources, thereby shortchanging Somalia. As author Susan Moeller states, this was an "implicit charge of racism."⁹¹ New York Times columnist Anna Quindlen put the matter more strongly.

The new Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, an Egyptian who is the first leader of the UN from the continent of Africa, has referred to the Bosnian conflict as a "rich man's war." He means it is a white's man war, a Eurowar, in its combatants, its victims and its interests.⁹²

The Secretary General's remarks did not catch the Bush Administration by surprise. Boutros-Ghali had seen both State and NSC officials before releasing the report with the volatile phrase. Furthermore, although the president yet to authorize any action, the Secretary-General had been made aware that the Bush administration "was prepared to provide military airlift for humanitarian supplies as well as airlift for peacekeepers that might be necessary in assisting with the delivery of those supplies."⁹³

Other domestic actors joined the voices speaking out for U.S. action. Among these actors was presidential candidate Bill Clinton. Sensing a rare foreign policy vulnerability in the Bush camp, Governor suggested the president had been too inactive

⁹⁰ Kansteiner, 106

⁹¹ Moeller, 134.

⁹² Anna Quindlen, "Somalia's Plagues," *The New York Times*, 12 August 1992, A 19., cited in Moeller, 134.

⁹³ Kansteiner, 111.

when it came to Somalia. As the president had previously seemed invulnerable to attack on issue of foreign policy, this new development, complete with an adverse press, was not lost on the White House.⁹⁴

The Story Grows

The Somalia situation was now attracting massive attention from the international and U.S. press. There was an explosion of coverage.⁹⁵ These stories featured innocent Somalis - especially mothers, children and the old as victims, international relief workers as heroes and the clansmen as villains.⁹⁶ With the press came an assortment of political and public figures such as the Somali supermodel Imam and former Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke.⁹⁷ Senator Paul Simon returned for a second trip accompanied by Congressman John Lewis (D-GA) Ironically, as the interest in the Somali tragedy continued to build some observers saw what they believed were growing numbers of indications that the famine was ending.⁹⁸ These views were not commonly held.

Operation Provide Relief

By the end of July, the mood of the PCC was changing. Walter Kansteiner, the director for African Affairs on the NSC staff had become a frequent attendee, reporting back to his boss, Brent Scowcroft.⁹⁹ The Kansteiner - Scowcroft connection was evidently channeling information directly to President Bush.¹⁰⁰ After Andrew Natsios reported that the grip of militias in Mogadishu was so strong that food could not be

⁹⁴ Ibid., 107.

⁹⁵ Moeller, 135 - 138.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Moeller, 140.

⁹⁸ Somers, 27.

⁹⁹ Cohen, 209.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

moved more than two miles, there were indications that U.S. senior leaders were reevaluating their reluctance to get involved in Somalia.¹⁰¹

The impression was correct. The president had ordered Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to be more "forward leaning" on Somalia.¹⁰² At the Deputies Committee the president's words were viewed as a directive for action. The Deputies then came up with what they believed would be the minimum level of U.S. involvement that would satisfy the president.¹⁰³ On 24 July President Bush authorized U.S. funding for the deployment of the 500 Pakistanis provided to the UN as peacekeepers for Mogadishu and to provide the required airlift to get them to Somalia. The troops arrived on 14 September 1992.

This was not enough for Andrew Natsios who was already recommending intervening on the ground.¹⁰⁴ Other representatives, such as Leonard Cohen who were sympathetic to Natsios' position, felt that they could not get the Defense Department to support such actions. They were right. Defense was not only opposed to any ground operation but were reluctant to go along with any level of involvement until it was clear that the military's participation would be limited solely to providing the airlift.¹⁰⁵ Eventually a compromise was reached and the outlines of a U.S. humanitarian supply effort was forwarded to the president. On 14 August 1992, the eve of the Republican National Convention, President Bush publicly announced the United States was initiating *Operation Provide Relief*. The possibility that his announcement had timed to gain

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Sommer, 22. Secretary Baker had resigned in order to serve as White House Chief of Staff and to run the president's re-election campaign.

¹⁰³ Cohen interview; Woods interview.

¹⁰⁴ Sommer, 23.

¹⁰⁵ Kansteiner, 111.

maximum positive political effect was not lost upon personnel within the government.¹⁰⁶

Whatever the reason for the timing of announcement, within 11 days U.S. airlifted supplies were arriving in Somalia.¹⁰⁷

Although far from perfect, Operation *Provide Relief* may be considered a success. From August to November 1992, the aircraft of Operation *Provide Relief* would bring more than 45,00 metric tons of relief supplies to Somalia.¹⁰⁸ An additional beneficial side effect of the operation was to lowering food prices in the vicinity of the distribution points, which meant that more Somalis could afford more food.¹⁰⁹ Even pro-interventionists such as Andrew Natsios conceded that the airlift had a positive effect on the crisis. Perhaps in response to Boutros-Ghali's allegations of unfairness, in August USAID reported that the United States had supplied more than \$63 million in relief to Somalia, far more than had been sent to the former Yugoslavia.¹¹⁰

One of the by-products of the success of *Operation Provide Relief*, at least in the view of the administration, was a decrease in the level of press coverage given to Somalia.¹¹¹ In policy-making circles the question of what to do about Somalia also took on less immediacy and importance.¹¹² It is not hard to understand why this occurred. The airlift was delivering large amounts of food and medicine. Somalis were being fed and the blue-helmets were arriving on the scene.¹¹³ The U.S. public, having been made aware of the plight of the Somalis and the U.S. efforts at providing assistance, did not respond with an increase in the level of donations some NGOs expected. In part this may have

¹⁰⁶ Cohen, 209.

¹⁰⁷ Sommer, 24.

¹⁰⁸ Clarke, 8.

¹⁰⁹ Sommer, 24.

¹¹⁰ Moeller, 134 - 135.

¹¹¹ Kansteiner, 111; Moeller, 140.

¹¹² Cohen interview

¹¹³ Kansteiner, 111.

reflected the perception that *Operation Provide Relief* was working and in part by the impact of disasters such as Hurricane Andrew closer to home.¹¹⁴

By August, in accordance with an established plan of operations and several technical assessments, Boutros-Ghali requested the UN troop strength in Somalia be increased to 3,500. On 28 August the Security Council passed Resolution 775 authorizing the deployment of the additional troops.¹¹⁵ These additional troops never arrived. Once again some of the Somali faction leaders had balked. In Boutros-Ghali's eyes, among the worst of these was Aidid.¹¹⁶ But recalcitrant warlords were not the only people causing the Secretary-General problems; there was also his special representative to Somalia.

Sahnoun had never been reluctant to criticize the UN bureaucracy for being inflexible and unresponsive. Now that he had successfully engineered the discovery of the Somali famine he was ever more sought after for interviews. His candor made for good stories and stung UN authorities in New York. When the Secretary-General ordered him to "refrain from any criticism of UN authorities," Sahnoun resigned.¹¹⁷ Ismat Kittani of Iraq was his replacement. Kittani, while viewed as an able diplomat, was never to achieve the level of trust among the leaders of the various Somali factions that Sahnoun had enjoyed.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ Moeller, 140.

¹¹⁵ "Security Council resolution approving the establishment of the four zone headquarters and the increase in UNOSOM's strength proposed by the Secretary-General, S/RES/775 (1992), 28 August 1992 reprinted in its entirety in *The United Nations and Somalia*, 189 -190 and "Letter dated 8 September 1992 from the President of the Security Council agreement with the proposed deployment of logistic units S/24532, 8 September 1992" reprinted in its entirety in *The United Nations and Somalia*, 191.

¹¹⁶ *The United Nations and Somalia*, 27.

¹¹⁷ Sahnoun, 40 -41.

¹¹⁸ Sommer, 27.

Another effect of rising levels of food and relief supplies entering Somalia was an increase in the looting of such supplies. An increase in international attention resulted in an increase of reporters and aid workers in Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu. These newcomers, who were fabulously wealthy by Somali standards, attracted increased numbers of Somalis who preyed upon these sources of wealth.¹¹⁹ Attempts to steal valuables, ranging from money to foodstuffs, ran the gamut from attacks on UN peacekeepers at the Mogadishu airport and individual relief workers in town to firing artillery at cargo ships attempting to land relief supplies in Mogadishu harbor.¹²⁰ The level of violence had reached the point where UN peacekeepers could do little more than look to their own security at the airport.

Pressure builds in Washington

By November it was clear to many in the United States that only armed intervention could prevent starvation in southern Somalia.¹²¹ Within the State Department, Herman Cohen found it increasingly easy to gain allies in this cause. Two key allies were Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, Frank Wisner and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Robert Gallucci.¹²² Both were well connected with the Pentagon and Wisner was close to Boutros-Ghali. The latter quickly established direct contact with the Secretary - General. President Bush, although having lost the election to Governor Clinton, "maintained a lively interest in Somalia."¹²³

Complications on the Ground

¹¹⁹ Westcott, 30., *The United Nations and Somalia*, 28,

¹²⁰ *The United Nations and Somalia*, 28.

¹²¹ Woods, 157. Cohen interview.

¹²² Cohen, 211.

¹²³ Cohen, 210.

The motivation behind this increased push for intervention was obvious. The sheer amount of stolen relief shipments at this point in time was enormous. This aspect of the story re-energized the press, resulting in a resurgence of media coverage of the plight of Somalia. The U.S. public was quickly inundated with tales of stymied relief efforts and, once again, imminent starvation on a massive scale. The young militiamen who were responsible for most of the thefts were tailor-made to be cast as villains.¹²⁴ Both UN representative Kittani and Coordinator Natsios reported that 80 percent of food aid was being diverted.¹²⁵

In response to these attacks, calls for protective security forces began to come from some very unusual sources. For example, Malcolm Fraser, the director of CARE and the NGO consortium known as InterAction, initially asked for a stronger, more robust, and active UN presence in Somalia. When it became clear that there would be no such increase, Fraser and InterAction began to call for a U.S. military security presence in Somalia.¹²⁶

These pressures, combined with the continued failure of the United Nations to provide adequate levels of protection, resulted in increased discussion among senior U.S. leaders about what to do about Somalia.¹²⁷ The Deputies Committee met every day from 19 - 25 November.¹²⁸ While some members of the committee were inclined to support direct military intervention, General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was not. Neither was General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC, the Commander of U.S.

¹²⁴ Moeller 137.

¹²⁵ Sommer, 28. As Sommer notes this number was "hotly contested" by NGO reps.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 29.

¹²⁷ Woods interview

¹²⁸ Kansteiner, 112.

Central Command.¹²⁹ Both the Chairman and the theater Commander-in-Chief believed that it would be difficult to establish operational goals for such an intervention and that, once inserted, extracting a U.S. force would be difficult.¹³⁰ If CENTCOM initiated any advance planning, they did not share it with DOD.¹³¹ However, from the start, there was one consistent note in the analysis of the situation in Somalia: neutralizing armed opposition from Somali clansmen would be a "piece of cake" for the U.S. military.¹³²

Initially it appeared that Secretary General Boutros-Ghali might have a method that U. S. leaders could endorse. He proposed sending in a UN peacekeeping force, authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter.¹³³ U.S. participation would be limited solely to providing logistics and airlift. The Africa Bureau thought this proposal was "eminently reasonable" and began to prepare a formal recommendation for consideration by the Deputies Committee

Ambassador Hempstone, whose "Day in Hell" cable may have influenced the decision to become more proactive in the region, now warned of becoming entangled in Somalia.¹³⁴ Among the more provocative phrases he used in his cable of warning was the admonition, "If you liked Beirut, you'll love Mogadishu," and a warning not to embrace the Somali "tar baby."¹³⁵ The Ambassador asked serious question about mission duration and scope, and warned that the Somalis would likely see any intervention as an invasion. For his efforts, Ambassador Hempstone was told, in effect, to "shut up."¹³⁶

¹²⁹ Sommer, 30.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Woods interview.

¹³² Woods interview.

¹³³ Cohen, 210.

¹³⁴ "Envoy To Kenya Had Opposed Somali Mission," *Los Angeles Times*, 6 December 1992, A22.

¹³⁵ Kansteiner, 112.

¹³⁶ Woods, in Clarke and Herbst, 169.

Despite Hempstone's cable, the Deputies Committee seriously considered what intervention would entail. It was decided that any intervention would have to get relief provisions flowing into, through, and out of Mogadishu. The operation would also have to be "blessed" with an UN-sponsored resolution.¹³⁷ It was also evident that the bulk of the intervention force would come from the United States, with a multilateral force arriving shortly thereafter.¹³⁸

A major turning point occurred at the 23 November meeting of the Deputies Committee. Those advocating involvement in Somalia gained significant ground when Admiral David Jeremiah, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, informed the Deputies Committee that the U.S. military could "do the job."¹³⁹ There has been subsequent speculation about whether Admiral Jeremiah's statement was meant to be a de facto DOD approval for a Somali intervention. Admiral Jeremiah and other DOD attendees at the meeting maintain to this date that the Admiral simply provided an objective, professional assessment of U.S. military capability. However, other, non-military participants clearly interpreted the Admiral's comments as that DOD was now willing to become involved in Somalia.¹⁴⁰ Planning proceeded rapidly and three options were developed for President Bush's consideration:

- A. Expand UNOSOM in terms of both numbers and combat capability and authorize the use of lethal force.

¹³⁷ Cohen interview; Woods interview.

¹³⁸ Kansteiner, 112.

¹³⁹ Somers, 30; Woods interview; Cohen interview.

¹⁴⁰ Jeremiah interview, Cohen interview, Woods interview.

- B. Deploy a 15,000 strong multi-national force, under UN command with heavy arms and the authorization to use lethal force. The United States would provide logistic support and on offshore rapid reaction force.
- C. Stand up an UN-endorsed, U.S.-led operation with heavy arms, an authorization to use lethal force under Chapter VII of the Charter.¹⁴¹

An additional option, that of providing a small number of troops (8,000) to establish "zones of tranquility," had been discarded by Powell almost as soon as it was offered.¹⁴²

Another option, proffered by NGO activist Fred Cuny suggested bypassing Mogadishu entirely, using smaller forces in smaller ports. This plan was of high interest to the U.S. Special Operations Command, whose representatives traveled to Washington to brief members of the Joint Staff and the services on a plan for Somalia which included Cuny's suggestion. Not only were the representatives rebuffed, but no mention of the plan was ever forwarded up the chain of command. As far as the Army was concerned, "that plan did not exist."¹⁴³

A few days later the Deputies reconvened to select a preferred alternative. Option B was clearly the winner until General Barry McCaffrey, who was attending in the place of Admiral Jeremiah, stated that it would take at least six months for the UN to mount an intervention.¹⁴⁴ Such a slow response would mean the deaths of possibly more than 120,000 Somalis. This effectively removed Option B from consideration, and Option C became the preferred alternative.¹⁴⁵ However, when the options were forwarded to the

¹⁴¹ Cohen, 211.

¹⁴² Somers, 31.

¹⁴³ Woods interview.

¹⁴⁴ Cohen, 212.

¹⁴⁵ Cohen, 212.

President there was no recommendation for selection attached.¹⁴⁶ The decision would be the President's alone.

The sudden collapse of opposition from the military surprised many members of the PCC. It was widely believed that gaining the approval of General Colin Powell had been the critical reason for the shift in the military's position.¹⁴⁷ Some believed Powell had become convinced of the humanitarian necessity of intervention, while others felt the and other senior Pentagon leaders were supporting intervention in Somali as part of a calculated strategy to avoid being ordered to intervene in Bosnia.¹⁴⁸ This latter viewpoint has been explicitly denied by some senior leaders of the Defense Department.¹⁴⁹ Still others believed that Powell, understanding the political pressure being brought to bear by the Congressional Black Caucus and others upon President Bush, and knowing that the president wanted to "do something," simply gave his Commander-in-Chief what he desired.¹⁵⁰

It is clear that the President was moved at a personal level by the suffering he was observing in Somalia. He drew direct parallels between the plight of the Somali people and the famine victims he had personally seen while in Sudan during the mid-1980s.¹⁵¹ He reportedly said, "No one should have to starve at Christmastime."¹⁵² In October 1999, former President Bush publicly stated that the images on starving Somali children he saw

¹⁴⁶ Woods, in Clarke and Herbst, 158. Failing to include a recommended course of action is significant. Whether at the NSC staff, Pentagon or State Department, action officers are taught to include such a recommendation on their point papers and briefing materials.

¹⁴⁷ Woods interview.

¹⁴⁸ Cohen, 212; Somers, 31; Cohen interview.

¹⁴⁹ Cohen interview; Jeremiah interview.

¹⁵⁰ Sommer, 30. It is possible that Somers overstates the role and the impact of the Congressional Black Caucus. In April 1992 the Caucus had sent a letter to Secretary of State Baker, requesting the United States "forcefully advocate a high-level UN presence in Somalia. Later, in October, Representative Lewis called for a U.S. role in a humanitarian intervention in Somalia. As will be see, given the Caucus' level of effort in the Haiti case, these efforts seem almost pro forma. See Johnson and Dagne, 195.

¹⁵¹ Natsios in Clarke and Herbst, 78.

¹⁵² Statement of President Bush to Andrew Natsios, December 1992, cited in Sommer, 31.

on television so affected he and his wife that he called Secretary of Defense Cheney and General Powell to the White House. There he told them "I - we- can't watch this anymore. You've got to do something."¹⁵³

An oval office meeting followed this round of Deputies Committee meetings between the president and his inner circle of advisors. These included, Acting Secretary of State Larry Eagleburger, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Chief of Staff James Baker and General Colin Powell.¹⁵⁴ It was apparent that the president was disposed to select Option C, but "he wanted to get his top team on board."¹⁵⁵ There was a discussion of the number of troops needed to do the job. Powell's answer was 30,000. Not only did the president approve the requested level of commitment, but he also asked if more troops might be needed.¹⁵⁶

The only remaining issue was the need to gain Security Council approval of the operation and to work out coordination issues with the UN. Eagleburger flew to New York to discuss the matter with Boutros-Ghali on 25 November.¹⁵⁷ The Secretary - General placed the matter before the Security Council on 29 November.¹⁵⁸ On 3 December the UN Security Council passed Resolution 794, which authorized action by the United States to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment in for humanitarian relief operations in Somali. The Security Council approved carrying out this

¹⁵³ Craig Hines, "Pity, not U.S. security, motivated use of GIs in Somalia, Bush says," *Houston Chronicle*, 24 October 1999, A11. Bush made these remarks at a speech given at Texas A&M the day before. Contact with both Texas A&M as well as the Bush library reveals that no transcript of the president's speech exist; and that he spoke from note cards. As former President Bush has not granted an interview on the subject it is not possible to determine the exact date of his discussion with General Powell and Secretary Cheney.

¹⁵⁴ Kansteiner, 112-113.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 113.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*; Woods Interview.

¹⁵⁷ *The United Nations and Somalia*, 30.

¹⁵⁸ "Letter dated 29 November 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council presenting the five options for the Security Council's consideration, S/24868, 30 November 1992," reprinted in its entirety in *The United Nations and Somalia*, 209 - 212.

operation under the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN charter.¹⁵⁹ President-elect Clinton endorsed the decision. President Bush announced *Operation Restore Hope* to the American people on 4 December and the Marines moved ashore just a week later.

Analysis of Key Decisions

Decision One - Initiate *Operation Provide Relief*

The Rational Model

There is little to suggest that the Rational Model offers any significant insight regarding President Bush's decision to authorize *Operation Provide Relief*. As a starting point, it is clear that none of the participants in the decision-making process believed that U.S. national security interests were at stake. The continuing failure of the formal NSC process to recommend any engagement in Somalia may be seen as evidence of this belief.

This interpretation of "national security" is somewhat surprising for, given the president's view of the U.S. role in the emerging "new world order," a case might be for U.S. participation in order to establish global leadership. Such leadership was viewed as a necessary requirement to produce the stable future environment sought by President Bush. Leading the humanitarian effort in Somalia would be a way for the United States to establish new patterns of international activity that would promote the president's vision. But, as far as can be determined, these arguments were not made. Even President Bush himself explained Somalia in terms of values, rather than interests.

Returning to a discussion of the Rational Actor model, it is also plain that a series of cost-benefit alternatives were not developed. Such alternatives are what the National

¹⁵⁹ "Security Council resolution authorizing the Secretary-General and Member States, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to use all means necessary to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia, S/RES/794 (1992), 3 December 1992, " reprinted in its entirety in *The United Nations and Somalia*, 214 - 216.

Security process is supposed to produce. Yet it took the president's personal intervention, directing the members of his national security team to become more "forward leaning," to stir the NSC into action. Even then, alternate courses of action were not developed. Rather the Deputies Committee determined the minimum level of effort that would placate the president.

Finally, it appears that *Operation Provide Relief* was ordered into existence with no clear objective other than to deliver relief supplies, mainly food, to several airheads. This would presumably continue until the famine was over. However, the United States was also aware that moving food to the airheads was not the most pressing issue where ending the famine was concerned. Opening distribution routes would be far more beneficial in this regard.

Thus, the Rational Actor model of decision-making seems to have very little power in explaining the decision to initiate *Operation Provide Relief*. It is now time to examine other models of decision-making,

The Organizational Model

In contrast to the Rational Actor Model the organizational model of decision-making provides a great deal of explanatory power regarding *Operation Provide Relief*. The organizations involved in this decision included: the Department of Defense, the CIA, the State Department, and the NSC staff. Within DOD, the Joint Staff should be included as a sub-organization, as should CENTCOM, EUCOM, and each of the military services. Within the State Department there were several significant sub-organizations including OFDA, the Bureau for African Affairs, the Bureau for Refugees and Migration, the International Organization Affairs Bureau, and the Bureau for Human Rights.

From the beginning, OFDA and USAID were strong proponents of U.S. involvement in the Somali relief efforts. These organizations, the Bureau of African Affairs, and the Bureau of Human Rights were among the first to call for armed U.S. intervention. It is easy to see why this was the case. OFDA and, to a lesser extent, USAID are focused on responding to and preventing such catastrophes as famine. OFDA maintained a presence "on scene," in the person of Jan Westcott; thus the plight of Somalia never dropped "off the organization's radar screen," as was common after the evacuation of the U.S. embassy. Both OFDA and USAID have SOPs and routines designed to deal with such issues as famine. It is not surprising that these agencies should have been "out in front."

Although the U.S. embassy in Somalia had been vacated at a relatively early date, information regarding the scope and nature of the Somali situation was reported by other embassies, most notably that of Kenya. Not surprisingly, the Bureau of African Affairs began to press for a more active role as Somali continued to descend into anarchy, and Somali refugees began crossing international borders in increasing numbers. This fact also activated SOPs involving the State Department's Bureau of Refugees and Migration. The scale of suffering and the deliberate use of food as a weapon were also instrumental in moving the Bureau of Human Rights to endorse stronger levels of U.S. involvement. However, there were other elements in the State Department, especially the Bureau for International Organizations that opposed a deeper level of involvement. Thus, internal division and dissent marked the State Department during almost all of the period in question.

This was not true of the Department of Defense or the CIA. No major element in these organizations saw any organizational gain through an involvement in the Horn of Africa. There were already a great many operations going on around the globe. Furthermore, it was already clear that peace operations were a growing business and these operations seemed to conflict with what the military saw as its primary mission. Since the invasion of Panama, U.S. forces had handled refugee operations in northern Iraq, a humanitarian relief effort in Bangladesh, and participated in humanitarian relief / disaster recovery in Florida following the devastation of Hurricane Andrew, and gained expertise each time. However, these and potential future MOOTW were seen as having the potential to divert resources and strain other essential operations and core functions such as training. Additionally, with no clear military opponent establishing victory conditions could be difficult. Many, such as the UN Secretary-General, were already talking about the need for nation-building activities in Somalia. Then, as now, there was a great reluctance to take on such missions. The specialized units such operations were already in short demand. Both EUCOM and CENTCOM had, in their view, far more pressing concerns with the former Soviet Union, the Balkans, and the Arabian Peninsula.

Against this backdrop the decision to initiate *Operation Provide Relief* can be seen as a case of satisficing behavior on the part of the involved organizations. With the presidential directive came the risk of being ordered to engage in an undesired level of operations. DOD did have the SOPS and assets to mount a humanitarian airlift. Such an operation would involve a relatively small military footprint and pose minimum risk to the organization. For the DOD, NSC staff, CIA, and the majority of the State Department, *Operation Provide Relief* was seen as the minimum effort that would satisfy

the president. For these organizations favoring a more robust response, *Operation Provide Relief* was all they could get.

The Government Politics Model

Who were the members of the president's inner circle in regards to the decision to initiate *Operation Provide Relief*? The list would include Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Larry Eagleburger, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Chief of Staff James Baker. Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was clearly a major player. To a lesser degree so were Andrew Natsios, John Bolton, Herman Cohen and Walter Kansteiner. Had the matter rested solely with these individuals, it is unlikely a recommendation to initiate *Operation Provide Relief* would ever have been forwarded to the president. It is clear that Cheney, Powell, Eagleburger, and Scowcroft were not in favor of the U.S. military becoming involved in Somalia. Neither were Walter Kansteiner or John Bolton. Opposing them were Natsios and Cohen, who lacked the seniority or clout to sway the other members of the inner circle. It is clear that both Cohen and Natsios realized this fact, just as they realized that organizationally, the odds were heavily against involvement as well. By taking their argument outside the NSC process, they reached a wider audience and formed powerful alliances with members of Congress. This resulted in increased media attention and formed new avenues by which to present the case for involvement to the president. When the President indicated a desire to be forward leaning, the dynamics of the government-politics surrounding this decision shifted. Doing nothing was no longer an option. Natsios and Cohen's position was strengthened, but not as much as they would have wished. The anti-involvement faction was however forced to offer a compromise

solution of a humanitarian airlift, which, in many ways, represented a classic political compromise. It was not as much as Cohen and Natsios wanted, it was more than their opponents had wished to do. While both groups could "live with the decision," the position of the pro-interventionists was significantly advanced. Having taken this interim step, there would be fewer options to choose from if the situation in Somalia did not get better.

The Human Factors Model

The summer of 1992 must have been a frustrating time for President Bush. During the preceding year he had seen the peaceful demise of the Soviet Union on his watch. Now the former Soviet Union was splintering with previously contained troubles erupting with, as in the Balkans, savage ferocity. The president had personally built a formidable international coalition, which had conclusively defeated the world's fourth largest Army, and he had achieved unprecedented levels of popularity with the American people. Now several of those coalition allies were accusing him of being willing to help hungry Balkan Christians but not starving Somali Muslims. President Bush had provided a blueprint - or at least an idea of how to deal with the emerging post-Cold War international landscape. Now the Secretary-General of the United Nations was asking the president to step up to the very type of challenge the blueprint seemed to predict. At the same time, his own population seemed to have lost interest in foreign policy and had turned their attention to domestic concerns. And, far from least, what once must have seemed like an all but guaranteed re-election was now a tightly contested political race. As a result there were significant pressures on the president to "do something" about Somalia. The Secretary-General wanted the United States to get involved. So did the Gulf Cooperative Council.

These requests would likely have carried significant weight with the president. His ability to handle foreign policy issues was universally acknowledged to be his greatest strength. He has worked hard to create the Desert Storm coalition and believed the UN should now play a much greater role in global affairs.

Domestically, Nancy Kassenbaum's persistent efforts to involve the United States were gaining strength. There was pressure from special interest groups and at least the potential for the Congressional Black Caucus to make Somalia an election issue. There was also a growing cry for action from the U.S. media. A senior Republican leading a bipartisan effort was something the republican party would not want, just as a Republican president would not want a fight with the Congressional Black Caucus if one could be avoided.

In addition, it is clear that President Bush was personally moved by the images of suffering in Somalia. He has said this was the case for both he and his wife. The president's personal experience in the Sudan would have made the images that more real to him. At the same time, he was not getting suggestions from his inner circle. The question of Somalia had reached an impasse. The result appears to have been his individual decision to order his advisors to become "forward leaning" on Somalia. That directive provided the impetus to produce the recommendation for *Operation Provide Relief*.

Once that recommendation had been made, the president found it easy to accept. The operation posed little risk to U.S. forces. It supported the efforts of the UN, one of the components of his New World Order. In authorizing the airlift the president at least partially answered the complaints of the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC), while at the

same time potentially defusing Somalia as an election issue. In fact, the operation would remind the U.S. public of the president's skill in the international arena and of his willingness to do things, simply because they were right - that the Bush Administration had a heart and was motivated by more than a commitment to security norms and the free flow of oil.

On a personal level, this decision let the president "do something." He was no longer watching children starve, but was assisting in efforts to save them. Potentially, the added deliveries of food and relief supplies flown in by the United States might be enough to break the back of the famine.

Integrated Analysis

Prior to the president's directive to be forward leaning, the U.S decision making process in regard to Somalia could be described as heavily rational, and strongly supported by organizational and government political forces. For very different reasons all three perspectives pointed toward a policy of non-involvement and the cumulative effect was to squash those who would have committed the United States to a more active course.

However, the human factors perspective reveals that personal influences on the president were continually gaining in importance during this period. Eventually these pressures became so strong that the president was compelled to act. This had two significant results. First, it altered the government politics balance of power. The president's command reduced the power and ability of senior leaders to resist any involvement in Somalia. The recommendation to initiate *Operation Provide Relief*,

although not supported by the rational process, generated by the forces examined by the other models was enough to force the issue.

The Decision to initiate *Operation Restore Hope*

Rational Actor Model

As with the decision to initiate *Operation Provide Relief*, the rational model sheds very little explanatory light on *Operation Restore Hope*. Nothing had occurred in the intervening period which would have posed a threat to the national security of the United States. None of the principal actors or organizations involved in the decision made any effort to cast the issue as involving U.S. national interests. Again, given President Bush's description of the "New World Order," and the role he expected the United States to play, it would seem possible to construct an argument, based on U.S. national security interests, to justifying intervention in Somalia. No such argument was made.

The Rational Actor Model does continue to explain why so much of the decision-making impetus in the case of Somalia flowed from the top down, and why the NSC staffing process for so long failed to forward recommended courses of action to the president. Rather than suggest a failure of the staffing system, the lack of recommendations can be seen as the system refusing to recommend a course of action that would not advance the national interests of the United States.

Once the president forces the system into operation, options were developed and the associated cost/benefit calculations were conducted. Of all the options presented, the eventual choice - the insertion of large numbers of U.S. troops in a U.S.-led, UN-supported, solely humanitarian operation - minimized risk. Thus, to some degree a

rational actor process was used to minimize the potential ill-effects of a non-rational decision.

The Organization Model

The organization model provides significant insight to this decision. The organizations with the most at stake in the decision, in terms of organizational risk and burden were the Department of Defense and the military services. Not surprisingly military considerations dominated this decision. Indeed the event which truly broke the decision logjam at the Deputies Committee was the statement by Admiral Jeremiah that "we could do this." At a minimum, the Admiral's statement reflected the fact the military had the required capabilities, SOPs, and routines to perform such a mission.

Each of the options forwarded to the President minimized risk to the U.S. military, both in terms of resources and prestige. Each focused solely on the issue of food distribution, resisting any efforts to broaden the scope of operations. Each option foresaw handing off the operation to the UN at some relatively quickly reached point. Furthermore, as this study has demonstrated, the military had defaulted to solutions involving the use of mainstream forces and conventional logistics assessments. The SOF -endorsed recommendation of Fred Cluny to bypass Mogadishu and use relatively small numbers of SOF troops to run the operation. Such a decision would have been a significant gain for the proponents of SOF and a blow to those who supported the primacy of more conventional forces. De-railing the SOF recommendation is more attributable to a manifestation of U.S. Army organizational bias as anything else.

Also, from an organizational point of view, going to Somalia was less challenging than going to Bosnia, which was clearly becoming a possibility. The sophistication of

enemy forces and their weaponry was far lower in Somalia. For example, there was no real armor or significant anti-air capability in Somali as there was in the Balkans. The Somali terrain, outside of urban centers, was far more conducive to military operations than that of the Balkans. Furthermore, operations in the states of the former Republic of Yugoslavia could easily become open-ended. While that risk also existed in Somalia, it was easier to envision an exit strategy based on easily obtained measures - most likely focused on the amount of food successfully delivered to distribution points over a period of time. Since the operation would end with a hand-over to the UN, breaking the famine, ensuring a harvest, or establishing a functioning Somali government would not be prerequisites for a U.S. victory and subsequent departure from Somalia.

DOD also had a willing ally in the State department. If *Operation Restore Hope* was successful, State could initiate its humanitarian regimes at dramatically lowered levels of risk. There was even a chance that the operation would contribute to the rise of a Somali government. Should that occur, State would be able to initiate other routines relating to the re-establishing of diplomatic relations. Other potentially involved organizations were in the same relative position. A victory could be shared by all, while a defeat would be the responsibility of the military. Equally important, the military would bear the majority of the costs involved.

Government Politics

Several changes occurred after the decision to initiate *Operation Provide Relief* that are revealed, by use of the Government Politics model, to be especially significant. First, the president had been defeated. Avoiding decisions that might adversely affect the president in the polls was no longer required. It was extremely likely that all the key

members in the Somalia decision-making circle would be replaced once the new administration came to power. Thus, there was a finite end to the power and influence that could be gained or lost in the debate over Somalia. The fact that President-elect Clinton had already come out in favor of intervening in Somalia further strengthened the pro-interventionists. Whether President Bush ordered intervention or not, it appeared that intervention was going to occur. Should the intervention be of limited duration and low risk as most believed it could be, delaying the operation would simply mean giving all the credit to the new Clinton Administration. A second factor was the obvious desire of the president to do something about Somalia. This bolstered the pro-interventionists, especially given the lack of success of *Operation Provide Relief* and the relatively short time left for the administration. Even the anti-intervention members were keenly loyal to the President. A third, and perhaps most critical factor, was the support of Colin Powell. Powell had the respect of his peers, and he was known as a man who did not easily recommend the use of American forces. He was also likely going to play a significant political role in the future. Powell's support overwhelmed the opposition from individuals such as Bolton and negated those of more powerful individuals such as Scowcroft and Cheney.

The combination of the futility of resistance in the long term; the desire of the President to intervene positively in Somalia, and the endorsement of Colin Powell resulted in increased support for intervention from the president's inner circle.

Human Factors

Just as the defeat at the polls affected the president's council, it must have also affected him personally. For one thing there was no longer any reason to delay or dilute

decisions for fear of upsetting the voting population or of arming his political opponents with additional ammunition. At the same time, this meant that the available time to carry out any Somalia operation was getting shorter.

Also, *Operation Provide Relief*, while far from being a complete failure, had not succeeded in achieving the results desired by the President. More was needed. Also, there was still external congressional pressure on the president to act. Of these voices, Nancy Kassenbaum was probably the most important to the president.

The president and the first lady, like the rest of the world continued to view Somali images with two powerful messages. The first was that people were dying of hunger who could be saved if food could only be got to the relief centers. The second message was if the armed thugs could be neutralized, then the food would flow.

The president had also received first hand accounts of the situation in Somalia by Natsios and others who had been there. These conformed with messages he was getting from the media. At the same time the president had ultimate faith in his military. His troops had never failed him and his best military advisors said the United States could do what was required in Somalia.

There is one final element which bears discussion. Somalia was a foreign policy issue - the type of problem that President Bush excelled in dealing with and was comfortable in dealing with. If he passed the problem on to the next administration, it would be dealt with by a President who's orientation was focused on domestic issues. He was untried in the international arena. President Bush believed he had enough time to do what was needed in Somalia. The desire to act must have been very strong.

Integrated Analysis

While an integrated analysis of the decision to initiate *Operation Restore Hope* shows that human factors dominated the decision process, it also points out the critical contributions of the government politics and organizational perspectives. In this, Colin Powell was a crucial actor. His agreement with the president's point of view destroyed any chance of a united front against intervention among the president's advisors. The Powell doctrine, that of applying overwhelming amounts of force to achieve the objective as rapidly as possible and then depart, was reflected in the military's option C. The military clearly had the capacity and had developed the SOPs to execute this type of mission. Thus the decision to intervene in Somalia can best be described as predominately stemming from the forces described in the Human Factors model. It was supported by the capabilities revealed through the use of the organizational models and depended upon the dominant role Colin Powell played as revealed through the application of the government politics model. The Rational Model does not shed light on this particular decision.

Secondary Research Questions

The Role of the International Political System

There were significant inputs from the IPS in this decision. The most important of these was the Somali warlords' use of food as a weapon and their refusal to allow the distribution of relief supplies to the people of Somalia. Had Somalia disintegrated into clan warfare without an accompanying famine or had done so while incorporating relief efforts, there would be little or no reason for the United States to get involved. But the warlord's actions prevented humanitarian NGOs, such as the ICRC, from carrying out their mandates. The next contributing factor was the failure of regional organizations and

the UN to successfully handle the situation without U.S. participation. Their failure removed their use as options.

Added to these somewhat passive inputs were the active pleas and criticism from Boutros Boutros-Ghali for U.S. involvement. Several U.S. Arab allies echoed these comments. In the wake of the Gulf War victory, many in the United States expected to make massive political gains in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Complaints over Somalia could potentially endanger that progress.

The other international input that must be mentioned was that provided by the media. Mohamed Sahnoun's brilliant tactic of allowing the media to "discover" the tragedy of Somalia paid huge results. As media coverage of the famine increased, image after image was presented to a global audience, and one member of that audience was the president of the United States. Furthermore, all it would take to reduce the international pressure to a minimum would be a relatively low-cost military operation.

The Role of the Domestic Political System

Although not as potent as the inputs from the International Political System, DPS inputs were important. Chief among these was growth in public sympathy for the plight of the Somalis. Nor could the increasing level of Congressional inputs be discarded, especially given the willingness of some elements of the NSS to ally with key congressional leaders who were pushing for increased levels of U.S. involvement. The lobbying efforts of TransAfrica and the potential involvement of the Congressional Black Caucus were also important. As with the IPS the catalyst for the increasing demands on the NSS to do something was the media. But, like the IPS, all these inputs might be turned off with a relatively small level of involvement.

Role of the National Security System

In contrast to the IPS and elements of the DPS, the National Security System was predominately against intervening in Somalia. Among the organizations involved in the case only USAID was firmly for intervention. There were elements in the State Department that were pro-intervention, but arrayed against these were other subdivisions of the State Department. DOD was firmly against intervention as were the military services. This organizational reluctance to embrace a Somali intervention was reflected in PCC meetings that failed to produce any action.

It is also clear that the president's most senior and closest advisors were initially against becoming involved in Somalia. Such heavy organizational and personal resistance had two significant side effects. One was the willingness of Natsios, Cohen and later Kunder to find allies within Congress where they lobbied for deeper U.S. involvement. This alliance allowed their pro-intervention message to be sent to the president via a channel external to those in the national security system. The second side effect was a mounting frustration on part of the president, who was expecting recommended courses of action. His frustration eventually reached the point where he intervened directly in the NSC process and ordered a change in the U.S. position on Somalia.

Secondary Research Questions

How did the effect of the duration of the crisis affect the decision makers?

Somalia was a prolonged crisis, actually spanning several years. This certainly impacted the decision process. Had a single warlord or clan been able to establish themselves as rulers of Somalia following the fall of Barre, it is likely the U.S. would

have reestablished an embassy once an appropriate level of stability and security had been obtained in Mogadishu. There would have been a far less severe crisis, and had famine broken out, NGOs would have likely possessed enough resources to cope with the situation. By prolonging the conflict the warlords deepened the effect of the famine and prevented NGOs and IGOs from being effective. The duration of the crisis also ensured that Somalia remained "hot" after the dust of Desert Storm had settled and the international media found the famine of sufficient interest to report upon. The duration also meant that the decision point would not only be reached when the United States military had sufficient assets to carry out *Operation Provide Relief*, but also when President Bush was looking for ways to advance his New World Order and when Boutros Boutros-Ghali was touting his *Agenda for Peace*. In short, by lasting long enough the crisis reached a point where a combination of forces was prepared to deal with Somalia. To what extent did the success or failure of prior decisions affect the decision making process?

As the decision to initiate *Operation Provide Relief* was the first major U.S decision about Somalia, this question does not bear as directly on this decision as it does on others examined in this chapter and in the rest of the paper. However, some prior successes did affect this decision. The successful prosecution of the war on Iraq had proved that international coalitions linked under the flag of the United Nations could work. Relief efforts in Northern Iraq, Bangladesh, and the United States had proven that NGOs and national militaries could work together. Given that the United States had moved an army half way around the world, providing relief supplies to Somalia should not have been too hard.

What elements of the International Political System had the most effect on the decision-making process?

Three key elements of the IPS stand out. One is the continuation of the conflict and the use of food as a weapon by the Somali warlords. The second element is the masterful way in which Mohamed Sahnoun publicized the plight of the Somalis to the world through the use of the international press. Without this effort it is likely that Somalia would have just been another relatively unnoticed tale of misery on the world stage. One the media had made Somalia a story, the associated images and tales played directly into the hands of those pushing for greater involvement. The third element is the power of Boutros Boutros-Ghali's appeals and implication that the United States and other developed nations were withholding aid based on racist beliefs. Extremely sensitive to such allegations at any times, an administration trying to solidify gain among Arab allies and advance the idea of a New World Order would find the implied rebuke particularly galling. This was doubly so when it seemed that, while thorny, the Europeans alone might deal with the Balkan issue.

What elements of the Domestic Political System had the most impact on the decision-making process?

The growing public awareness of the plight of the Somalis seems to have been the most significant single DPS input. As sympathy for the Somali people grew, it became more and more likely that a U.S. relief effort would be met with approval. The second most important input would be the increasing large, bi-partisan congressional support for such activity.

Situational Factors

Situational Factors play a large role in the case of Somalia. On a grand scale, the end of the Cold War and the coalition victory in Desert Storm had a significant impact. Each reduced the geo-strategic importance of Somalia in the eyes of the western powers, most notably the United States. The victory over Iraq meant that the U.S. and its allies had all the access to petroleum products they could desire. The Red Sea was no longer as vital a commercial artery as it had been. The end of the Cold War brought an end to any vestigial elements of the zero sum mind set that had dominated the bi-polar confrontation. What did it matter if Somalia collapsed into anarchy? Rather than act out of fear that a superpower rival might gain a new client, there was now no interest-based reason to salvage the Somali government. However, these same changes in the international political system also prompted President Bush and Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to articulate their ideal of a new world order. The timing of Somalia was such as to offer an apparently attractive proving ground for these ideas.

Of more immediate impact on the decision-process were the three following situational factors.

The first was President Bush's personal experience with famine in sub-Saharan Africa. For anyone who, at first hand, has seen starvation, especially among what might be defined as non-combatants, the impact is a deep one.¹⁶⁰

¹⁶⁰ The author has taught graduate level professional military officers for nearly a decade. Significant numbers of these students have seen much human suffering, whether resulting from war, or from other causes. In all these years, not one student has claimed that the sight of starving people, especially starving women and children did not evoke a strong emotional reaction to provide some form of help.

The second factor was the extremely compelling images that were being broadcast by the domestic and international media. The suffering of the Somali people was having a direct impact on U.S. viewers, including the president and the first lady.

The third factor was President Bush's loss of the 1992 presidential election. Defeat meant there was only a limited time remaining to mount an operation, with even less time available if the intervening force was to be withdrawn from Somalia by the time of the inauguration. With the election over, considerations as to how intervention might affect the electoral results were moot. These factors would have been important whether the president was acting from a desire to add one foreign policy victory to his personal legacy, or if he simply wished to provide at least one example of how the challenges of the New World Order could successfully be overcome. While the exact motivations of the president must remain at least somewhat the subject of speculation, it is clear that President Bush wanted to intervene in Somalia to ease the impact of the famine.

The Role of Uncertainty

Interestingly, while uncertainty played a role in the decision-making process, there never was a significant question whether U.S. troops could accomplish the humanitarian mission with relatively little or no loss of U.S. life. Some uncertainties were focused on the UN's ability to gain a sufficient level of participation from the member states, the potential cost of the operation, and the UN's exit strategy.

Prior to the November elections there was also significant uncertainty as to what impact an intervention in Somalia would have had in the presidential campaign. It is clear that no major initiative was going to be taken until the campaign was over.

However, none of these uncertain elements had a major impact on the decision-making process.

Conclusion and Summary

The most notable aspect of U.S. national security decision-making in the case of Somalia is the rather lengthy period in which an apparent rational calculation of national interests dominated the decision-making process. There was a clear recognition by staff and senior members of the National Security Council that the situation in Somalia did not involve U.S. interests and that, accordingly, U.S. military intervention was not warranted. However, the United States did intervene and the ability of the Rational Actor model to provide explanatory power for the decision to initiate *Operation Provide Relief* and *Operation Restore Hope* is severely limited. For that matter, applying any single model of decision-making, even that of Human Factors, leaves too many gaps when it comes to understanding why heavily armed U.S. Marines eventually came ashore prepared to use deadly force in order to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. As this chapter has shown, the claim that "pictures got us and pictures got us out," is simply a grand exaggeration of the importance of the media in this case and a simplification of the forces that led to the U.S. intervention.

On the other hand, the chapter also showcases the value of using an integrated approach to understanding national security decision-making. It is by recognizing the combination of forces best observed through the application of two different models of decision-making that a more complete understanding may be obtained. The decision to intervene militarily in Somalia represents the triumph of the forces of human factors and government politics over organizational bias and a rational determination of interests.

As this study has shown, relatively junior members of the National Security System, such as Herman Cohen and Andrew Natsios were, over time, able to sway the decision-making process in a direction they preferred. This was accomplished by, in effect, leaving the domain of the National Security System and, in many ways, acting as a special interest group within the Domestic Political System, where they found powerful allies. Despite finding a significant and powerful ally in Senator Nancy Kassenbaum, this effort would likely have been unsuccessful were it not for one other factor.

That factor was President Bush. Cohen and the rest were only successful because a sympathetic decision-maker, who was not afraid to be proactive, eventually received their message. In short, the Somalia case demonstrates how a decision filter - in this case the NSC staffing process - can be circumvented. Whether or not President Bush would have authorized the intervention in Somalia without the inputs of Natsios, and others is debatable. What appears certain, however, is that there would have been no intervention at all if the president had been personally against such an act.

But Somalia offered a chance to add one more foreign policy triumph to the legacy of President Bush. It offered an opportunity to demonstrate to the world that the president's "new world order" could be achieved. It was a chance to do something positive about a type of human suffering the president had witnessed first-hand. Furthermore, the president's election loss to Governor Clinton freed him to take action he considered necessary while ignoring the risks associated with that action..

The case of Somalia suggests that the concept of organizational bias and the ability of national security organizations to resist certain decisions may be overstated. There is certainly no denying that the Defense Department and the various military

services were not keen to intervene in Somalia. Nor does it appear that the CIA or the NSC staffs were in favor of such an operation. While there was some support for intervention in the State Department, this study has also shown that there were at least some elements of that Department that were not in favor of such action. Given the depth and breadth of organizational resistance to armed humanitarian intervention in Somalia, one might predict that such an outcome was unlikely. Yet, it was only a relatively short period of time from the president's directive to be "more forward leaning" to the Marines arrival. It appears that the military's ability to mount a successful resistance was hampered by two factors. The first was, that by the fall of 1992, conducting humanitarian relief operations was a mission at which the armed forces of the United States were becoming technically proficient. In northern Iraq, in Bangladesh, and even in southern Florida, the U.S. military had conducted successful humanitarian operations. Not surprisingly, lessons learned from each operation had increased DOD's knowledge of how to conduct similar operations more effectively and efficiently. As the Defense Department incorporated humanitarian relief operations into its menu of operations, it became increasingly vulnerable to being tasked with carrying out more of those operations.

The second factor was the possibility of a deployment to the Balkans if a humanitarian operation was not mounted in Somalia. Somalia posed far less risks to the military services. The opposition was less technologically advanced; the terrain was less hostile, and the operation, at least at the time, seemed far less open-ended. From an organizational perspective, Somalia was simply easier.

It is relatively easy to argue the case of the first two factors. The services did have SOPs for moving troops ashore. They routinely planned such operations and had also gained significant experience in humanitarian assistance. The operations envisioned for Somalia were part of the military's operational repertoire. Likewise it is clear that there was much higher resistance to the idea of a Balkan intervention. Selecting the lesser of two evils can be seen in the light of a classic organizational reaction to risk.

It would be irresponsible to discuss the Somalia case without acknowledging that the decision to intervene set events in motion that would eventually lead to the Mogadishu firefight of 3 October 1993. That event would, in turn, cast a long shadow over U.S. national security decision-making during the remainder of the 1990s, and would brand the U.S. intervention in Somalia as a failure.¹⁶¹

¹⁶¹ While, a detailed exploration of the decisions leading to that event is beyond the scope of this study and must wait future research efforts, it is the author's contention that, at the time of the 1993 presidential inauguration, the Somalia intervention could rightly be considered a significant success and that the battle of Mogadishu was by no means unavoidable.

Figure 2 - 1
Somalia Chronology

- 1960 - Somalia achieves independence.
- 1969 - Siad Barre comes to power in Somalia.
- 1974 Treat of Cooperation and Friendship signed between the Soviet Union and Somalia.
- July 1977 - Somalia invades Ethiopia.
- November 1977 - Siad Barre breaks with the Soviet Union.
- April 1978 - Somalia defeated by Ethiopia.
- 1981 - Civil War breaks out in Somalia.
- 1990 - Forces of Siad Barre control only Mogadishu.
- January 1991 - U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu is evacuated. Siad Bare loses control of Mogadishu. U.S. declares Somalia to be suffering from a civil disaster and provides nearly \$30 Million in aid to Somalia.
- June - July 1991 - U.S. government employees make a series of visits to Mogadishu. These will be the last such visits until March 1992.
- November 1991 - Andrew Natsios presses ICRC and others to increases relief efforts in Somalia.
- December 1991 - James Kunder becomes the director of the U.S. Office of Disaster Assistance. Initially he believes Somalia is of relatively low priority.
- 23 January 1992 - Security Council adopts UNSCR 733 and initiates an embargo of all arms delivery to Somalia. Andrew Natsios testifies on conditions in Mogadishu before Congress.

- February - March 1992 - James Kunder visits Somalia. He returns convinced the United States must take a more active role in providing assistance to Somalia.
- March 1992 - Following a visit to Somalia, Senator Nancy Kassenbaum (R-KS) introduces a non-binding resolution calling upon President Bush to lead a global humanitarian effort in Somalia.
- 3 March 1992 - Warlords Ali Mahdi and Mohammed Farah Aidid agree to a cease-fire. The agreement involves the establishment of a small UN peacekeeping force in Mogadishu.
- April 1992 - Senate Subcommittee on Africa request and Congressional Research Service briefing on Somalia.
- 21 April 1992 - Boutros Boutros-Ghali request UN troops be sent to Mogadishu.
- 24 April 1992 - UN Security Council passes UNSCR 751 and authorizes UNISOM.
- 28 April 1992 - Mohammed Sahnoun appointed Secretary-General's Special Representative for Somalia.
- May 1992 - Ambassador Hempstone files the "Day in Hell" cable.
- June 1992 - For the first time Somalia is discussed at the Deputies Committee.
- July - Mohammed Sahnoun invites members of the international media to Mogadishu. Jane Perlez of the New York Times "breaks" the story of the Somali famine. By the end of the month Boutros-Ghali refers to Bosnia as a "rich man's war." President Bush orders the NSC to be more "forward leaning" on Somalia.
- 24 July - President Bush authorizes U.S. funding of transportation of Pakistani UN peacekeepers to Mogadishu.

- August 1992 - 33% of the ICRC's budget is being devoted to Somalia.
- 14 August 1992 President Bush announces initiation of *Operation Provide Relief*.
- 25 August 1992 - U.S. famine relief supplies begin arriving in Somalia.
- 28 August 1992 - UN Security Council passes UNSCR 775 increases UN troop strength to 3,500 peacekeepers.
- 19 -25 November 1992 - The Deputies Committee meets daily. Somalia is an agenda item.
- 23 November 1992 - during a discussion of the possibility of using the U.S. military to ensure the delivery of humanitarian supplies in Somalia, Admiral David Jeremiah tells the Deputies Committee that the armed forces of the United States "could do the job."
- 24 November 1992 President Bush chooses "option C." "Option C" is a massive U.S unilateral humanitarian intervention in Somalia.
- 25 November 1992 - U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger meets with UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to work out details of a UN sanctioned, unilateral U.S. intervention in Somalia.
- 29 November 1992 - Boutros Boutros-Ghali places the U.S. proposal before the UN Security Council.
- 3 December 1992 - the UN Security Council passes UNSCR 794 authorizing the U.S. intervention.
- 4 December 1992 - President Bush announces he is initiating *Operation Restore Hope*.
- 11 December 1992 -U.S. Marines arrive in Mogadishu.

Sources: Compiled by the author from; Contemporary press accounts, primarily *The New York Times*, memoirs, and autobiographies from participants, official after action reports, and case studies. All are listed in the bibliography.

Chapter 3: Haiti: A Prolonged Crisis

Introduction:

On 18 September 1994, the armed forces of the United States were going to war. Aboard ships in the Caribbean and transport aircraft above the Atlantic, U.S. soldiers and Marines made ready to invade the state of Haiti, engage and defeat the Haitian military and depose Haitian dictator General Raoul Cedras. The problem of what to do about Haiti and General Cedras was a long standing one. It had bedeviled two presidential administrations. The decision would pit the might of the world's sole remaining superpower against an opponent that posed no security threat to the United States. The actual decision was made by a president who had already changed U.S. policy toward Haiti more than once. Furthermore the decision to invade was not supported by a majority of either the U.S. public or the U.S. Congress. For all these reasons the 1994 decision to authorize an invasion is deserving of further examination and analysis.

This chapter will analyze the events leading up to the 19 September 1994 occupation of Haiti by U.S. military forces. It will focus on decisions made by the Clinton Administration, beginning with those made just before taking office in January 1992. In order to set these decisions in context, a very abbreviated discussion of Haiti's political history will be provided. This will be followed by a chronological history of the confrontation, including a summary of the actions taken by the Bush Administration and a more detailed description of the Clinton Administration's efforts

to deal with the Haitian situation. In doing so, three decisions made by William Clinton will be highlighted. The first decision, made after his successful campaign for the presidency was to continue the Bush Administration's policy of forcible return of Haitians interdicted at sea. This decision reversed an earlier campaign pledge by then candidate Clinton. The second decision was to embrace a political agreement reached between the Haitian principals at Governors Island, New York on 3 July 1993. The third decision, reached on 7 September 1994, was approving the use of U.S. combat troops to seize Haiti by force and wrest control of the country from the Cedras regime. The first two decisions formed critical milestones on the path to the final decision. In order to facilitate the reader's understanding of these and related events, a chronology has been included (Figure 3-1).

Having provided the historical backdrop and empirical data on presidential decision-making to the case, the chapter will then move to an analysis of the three highlighted decisions using the Rational Actor Model, the Organizational Model, the Government Politics Model and the Human Factors Model. Then these decisions will be analyzed using the Integrated Model of Decision-Making.

In preparation for addressing the secondary research questions, the chapter will then discuss the role of the international political system, the domestic political system and the national security system, in that order. It will then be possible to answer the secondary research questions in regards to Haiti. Specifically, those questions are:

- How did the duration of the crisis affect the dominance of forces acting on the decision-makers?
- To what extent did success or failure of prior decisions affect the decision-making process?
- Which elements of the International Political System had the most effect upon the decision-making process?
- Which elements of the Domestic Political System had the most effect upon the decision-making process?

Finally, the roles and importance of situational factors and uncertainty will be examined.

Having completed the full analysis of the Haiti case, conclusions will be presented and a summary of the chapter will be provided.

Haiti - an unpromising political history

Born in revolution, Haiti has been independent for two centuries. But independence has not been equated with democracy. In the 200-year history of Haiti, 41 separate individuals have served as the head of state, under 21 different constitutions. The leader's lots have not been particularly happy ones. 29 were

assassinated or forcibly removed from office.¹ Nine of the 41 men elected to declare themselves "President for Life." Seven of these men succeeded in serving in that position for more than ten years. In the nineteenth century, only one Haitian President left office alive.²

The history of Haiti is the history of elite rule, corruption and exploitation of the population. The elites traditional tool of staying in power has been the use of state and para-military forces. By 1991 less than one percent of the Haitian population controlled more than 44% of the national wealth.³ Two periods of occupation by U.S. forces, including a twenty year occupation by U.S. Marines from 1915 to 1935 did not change this aspect of Haitian life. The best known, and among the most brutal of Haiti's dictators were the father-son team of "Papa Doc" and "Baby Doc" Duvalier. The key Haitian actors in the Clinton Administration's Haiti crisis grew up under the Duvalier regimes.

The Reagan Administration

Given Haiti's unenviable distinction as the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, its traditional dictatorial rule, and geographic proximity to the United States, it is not surprising that the United States had long been a preferred destination of Haitians fleeing from conditions at home. In 1981, having just experienced the major Cuban refugee flow known as the Mariel Boat Lift, the Reagan Administration was faced with substantial increases in the number of Haitians attempting to escape to

¹ 10th Mountain Division, United States Army, Briefing Packet, Operation Uphold Democracy: Operations in Haiti: Planning/Preparation/Execution: August 1994 Thru January 1995, printed locally by the 10th Mountain Division, June 1995, 5.

² Adam B. Siegel, The Intervasion of Haiti, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Naval Analysis, 1996),4.

³ James Ridgeway, The Haiti Files: Decoding the Crisis, (Washington, D.C.: Essential Books, 1994), 27.

the United States. To deal with the situation the U.S. State department reached an agreement with “Baby Doc” Duvalier’s government. Duvalier consented to letting U.S. Coast Guard ships to stop and search Haitian vessels in international waters in order to apprehend and return Haitians attempting to enter illegally the United States.⁴ Once this agreement was in hand, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12324 on 29 September 1981, otherwise known as the Alien Migration Interdiction Order (AMIO).⁵ The reason for AMIO was simple. If Haitians managed to reach the territorial waters or shores of the United States, they were entitled to certain protections provided by the U.S. constitution. These protections enabled self-proclaimed asylum seekers to remain in the United States for as much as a year before their status could be determined. AMIO was designed to intercept Haitians before the constitutional protections applied, thus allowing immediate return to Haiti. As of the writing of this study AMIO remains in effect.

The Bush Years

Amid all the tumult of the late 1980s and early 1990s, Haiti remained a political backwater until 1991, when for the first time in decades, free elections were held.⁶ Jean Bertrand Aristide, a fiery orator, left wing political leader of the *Lavalas* movement, and defrocked Catholic priest, was swept into office.⁷ Although Aristide's politics were of concern to many conservative U.S. leaders, he was recognized as the legitimate President of Haiti. However, Aristide opposed everything the Haitian elites

⁴ Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Record Service, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 17, Nr. 40 (Washington, D.C.: General Services Division, 1981), 1056 - 1057.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Many Haitian who went to the polls had never before voted in their lifetime.

⁷ *Lavalas* is usually translated to mean a rushing torrent, such as scours a hillside after a heavy rain.

stood for, and it was not surprising that he was forcibly removed from power in a coup that occurred on 30 September 1991. The coup was carried out by former members of the Duvalier regime and was led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras. Almost at once the numbers of Haitians attempting to enter the United States began to skyrocket.

The Bush Administration and the Organization of American States refused to recognize Cedras as the legitimate ruler of Haiti and commenced a series of embargoes.⁸ President Bush then embarked on essentially a two-track policy toward Haiti. One track was aimed at getting Cedras and his cronies to relinquish power. The other track was designed to deal with the increasing numbers of Haitian boat people heading to the United States. It was hoped that the use of diplomacy and the embargoes would accomplish the former. There was no mention of returning Aristide by force, in fact the former Haitian president was against such an option.

The second track was more difficult to negotiate. AMIO provided the means by which Haitians could be returned, but there could be adverse political repercussions if the Haitians were returned to a repressive regime that could quite possibly punish them for leaving in the first place. While the question was debated among the Departments of State and Justice and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Coast Guard, Coast Guard cutters intercepted and held Haitians on board.⁹ This situation could obviously not last very long and eventually one of the

⁸ Ronald I Perusse, *Haitian Democracy Restored: 1991 - 1995*, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1995), 21.

⁹ R. Allan Ricketts and Stephen Huber, "Coming to America," in *National Security Vol. I: Case Studies in Policy Making and Implementation*, R. Allan Ricketts and Richard J. Norton, eds. (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1994), 335.

Coast Guard vessels was forced to off load its Haitian passengers at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Cuba.¹⁰

This act of necessity presented the administration with a potential solution to the problem of Haitian boat people. Guantanamo could serve as a holding facility for the refugees, thus ameliorating the problems with direct repatriation. Within days a Joint Task Force (JTF) was dispatched to Guantanamo to run what would become *Operation Gitmo*, the housing, caring, processing and, if so determined, the return of Haitian refugees. This operation would grow to include six separate refugee camps and more than 37,000 refugees.¹¹

A series of hard fought legal battles ensued. The Bush Administration took the position that although Guantanamo was a U.S base, it was not U.S. soil and thus, debarked Haitians could still be detained and returned under the provisions of AMIO. Lawyers representing various non-government organizations, such as the Haitian Refugee Center in Miami filed suits and restraining orders against the policy.¹² Each time the government won a case and began directly repatriating Haitians there would be another restraining order and an appeal. Each step attracted media attention.¹³ It would take until 29 January 1992 and a ruling by the Supreme Court, but government lawyers eventually carried the day.¹⁴

¹⁰ Interview with Captain Wayne Gibson, USCG, former Commanding Officer (CO), USCG Confidence (WMEC-619) 13 October 1999. Gibson, citing , health problems and humanitarian necessity, was the first Coast Guard CO to debark Haitians at Guantanamo.

¹¹ John T. Haynes, *A Comparative Study of Civil-Military Perspectives as they Apply to Peace Support Operations*, (Monterrey, CA.: Naval Postgraduate School, 1996), 108.

¹² Perusse, 27.

¹³ Al Kamen and James L. Rowe, Jr., "Courts Split on Haitian Deportation: Appeal Pane Backs Return of Refugees; Judge Reissues Ban," *Washington Post*, 18 December 1991, A1.

¹⁴ Ricketts and Huber, 341.

But the courts were not the only venue in which Haitian reparations and the treatment of boat people were being discussed. Political notables such as the Reverend Jesse Jackson and members of the Congressional Black Caucus also became involved, claiming that the U.S. policy was racist . Conditions in the camps were also criticized. To make matters worse, there were several riots among the detainees.¹⁵

If there was a ray of sunshine for President Bush and his inner circle it was that his policy was having the desired effect. Faced with the prospect of internment at Guantanamo and/or forcible return to Haiti, the flood of boat people was reduced to a trickle. The camp at Guantanamo began to empty out.

If the policy track aimed at handling Haitian boat people was working out, the same could not be said for the policy track aimed at getting Cedras to step down. Although embargoes of fuel and arms had been quickly established and followed up with additional embargoes, they were not working. Smuggling both by water and land was rampant. Some other states, most notably France, were simply ignoring the embargo and continuing to trade with Haiti as though nothing had happened. The only Haitians feeling privation were the poor, the elites and the Haitian military were not suffering.¹⁶ Efforts to involve the UN in seeking a return of Aristide to power were not working out. And all of this was taking place against the backdrop of a Presidential election year.

William Jefferson Clinton and the Haitian Dilemma

¹⁵ "U.S. Tallies 7,477 Haitian Boat People," *Washington Post*, 17 December 1991, A10.

¹⁶ Perusse, 37.

Candidate Clinton

After emerging as the democratic candidate for President, Bill Clinton attacked the Bush Administration on a very broad front. Although the former governor of Arkansas was focused most on domestic issues, he also attacked several Bush foreign policies, Haiti among them. Not only did Bill Clinton publicly state his opposition to the Bush decision to repatriate Haitians, but he also took pride in being "...the first person running for President in either party, and including Mr. Perot, to speak out against the Bush administration's handling of the Haitian situation."¹⁷

Candidate Clinton was also able to accuse the Bush Administration of hurting the very people who the Haitian policy was designed to rescue from the Cedras regime. In this, he was backed up by facts. By October 1992 more than 150,000 jobs in Haiti had been lost. Commerce was down by 67%. More than 38,000 Haitians were estimated to have fled the country. However, the elites and the military continued to be unaffected.¹⁸

In November, Bill Clinton put an end to 12 years of Republican occupancy of the White House. There was an immediate reaction from the Haitian population. They began building record numbers of boats. At the same time the new president-elect and his team began receiving a series of briefings from various government agencies, including the Departments of Defense and Treasury. Based on Haitian activities the U.S. Coast Guard and DOD officials predicted Haitian refugee flows containing as many as 200,000 people would begin to move as soon as the new President was inaugurated. Florida democrats also had access to this data and feared

¹⁷ Transcript #586, *Larry King Live*, 8 June 1992, Cable Network News, 6; Ralph Z. Hallow, "Melting Pot gets Fuller: Immigration Pace Changing a Nation," *The Washington Times*, 10 June 1992, A1.

¹⁸ Perusse, 38.

the consequences that would befall them if another wave of refugees hit their beaches. They warned the Clinton team that the political fall-out of such an event could include the loss of Florida to the Republicans.¹⁹

It is worth noting that Bill Clinton had experience with a Caribbean refugee flow in the past and that the experience had not been a pleasant one. Nearly a decade earlier, President-elect Clinton had been Governor of Arkansas and the United States was trying to deal with the Mariel boat lift. As Cuban refugees poured into the United States, President Jimmy Carter placed Cuban detainees at various spots around the country.

One such spot was Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. After a period of time the detainees rioted. There were several deaths. The Fort Chaffee riots became a major campaign issue and a contributing factor to one of only two political defeats Bill Clinton ever suffered.²⁰

Citing a desire to avoid the certain loss of life that would accompany such flows, President-elect Clinton reversed his campaign position and announced that he would continue the Bush policy toward Haitian boat people. While there were, as will be shown, political components to this decision, it seems to have also reflected the president's personal beliefs. As David Gergen, a close Clinton advisor said, "When he (President Clinton) saw that keeping his campaign pledge on Haiti would encourage boatloads of Haitians to head for Florida, he thought it better to accept

¹⁹ Lake interview, 18 October 1999.

²⁰ George Graham, "Short-term bid to solve old problem," *London Financial Times*, 20 August 1994, 3.

criticism for retreating than to have people die on tiny skiffs at sea.²¹ At the same time President Clinton pledged his support of continuing UN efforts to restore democracy in Haiti. This failed to satisfy either the human rights activists or the Haitian community.²² Congress was also unsatisfied. Debate over allowing HIV-positive Haitians, even those found to have legitimate claims for asylum, admittance into the United States was highly divisive. The Congressional Black Caucus came down squarely on the side of admittance.²³

President Clinton

Presidents Clinton and Aristide met for the first time on 13 March. Aristide asked for a deadline for the restoration of democracy. He asked for more sanctions. He also wanted more Haitian financial assets frozen. President Clinton agreed to none of these requests, merely pledging to a more aggressive effort to restore Aristide to power.²⁴ Aristide pronounced himself satisfied.

Others were not. The detainees rioted in Guantanamo. Protest marches were conducted in New York. High profile individuals such as political activist Jesse Jackson and actress Susan Sarandon, who were normally supportive of the Clinton presidency, condemned U.S. policy.²⁵

First Attempts: The Envoy and the Plan

²¹ David Gergen, *Eyewitness to Power: The Essence of Leadership Nixon to Clinton* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 325.

²² Ricketts and Huber, 345.

²³ Kenneth J. Cooper, "House Backs HIV Immigration Ban: Nonbinding Resolution at Odds with Clinton's Campaign Pledge," *The Washington Post*, 12 March 1993, A13.

²⁴ Ruth Marcus, "Clinton Backs Aristide Return to Power, but Sets No Date," *The Washington Post*, 17 March 1993, A28.

²⁵ Murray Kempton, "The Haitians. The President and The Colonel," *The Washington Post*, 14 March 1993, C7; David Kidwell, "Violence Erupts at Guantanamo Refugee Camp," *Miami Herald*, 15 March, 1993, A1; Yvonne Samuel, "Clergy in N.Y. Haiti-policy protest," *Saint Petersburg Times*, 20 March 1993, 5E; "Jackson Urges Release of Haitian Refugees," *The New York Times*, 21 March 1993, 1, 28.

The most encouraging development regarding Haiti in the spring of 1993 came through traditional diplomatic methods. These efforts had not attracted much public notice or public attention, but seemed to be bearing fruit. The brunt of the work in this regard had been carried out by Lawrence Pezzullo, Special Envoy to Haiti and advisor to the President, and Dante Caputo, UN envoy to Haiti.²⁶ Part of the diplomatic effort involved direct discussions with Cedras and part involved signaling that the United States was growing tired of the situation and was prepared to act if needed. Several statements to this effect were made by both senior politicians and military officers.²⁷

The plan was relatively simple. Cedras would step down from office. Aristide would return to Haiti. A new Prime Minister, acceptable to both parties, would be installed. A 500 man UN mission would be established and would reconstruct the Haitian judiciary and create an independent Haitian police force. The 140 UN human rights observers already in Haiti would remain.²⁸ Massive amounts of aid would flow into Haiti following Aristide reassuming his role as President.²⁹

However, negotiations broke down by mid-April.³⁰ Within the Administration the first steps toward finding a military solution began to be taken by Secretary of Defense Aspin. The Secretary has become aware that "After Action Reports" of U.S. military operations in Grenada, Panama and Somalia were being widely circulated

²⁶ Interview between Larry Pezzullo, former U.S. Special Envoy to Haiti and the author, via telephone, Newport, RI, 22 October 1993.

²⁷ "UN Envoy Restarts Haiti Peace Effort," *London Financial Times*, 24 March 1993, 4; "Haiti," *Miami Herald*, 31 March 1993, A10.

²⁸ Howard W. French, "Pact to Return Aristide to Haiti is Called Near," *The New York Times*, 28 March 1993, 1, 17.

²⁹ "Talks on Haiti Shift the Focus to Aid," *The New York Times*, 30 March 1993, A3.

³⁰ Michael Tarr, "Diplomatic Efforts Fail In Haiti; U.N. envoy could not get military to let Aristide return," *Houston Chronicle*, 17 April. 1993, A3.

within the Pentagon. Fearing that his senior leaders would see these reports as a reason to oppose military involvement in Haiti, Aspin ordered his Department to get involved in interagency planning process.³¹

A Reluctant Military

The Secretary's instincts had not been wrong. The U.S. military, in the main, was leery of any mission in Haiti from the beginning. There were two major elements to this opposition. The first was a reluctance to avoid "nation-building exercises. These were costly, time consuming and many military professionals felt such operations shifted emphasis from war-fighting. The second reason was, having analyzed conditions in Haiti, many military leaders believed that the U.S. military simply could not solve Haiti's problems.³² The failure of the 35 year long occupation of Haiti by United States Marines from 1915 - 1934 to bring about lasting positive change was part of this belief.³³

However, once part of the Haiti Interagency Working Group (IWG), DOD personnel began to contribute to the formulation of various alternative courses of action. Over time these options would be forwarded, through the NSC staffing process to the various key senior administration players in the Haiti case. This process ensured that each of the suggested options would be evaluated in terms of risk and potential gain.

Aristide's Team

³¹ Margaret Hays and Gary Wheatley, eds., *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti -- A Case Study*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996,) 13.

³² Ibid.

³³ 10th Mountain Division, 3-4; Richard A. Haggerty, *Dominican Republic and Haiti Country Studies*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991) 226 - 27, 353, 355; Peter J. Streng, *Lessons from the Marine Intervention in Haiti, 1915-1934*, (Fort Belvoir, Virginia: Defense Technical Information Center, 1995).

Aristide continued to be bolstered and helped through the efforts of a very talented lobbying team, led by Michael Barnes. Barnes was a former Congressman with an in-depth understanding of what it took to get things done in Washington. Barnes was also connected to the Clinton Administration. He has been a key fundraiser for the administration as well as a partner in the former law firm of Sandy Berger, the Deputy National Security Advisor.³⁴ In his efforts to advance the cause of President Aristide, Barnes was assisted by Randall Robinson, a leader of the lobby group "TransAfrica." Robinson was a former business partner of Barnes and also a friend of Tony Lake.³⁵

Diplomacy Ascendant - The Governors Island Agreement, 3 July 1993

Although plagued by a series of fits and starts, the Aristide and Cedras factions finally agreed to meet in order to discuss a transition of power. The meeting began on 27 June and took place on Governors Island, just off Manhattan. UN envoy Dante Caputo served as a go-between the two groups as Aristide and Cedras refused to meet face to face. The talks dragged on, with both principals proving difficult at every turn. However, Caputo persevered and on 3 July agreement was reached.³⁶

The accord outlined a series of relatively simple steps. The Haitian Parliament would be seated. A Prime Minister, nominated by Aristide, would be confirmed. Haitian embargoes would then be suspended. The UN and the United States would initiate training programs designed to modernize the Haitian armed forces and create

³⁴ Jack Ahart and Richard J. Norton, "Haiti" Operation Restore Democracy," in *National Security Volume II: Case Studies In Contingency Operations*, Richard J. Norton and James F. Miskel, eds. (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1994,) 212.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Stanley Meiser, "Haiti Rivals Sign Pact To Restore Aristide To Power: Caribbean Under Intense Pressure, Hesitant President Joins Army Chief In Approving U.S. Accord. Deal Would Return The Ousted Leader By Oct. 30," *Los Angeles Times*, 4 July, 1993, A1.

a new Haitian police force. Aristide would grant amnesty to all officers who had participated in the coup. Cedras and Jean Michael Francois would step down. Aristide would return.³⁷

Although there were delays in executing the plan, there was an initial sense that the problem of Haiti had been solved. Mr. Robert Malval, a respected Haitian publisher, was nominated by Aristide to be Prime Minister and named as such by the parliament. President Clinton agreed to send 50 military trainers to Haiti and proposed a five year, billion dollar development program for Haiti.³⁸

By the beginning of September 1993, in accordance with the plan, UN sanctions were lifted.³⁹ But then, when things seemed to be on track, there was a renewed flurry of violence in Haiti. Several Aristide supporters were killed. In return, Aristide demanded the removal of incumbent Haitian military and police leaders.⁴⁰

Enter the *Harlan County*

On 25 September 1993 a small group of Canadian police became the first contingent of UN trainers to arrive in Haiti. On 27 September the UN Security Council responded to the renewed violence in Haiti by threatening to activate the dormant sanctions and by increasing the size of its training contingent to 1300. The

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Clinton, Aristide Meet; U.S. To Send Military Trainers," *Los Angeles Times*, 23 July 1993, A11.

³⁹ Thomas W. Lippman, "Dramatic Success of Sanctions Linked To Haiti's Circumstances: Economic Pressure Has Yielded Few Clear Victories In Recent Use," *Washington Post*, 29 August 1993, A23.

⁴⁰ Howard French, "Many Disappear in Haitian Terror Campaign," *The New York Times*, 5 September, 1993, 1,8.; Michael Tarr, "Bloody Anti-Aristide Outburst At City Hall Shatters Hopes For Peaceful Transition," *Washington Post*, 10 September, 1993, A27.; "Prominent Backer Of Aristide Slain After Mass," *The New York Times*, 12 September 1993, 1,8.

force was expected to be in position by 30 October 1993.⁴¹ On the last day of September 1993 the initial contingent of U.S. "trainers" embarked aboard *USS Harlan County* (LST 1195) and set sail from Charleston, South Carolina. The ship was scheduled to perform several training missions and stop at several ports prior to disembarking the trainers at Port-Au-Prince.

The departure of *Harlan County* intensified an argument that had been ongoing between key Clinton advisors. Secretary of Defense Aspin was against placing the monitors in country. The CIA was reporting that neither Aristide nor Cedras had any intention of living up to the Governors Island agreement. Violence in Haiti was on the upswing, posing increased risks to any U.S. personnel assigned to the monitoring force. Finally, Aspin feared that once the mission was initiated, it would be hard to terminate.⁴² Aspin's opinion was shared by several key players in Congress, notably Bob Dole (R-KS) and Sam Nunn (D-GA).⁴³

Aspin was opposed by Lake, Berger and Christopher. They believed the United States could not afford another policy reversal. Without having to involve President Clinton, the pro-interventionists carried the day.⁴⁴ *Harlan County* would travel to Haiti as planned.

Mogadishu and its impact on Haiti

Then, half a world away, events unfolded that would directly impact and eventually derail the Administration's intended handling of the Haitian situation. On 3 - 4 October *Task Force Ranger*, consisting of U.S. Army Rangers and Delta Force

⁴¹ Julia Preston, "U.N. Approves Monitoring Force For Haiti Transition," *Washington Post*, September 1993, A28.

⁴² Drew, 333.

⁴³ Martin Walker, "U.S. Tussles Over Haiti," *London Observer*, 11 October 1993, 8.

⁴⁴ Drew, 333.

operators clashed with thousands of warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid's tribesmen in the streets of Mogadishu. Although the U.S. soldiers fought with extreme valor, and inflicted severe casualties on the enemy, their own losses were heavy. Eighteen members of *Task Force Ranger* were killed, seventy-four were wounded and one was captured. CNN was on the scene and soon every television station in the United States was showing grisly footage of a dead Ranger being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Public and Congressional reaction was swift and negative.

While the *Harlan County* sat in port at Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, senior Clinton advisors re-opened the argument about the ship's mission. Secretary Aspin and Admiral David Jeremiah, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, maintained that the ship could not go to Haiti until Secretary Christopher assured them that all the conditions of the Governors Island Accord had been met.⁴⁵ The concerns of Aspin and Jeremiah were not sufficient to stop the mission. The *Harlan County* set sail and arrived at Port-au-Prince on 11 October 1993.

Although the Haitian government had agreed to allow *Harlan County* to dock alongside a harbor pier, the ship's crew discovered the assigned berth was occupied by another vessel. Furthermore, a sizeable and apparently angry crowd stood upon the pier. Brandishing clubs and pistols, the Haitians shouted "Burn all foreigners!"⁴⁶ Mob leaders claimed they would turn Port-au-Prince into another Mogadishu.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Elaine Sciolino, "Pentagon and State Department at Odds Over Sending Soldiers to Haiti," *The New York Times*, 8 October 1993, A3; Interview with Admiral David Jeremiah, USN (ret.) 17 November 1999. It is also useful to note that General Powell retired 1 October 1993.

⁴⁶ "Envoys Chased From Port In Challenge To UN Mission," *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 12 October 1993, 1A.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

Harlan County came to a stop in the harbor, reported the situation and waited for guidance from higher authority.

Exit the *Harlan County*

In the White House a battle erupted between presidential advisors demanding *Harlan County* conduct an immediate landing and those who wanted the ship to leave Haitian waters. Madeline Albright, Larry Pezzullo and Tony Lake were among the most vocal favoring a landing.⁴⁸ They argued that U.S. prestige would be harmed if the ship withdrew. Les Aspin was equally adamant that *Harlan County* should leave. He continually pointed out that the troops embarked in the LST were not equipped for combat operations, nor were they the type of forces that would have been used for an assault.⁴⁹

Deliberations over what course of action to adopt continued into the next day. The specter of the dead Rangers hung heavy over the discussion.⁵⁰ Lake, Albright, Pezzullo and Berger continued to argue for intervention. Aspin hung tough in opposition. Chief of Communications David Gergen, who, in the aftermath of Mogadishu, been invited into policy councils advised "cutting our losses."⁵¹

Pezzullo was outraged. He had been the most forceful of the interventionists. Insisting that the Haitians were providing "theater, not threat," he pointed out that there was an open private pier in the harbor where *Harlan County* could dock.⁵² When CIA Director James Woolsey recommended against docking the ship,

⁴⁸ Martin, 3.

⁴⁹ Drew, 334.

⁵⁰ Stephanopoulos, *All Too Human: A Political Education*, (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1999), 217.

⁵¹ Lake interview.

⁵² Pezzullo interview 22 October 1999.

Pezzullo personally called the CIA station chief in Port-au-Prince.⁵³ In Pezzullo's words, the station chief saw "no problem" with the situation and "gave a green light for the landing."⁵⁴

Despite Pezzullo's best efforts, Aspin, Gergen and Woolsely prevailed. The impact of the Somali firefight simply dominated all considerations. As Pezzullo desperately tried one last argument for bringing *Harlan County* pierside, he was pulled aside by Sandy Berger. "Larry, it was Somalia," he said.⁵⁵

The failure of the *Harlan County* to dock in Port-au-Prince marked a significant turning point in U.S. - Haitian relations. Lake, Albright and Berger pressed not only for a rapid return to Haiti, but would support a forced entry if required. Even the president began to ask if it were time to authorize military action.⁵⁶ However, public opinion and the Defense Department continued to oppose such an option.⁵⁷

With an invasion of Haiti off the table, at least for the moment, President Clinton lost no time in calling for reactivating the sanctions. This was widely supported and endorsed by such public figures as Jesse Jackson. Jackson now began sounding rather hawkish. He argued that the United States must take the lead in restoring Aristide to power and that failing to do so would be backing down to Haiti's military junta.⁵⁸

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Stephanopoulos, 144.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 145.

⁵⁸ Frank V. Ransom, "Jackson Urges U.S. To Be Tough On Haitian Regime, *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 13 October 1993, A6.

As part of the President's increasingly hard stance on Haiti, the blockade, which had previously been run by the Coast Guard, now became a responsibility of the Navy. U.S. warships were soon joined by forces from Canada and the United Kingdom. Once again commercial traffic bound for Haiti began to be intercepted and turned away.⁵⁹

Back to Square One

As 1993 gave way to 1994, Haiti remained a perplexing and difficult problem for the Clinton Administration. It was clear that the Governor's Island agreement was defunct. Aristide had returned to a policy of no amnesty for the rulers of the junta. Cedras was as opposed as ever to an Aristide return. Talks between the Aristide and Cedras camps went nowhere, and the CIA was accused of conducting a smear campaign against Aristide.⁶⁰ The Agency's objectivity was further called into question when it was announced that both Cedras and junta strong man Francois has once been on the CIA's payroll as informants and agents.⁶¹ The situation seemed no closer to resolution that it has been when President Clinton had assumed office.

In the UN the prospect of further tightening the blockade was discussed. This was a difficult decision as it was clear that Haiti's poor were the most affected by the blockade. Unemployment was at record levels. Other than Private Volunteer Organizations, there were no relief mechanisms in country. The death rate among Haitian children was on the rise. At the same time, the imports and exports to Haiti

⁵⁹ U.S. Ship Stops First Ship In New Haitian Embargo," *Saint Louis Post Dispatch*, 20 October, 1993, 1A.

⁶⁰ Doyle McManus and Norman Kempster, "Sen. Kerry Accuses CIA on Haiti Policy; Congress: He Sees a "Perfidious " Effort. But The Agency Is Getting A 'Bad Rap,' Deconcini Says., *Los Angeles Times*, 5 November 1993, A43.

⁶¹ "Aristide's Enemies Paid By CIA," *Toronto Star*, 1 November 1993, A14.

had actually increased during 1993. The border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic was a sieve through which goods poured at an ever increasing rate. Gas prices has actually begun to fall in Port-au-Prince.⁶² Broadening the sanctions would only make matters worse.⁶³

On 27 January 1994, the Clinton Administration further tightened the economic screws on Haiti. Ostensibly targeting Haitian elites, the United States revoked visas and froze additional Haitian assets.⁶⁴ Efforts were also made to press the UN to approve a total embargo of all trade with Haiti.⁶⁵

Clinton Besieged

As these actions were being pursued, relations between Aristide and his followers and the Clinton Administrations increasingly soured. On 8 February Aristide criticized the Administration's handling of Haitian refugees and announced that he was considering abrogating the AMIO agreement.⁶⁶ Aristide also flatly rejected new Administration plans that would provide amnesty to Cedras, despite assurances that such efforts were designed to restore him to power as quickly as possible and minimize harm to the Haitian population.⁶⁷

The next assault on the Clinton Haiti policy came from domestic sources. Florida Governor Lawton Chiles had long argued that his state was impacted

⁶² "Embargo, What Embargo? U.S.-Haiti Trade Rises As Military Hangs On," *Buffalo News* 19 February 1994, 2. Kenneth Freed, "Army Senses Victory in U.S.- Aristide Split," *Los Angeles Times*, 26 February 1994, A16.

⁶³ Doyle McManus, "Administration Plans To Seek Broader Haiti Sanctions," *Los Angeles Times*, 7 November 1993, A6.

⁶⁴ U.S. Revokes Visas, Freezes Assets of Haitians, *Houston Chronicle*, 27 January 1994, A16.

⁶⁵ Pezzullo interview.

⁶⁶ John M. Goshko, "Deposed Haitian Leader Ends Agreement Not To Criticize Clinton," *Washington Post*, 9 February 1994, A17.

⁶⁷ John M. Goshko and Julia Preston, "Rejection of U.S.-backed Plan Deepens Conflict With Aristide," *Washington Post*, 15 February 1994. A14.

adversely by refugee flows as no other in the Union. Legal immigrants, bona fide refugees and illegal immigrants were arriving and staying in Florida in record numbers. He argued this exploding population was putting fatal pressure on the state's social systems and budgets. Previous efforts to obtain federal assistance had failed. In desperation, Governor Chiles sued the federal government.⁶⁸

Chiles' actions were closely watched by the governors of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, New York and California. Each of these states were encountering similar immigration-fueled strains on their budgets.⁶⁹ If Florida won, they would likely follow. Chiles was also a power among the Democrats. The president needed Chiles. He needed Florida's voters. And, at the same time he needed to make sure that the Florida lawsuit was not successful.⁷⁰

Aristide increased his attacks on the Clinton policy. In an extremely canny move, he compared the treatment of Haitian refugees with that afforded refugees from Cuba. Ignoring the Cold War origins of the 1960s Cuban Adjustment Act that granted Cuban immigrants refugee status, Aristide simply maintained that the policy was racist. Several members of the black caucus immediately agreed.⁷¹

Aristide's charge of racism resonated with many Clinton supporters. In a nearly full page ad in the *New York Times*, more than eighty-five religious leaders, actors, politicians and other well known personages published an open letter to the president. The letter accused his Haitian policy of being "driven by race."⁷²

⁶⁸ Perusse, 86.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ U.S. Haitian Policies Are Racist, Says Aristide," *Seattle Times*, 19 March 1994, A2.

⁷² "An Urgent Message to President Clinton," *The New York Times*, 23 March 1994, A20. Among those signing the letter were the Reverend Jesse Jackson, actors Robin Williams, Robert De Niro,

In Haiti, the Cedras regime unleashed a reign of terror on Aristide supporters. Scores were killed. Thousands were forced into hiding. At least one of the victims was reported to have been formerly repatriated by the United States.⁷³ On 7 April Aristide formally served notice on President Clinton that he was canceling the AMIO accord. In provision with the terms of the treaty, the cancellation would become effective in six months and the U.S ability to directly repatriate Haitians would cease to exist.⁷⁴

Randall Robinson, director of the lobbyist group TransAfrica was so opposed to the Clinton policy on Haiti and toward Larry Pezzullo that he embarked on a public hunger strike on 12 April 1994. He vowed to continue his fast until the Clinton policy was changed or he died. In a concurrent editorial Randall accused the Clinton Administration of lacking true convictions. He stated that Special Envoy Pezzullo held Aristide in contempt and had favored the Haitian military. He castigated the State Department for not including FRAPH on their annual listing of human rights abusers.⁷⁵ The White House's initial response to Robinson's act was to announce a review of the policy toward Haiti.

Several Congressional representatives began edging toward endorsing the use of military force to solve the Haitian problem. The first to do so was Congresswoman Carrie Meek (D-FL), who favored direct U.S. military intervention.⁷⁶ Others, such as David Obey (D-WI) said they would approve a UN military operation, while still

Gregory Peck, and Julia Roberts, the Mayors of Birmingham and Denver and the President of the Central Conference of American Rabbis.

⁷³ Pamela Constable, "Relations With Aristide Enter New Phase," *Boston Globe*, 10 April 1994, National/Foreign, 15.

⁷⁴ Exiled Haitian Leader Cancels Refugee Agreement With U.S.," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 7 April 1994.

⁷⁵ Randall Robinson, "Haiti's Agony, Clinton's Shame," *The New York Times*, 17 April 1994, 4, 17.

⁷⁶ Peruse, 65.

others such as Charles Rangel (D-NY) stated they would only endorse a show of force.⁷⁷

As Robinson's fast entered its third week, President Clinton admitted that his Haiti policy had been a failure.⁷⁸ Congressman Joseph Kennedy (D-MA) added his voice to those calling for a military solution. So too did columnists Mary McGrory, Richard Cohen and Cathy Booth.⁷⁹ On 21 April six members of the House of Representatives chained themselves to the White House in protest of the president's Haiti policy and were arrested. The six included Congressman Kennedy and Congressman Ron Dellums (R-CA). Pictures of the arrest made the front page.⁸⁰

Exit Pezzullo

On 27 April Larry Pezzullo resigned. He had attracted the enmity of the Black Caucus, he was not trusted by the Aristide faction and, had he not left voluntarily, he would have been dismissed.⁸¹ As Pezzullo handed his letter of resignation to Secretary Christopher he stated that the United States was on a path that could lead only to a military confrontation with Haiti.⁸² Pezzullo was replaced by William Gray, a former member of the Black Congressional Caucus (D-PA).

Pressure on the president continued to increase. The refugee issue continued to receive heavy play in the papers. Randall Robinson was gradually starving to death and California and Arizona had followed Florida's lead in filing suit against the federal government. The governor of New York announced his state would also sue

⁷⁷ Kevin Merida, "Obey Calls for Invasion to Oust Haiti's Rulers," *Washington Post*, 15 April 1994, A7.

⁷⁸ Elaine Sciolino, "Haitian Impasse -- A Special Report," *The New York Times*, 29 April 1994, A1.

⁷⁹ Perusse, 76.

⁸⁰ *Washington Post*, 22 April 1994, A1.

⁸¹ Pezzullo interview.

⁸² Ibid.

and Attorneys-general in Texas and New Jersey prepared to do likewise.⁸³ By the end of April the President was no longer ruling out the use of force as a potential method to restore the Aristide government.

Publicly, the Clinton Administration reiterated that there was no change in the Haitian policy. Reports of reprisals against returnees were said to be rare. It was argued the solution to Haiti most likely lay in convincing the UN to increase sanctions.⁸⁴ However, a very different story was being played out behind the scenes.

Administration leaders were watching the Robinson hunger strike closely. They were afraid for the life of their friend and of the political impact his death would have.⁸⁵ The military was directed to begin contingency planning for an invasion.

Admiral Paul David Miller, Commander in Chief Americas Command (USACOM) would be in overall command of any operation against Haiti. In May, 1994, Admiral Miller ordered General Hugh Shelton, USA, to plan an operation that would forcibly remove Cedras from power. This plan would be known as Operations Plan 2370 (Oplan 2370). The U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps would provide the required combat power. At the same time, USAID began developing a plan to train and equip a new Haitian police force and to assist democratic forces in Haiti.⁸⁶

Policy Shift

In accordance with U.S. wishes the UN Security Council tightened the Haitian embargo on 6 May. President Clinton once again changed U.S. Haitian policy the

⁸³ Daniel B. Wood, "Legal Fight Over Illegal Aliens," *Christian Science Monitor*, 12 May 1994, The U.S., 1.

⁸⁴ "State Department Stands Firm On Repatriation." *Saint Louis Post Dispatch*, 6 May 1994, 5C.

⁸⁵ Lake interview.

⁸⁶ Margret Hays and Gry Wheatley, eds. *Interagency and Political Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti - A Case Study* (Washington, D.C: National Defense University, 1996), 14.

following day. Direct repatriation would no longer be practiced.⁸⁷ This satisfied Randall Robinson, and he ended his hunger strike. The president had actively considered a much stronger course of action. He had actually come close to authorizing a military intervention. The president changed his mind only after General Shalikashvili personally discussed the difficulties of such a course of action with him.⁸⁸

In addition to the new policy on returnees the administration also announced the appointment of former Congressman William Gray (D-PA) as the new Special Envoy to Haiti. His appointment was welcomed by his former colleagues in the Congressional Black Caucus. As far as Aristide was concerned Gray sounded the right note from the start when he announced that his goal was "to end the suffering of the Haitian people at the hands of their military leaders."⁸⁹

Administration willingness to use force to oust Cedras became increasingly manifest during May and June 1994. Military maneuvers were held off the Haitian coast. Prominent Congressional leaders such as Bob Graham (D-FL) began openly calling for military intervention.⁹⁰ Senior Administration leaders, including Special Envoy Gray, refused to rule out using force to solve the Haitian problem, and President Aristide himself indicated that he no longer objected to such a course of

⁸⁷ Gwen Ifill, "Clinton Grants Haitian Exiles Hearings At Sea," *The New York Times*, 8 May 1994, 1,1.

⁸⁸ Perusse, 87.

⁸⁹ "Dole Proposes Bipartisan Panel To Set Haitian Policy," *Los Angeles Times*, 14 May 1994, A 12.

⁹⁰ "The Haitian Dilemma: Send in a Military Force," *San Diego Union*, 22 May 1994, G-3.

action.⁹¹ The Washington Post revealed that military planning for an invasion had been in progress for some time.⁹²

The Clinton tilt to a more aggressive stance did not lack for opposition. A major source of resistance was Senator Robert Dole (R-KS). He and his supporters attempted to prevent the President from committing troops to a Haitian intervention without prior Congressional approval.⁹³

Public opinion polls made it clear that Dole was not alone in questioning the Administration's ability to deal with the situation.⁹⁴ Less than half approved of his general handling of foreign policy.⁹⁵ By the end of June less than 30% of the public favored an invasion of Haiti.⁹⁶

Swamped by Refugees

Pressure on the Clinton Administration continued to mount. Record numbers of Haitians were being intercepted. None of the existing preparations were adequate for a refugee flow of such magnitude.⁹⁷ By 28 June, the numbers of Haitians intercepted daily reached as high as 1,800. The president re-opened the refugee center at Guantanamo.

⁹¹ Howard W. French, "Doubting Sanctions, Aristide Urges U.S. Action On Haiti," *The New York Times*, 3 June 1994, A3.

⁹² Ann Devroy and Barton Gellman, "Exodus From Haiti Strains U.S. Policy," *Washington Post*, 2 July 1994, A1.

⁹³ "Dole Proposes Bipartisan Panel to Set Haiti Policy," *Los Angeles Times*, 14 May 1993, A12. Note: The Senator's Motion was eventually defeated, 65 - 34.

⁹⁴ Robert Shogan, "Foreign Policy Missteps Wound Clinton's Standing At Home," *Los Angeles Times*, 26 May 1994, A5.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Maria Puente, "24% of migrant accepted as refugees." *USA Today*, 23 June 1994, 9A.

⁹⁷ "U.S. Fails To Use Intelligence Outlets in Haiti, Critics Say," *Los Angeles Times*, 24 June 1994, A4.

The Haitian refugee flow continued to increase. In desperation, the Clinton Administration sought to find third countries where Haitian asylum seekers could be re-settled. The policy was immediately attacked by organizations such as Amnesty International.⁹⁸ Additional military exercises were conducted off the Haitian Coast.⁹⁹

By 18 July there were more than 17,000 Haitians at Guantanamo. The UN had failed to find the number of peace-keepers required for a Haitian operation.¹⁰⁰ It was suggested that the lukewarm response was due to international uncertainty regarding U.S. intentions.¹⁰¹ This uncertainty increased as political debate over a potential invasion continued. Senators Mitchell (D-ME), Nunn (D-GA) and Congressman Torricelli (D-NJ) crossed the aisle to stand with Senator Dole.¹⁰²

On 28 July the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division was given the responsibility for planning a permissive entry into and occupation of Haiti.¹⁰³ This plan would be known as Oplan 2380. It was supposed to be a completely separate operation from Oplan 2370.

On 31 July the UN Security Council authorized the United States to "use all means necessary" to restore President Aristide to power. The vote was 12 to 0. No international obstacles remained in the path of a U.S. invasion. However, there was still a distinct lack of domestic support for such a move. The Senate noted that a UN authorization to use force did not, in itself, justify such acts. However, the Senate

⁹⁸ Michael R. Gordon, "In Shift, U.S. Will No Longer Admit Haitians At Sea." *The New York Times*, 6 July 1994, A1.

⁹⁹ Bob Deans "2,000 Marines Heading For Waters Off Haiti," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 6 July 1994, A12.

¹⁰⁰ Elaine Sciolino, "Allies Wax Unenthusiastic About Peace Force in Haiti," *The New York Times*, 8 July 1994, 1, 6.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Christopher Marquis, "Aristide Opposes U.S. Invasion of Haiti," *Miami Herald*, 14 July 1994, A16.

¹⁰³ 10th Mountain, 4-2.

measure was not binding and the president merely reasserted his authority to use military force as needed.¹⁰⁴

By early August the groundwork for an invasion has been made. U.S./UN plans were in place and there was no objection from Aristide to get in the way of an invasion. Yet still no decision had been reached. Those opposing an invasion, such as Secretary of Defense William Perry, argued that there were still non-military ways of removing Cedras from power. Chief among these would be a simple buy-out.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, it was difficult to make the case that an invasion would be in the national interests of the United States.¹⁰⁶ Finally, should any serious U.S. casualties be incurred, a loss of national prestige would be inevitable.¹⁰⁷

Those in favor of invasion, such as Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot claimed that a restoration of Aristide to power, with an attendant end to the refugee flow, would be in the national interests of the United States. They wanted to impose a deadline by which the junta leaders would have to be gone or face a U.S. invasion.¹⁰⁸

Cuban Complications

At this point, Cuban President Fidel Castro proved he had lost none of his sense of timing when it came to embarrassing his U.S. counterpart. He allowed the largest flow of Cuban refugees to flee to the United States since the Mariel boat lift. The Cuban expatriate community in southern Florida welcomed the new arrivals with

¹⁰⁴ "Invasion Not Yet Justified, Senate Says," *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, 4 August 1994, 7A.

¹⁰⁵ Elaine Sciolino, "Top U.S. Officials Divided in Debate On Invading Haiti," *The New York Times*, 4 August 1994, A1.

¹⁰⁶ Lake interview.

¹⁰⁷ Edward R. Drachman and Alan Shank, *Presidents and Foreign Policy: Countdown to Ten Controversial Decisions* (Albany: State University of New York, 1997), 317.

¹⁰⁸ Elaine Sciolino, "Top U.S. Officials Divided in Debate On Invading Haiti," *The New York Times*, 4 August 1994, A1.

open arms. As the Cold War rules still applied, the Cubans were granted political asylum. As the Cuban flow swelled to more than 2,000 individuals per week, the contrast between the treatment afforded Cubans and Haitians could not have been more pronounced.

On 19 August the old Cuban policy was struck down. President Clinton declared that Cuban refugees would, just as the Haitians were, be taken to Guantanamo Naval Base.¹⁰⁹ Guantanamo began to rapidly fill. It was announced that plans were in place to accommodate as many as 40,000 refugees onto the base. Military dependents would be moved back to the mainland.¹¹⁰

Decision Point

The first week in September would bring matters to the decision point. Congressional opposition to invasion, outside of the Black Caucus, ran high. Public opinion was not in favor of invasion.¹¹¹ The Department of Defense published a figure of \$427 million as the cost of an invasion, over and above the \$200 million already spent on interdicting refugees and running the camp at Guantanamo.¹¹² The Cedras regime had stepped up violence against Aristide supporters, including the first political killing of a priest in the sad history of the country.¹¹³ Four Caribbean states had pledged at least token participation in any invasion and Boutros Boutros-Ghali

¹⁰⁹ "U.S. To Send Cubans Rescued At Sea To Guantanamo," *Washington Post*, 19 August 1994, A1.

¹¹⁰ John F. Harris, "At Guantanamo, Military Mission Is In Retreat," *Washington Post*, 25 August 1994, A21.

¹¹¹ Lake interview.

¹¹² Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Estimates it will cost \$427 Million to Invade Haiti," *The New York Times*, 2 September 1994, A1.

¹¹³ Rick Bragg, "Priest Who Aided President Is Killed By Gunmen in Haiti." *The New York Times*, 30 August 1994, A1.

had announced he was abandoning any efforts to talk the Cedras regime into giving up power.¹¹⁴

Media efforts to cover military preparations for a possible invasion received unprecedented access and cooperation. The identity and numbers of troops involved, movement of naval assets to station and invasion rehearsals were all fully covered and reported. The Clinton Administration was clearly using the media as a source of information to convince Cedras and other Haitian leaders to voluntarily relinquish power rather than face the military might of the United States.

On 7 September 1994, Tony Lake chaired a meeting of all the key administration officials involved in the Haiti situation. General Shalikashvili reviewed the combat capabilities of the Haitian military and U.S. invasion plans. As soon as the briefing was concluded, President Clinton thanked the general and said, "It's a good plan. Let's go."¹¹⁵ The decision to restore Aristide to power by force had been made.

The Question of National Security. Was U.S. national security at stake during the confrontation with Haiti? Using a traditional security calculus, the answer would be no. Haiti offered no military, economic or political threat to the United States. The refugee flows, while representing a burden to the state of Florida and having the potential to severely disrupt the economy of Miami and other south-east Floridian coastal communities, posed no threat to the stability of the United States. Furthermore, if stopping the refugee flow was the U.S. paramount goal, cooperation

¹¹⁴ Paul Lewis, "U.N. Gives Up On Talks To Resolve Haitian Crisis," *The New York Times*, 31 August 1994, A1.

¹¹⁵ Stephanopoulos, 307. Lake interview.

with the Cedras regime might well have been the most cost-effective means of achievement.

However, the Clinton Administration embraced an expanded definition of national security.¹¹⁶ Accordingly, promoting human rights and expanding the number of democratic states were seen as increasing U.S. security. Given these considerations, restoring Aristide to power and increasing the rights afforded to Haitian citizens would be reasonable goals.

Analysis of Key Decisions.

Decision One – Maintain the Bush Policy

The Rational Model

Candidate Clinton's objection to the Bush policy on Haiti was two-fold. First, Clinton argued that the embargo was devastating the poorer elements of Haitian society and not affecting Haitian elites. Second, the policy of repatriation was a violation of the human rights of the individuals returned to Haiti. However, candidate Clinton did not pledge to lift the embargo, merely rescind the policy of repatriation. The event that triggered the reassessment and eventual overturn of Candidate Clinton's pledge was the report of an impending massive Haitian refugee flow and the attendant possibility of significant loss of refugee lives. Can the rational model of decision-making account for this policy shift?

¹¹⁶ Clinton, 1994 National Security Strategy, 5.

The answer is no. At its core the Rational Actor Model requires the generation of alternative courses of action, a careful weighing of the costs and benefits of each. There was no attempt on the part of the Clinton campaign team to do this. Were alternate options available? Yes. The president-elect could have pledged to increase the facility at Guantanamo and conduct all screening there. He could have pledged to provide more funds to Florida to establish refugee processing centers. He could have directed that floating processing centers be created and so on. Without an attempt to generate alternatives, much less the associated cost-benefit analysis, claims of a rational actor component to this decision simply cannot be maintained.

The Organizational Model

It is the contention of this study that organizational inputs had a strong impact on the decision to reverse candidate Clinton's campaign pledge. Between the time of election and inauguration, future presidents receive a large number of varied briefings, many revolving around national security issues. This is a routine function carried out every four to eight years. These briefings represent the first opportunity national security organizations have to influence the president-elect's policies. Avoiding an increase in the size of the Haitian refugee flow was clearly desired by the Department of Defense and the Coast Guard. The briefing and evidence provided to the President-elect, detailing the explosion of boat building on the Haitian coast and projections of higher levels for loss of life at sea, clearly set a decision process in motion that would result in the reversal of the Clinton campaign promise.

However, once past the triggering of the decision process, the organizational model plays no role in president-elect Clinton's decision. The campaign organization was the only organization the president-elect possessed. The only routines and SOPs were related to campaigning and winning the election. So while the organizational model explains how the issue was placed before the Clinton inner circle, it does not account for the decision to reverse the campaign pledge.

The Government Politics Model

During the campaign Governor Clinton's inner circle of advisers were motivated by one goal — winning the Presidency. This group included Paul Begalla, George Stephanopoulos, Hillary Clinton, James Carvel and several others. None were expert in security affairs or foreign relations. In contrast to these tried and true political subordinates, the new people which were brought in for their security expertise did not have a great deal of contact or history with the candidate/president-elect. It is also apparent that many, if not all of these advisers viewed campaign promises as required expediencies for election.¹¹⁷ When DOD provided proof of impending, massive refugee flows and Florida democrats warned that such flows would carry a large political costs, Clinton's advisers counseled that the Bush policy be allowed to stand. Thus, the government politics model at this stage of the crisis pushed strongly for maintaining the status quo.

The Human Factors Model

If there is one thing that most observers of William Clinton agree on, it is that the president completely understood and reveled in the political arena. It is also

¹¹⁷ Stephanopolous 300.

widely agreed that he sincerely held liberal values.¹¹⁸ He appears to have genuinely desired to give full due process to Haitian refugees, although this campaign pledge also was a method of attacking the Bush policy.

It is an axiom that breaking campaign promises is not something a newly elected official wants to do. Although some close to Clinton may argue that these promises were never meant to be treated as binding, the idea that the president would lightly set them aside beggars belief.

There appear to have been three critical inputs that led to the president's decision. One was the insistence from Florida democrats that another refugee wave hitting their beaches would cost them their seats. The other was clear evidence of a building wave of refugees in Haiti and the knowledge that there would be an associated increase in loss of life. The president knew that he needed Florida to remain a democratic stronghold, if he was going to have a chance of passing the domestic legislation that was going to comprise the main effort of his administration. Both houses were controlled by the opposition and the president needed every vote he could get. It was a difficult position to be in. Reversing the campaign pledge would expose the president to attacks from like-minded liberals and lead to accusations of weakness from friend and foe alike. Standing by his word, could cost him support in a key democratic state and possibly imperil his domestic social programs.

The third critical input, from a Human Factors perspective, had occurred nearly a decade earlier. During the Mariel boatlift, Bill Clinton had been governor of Arkansas. President Jimmy Carter had placed Cuban detainees at various spots around the country, including Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. Eventually violence broke out

¹¹⁸ Gergen, 325 - 326.

and there were several deaths. The Fort Chaffee riots became a major campaign issue and a contributing factor to one of only two political defeats the president ever suffered. Now, Caribbean boat people once more posed a potential political threat to Bill Clinton.¹¹⁹

The potential for increased loss of life, offered President Clinton a cognitive hook upon which to base his decision. The argument that reversing the campaign pledge was saving lives was undoubtedly more personally palatable than the argument that it was saving votes, and there is no doubt that President Clinton explained his decision in these terms from the beginning.¹²⁰ This line of reasoning made it possible for him to publicly claim and perhaps to personally believe that the turn around was based on the highest moral considerations. Making the issue a question of saving lives or risking them simplified things considerably. It also enabled the president to act in a manner that seemed to be consistent with his liberal values, while at the same time prevent the possibility of another Fort Chaffee. These cognitive coping mechanisms, combined with the tangible political benefits, undoubtedly made choosing to stay with the Bush strategy easier for the president-elect.

Integrated Analysis

The decision to maintain the Bush policy in regard to reparation of Haitian refugees shows no evidence of a truly rational process at work. There was no effort to develop alternatives to either following the status quo or enacting the campaign promise. Thus the rational actor model offers provides minimal explanatory power for this decision.

¹¹⁹ George Graham, "Short-term bid to solve old problem," *London Financial Times*, 20 August 1994, 3.

¹²⁰ Gergen, 325.

The organizational model does not provide much more. As a president-elect Governor Clinton had only limited access to the organizations of the executive branch and their influences. It is true that organizational SOPs and routines packaged and interpreted the data that served as a trigger for the decision, but in no other way did government organizations apparently affect the president-elect. The president-elect's own campaign organization did not possess the structure or the SOPs to deal with this type of issue.

There is evidence of the Government Politics Model at work in this decision. Those advisors, such as Lake and Albright, who would be most opposed to maintaining the status quo were not especially well-known or close to the president-elect at that time. Other advisors who were close, such as Begalla, Stephanopolous and Carvell, saw everything through a domestic political lens. The potential damage to the democratic party in Florida weighed heavily on them. Nor did they view the campaign pledge as particularly binding. The Government Politics process supported the decision.

The Human Factors model strongly supported this decision. First, Haiti was a minor issue in a campaign that had been primarily aimed at domestic issues. Relatively few U.S citizens appeared energized by Haitian issues and the campaign promise to reverse the Bush policy was but one of a great many. Second, the president-elect understandably did not want to weaken his supporters in Florida. Third, memories of Fort Chaffee and the association of refugee issues with political defeat may have fueled his desire to keep the Haitian refugee problem offshore. Fourth, there were no close advisors strongly arguing to honor the campaign pledge,

and these same advisors did not see much risk in a reversal. Fifth, with the election just won there was plenty of time to recover. Finally, for a president focused on domestic issues, the question of Haitian boat people must have been something of an unwelcome distraction. The decision to stick with the Bush policy enabled the president-elect to return to items of greater personal interest.

Thus the decision to reverse the campaign pledge seems to have been dominated by human factors, while receiving additional support from the government politics process. There was no rational model or organizational influences to speak of, in part because support mechanisms and structures for these influences to reach the president-elect did not exist. All that would change by the time of the second decision.

Decision Two - Embrace the Governors Island Agreement of 3 July 1993.

Rational Model

Decision Two is very different than decision one and shows clear evidence of a rational model process at work. To a large degree this was due to the involvement of the National Security Council staff structure. Designed to produce alternative courses of action for evaluation, the interagency process had done just that. These ranged from maintaining the status quo, to tightening the embargo, to accepting the agreement, to conducting forcible entry military operations.

Furthermore, the decision to go with the agreement did seem to be supported by cost-benefit analysis. The agreement's time line would offer a speedier conclusion to the crisis than would maintaining the status quo or tightening the embargo. It

would be less costly in both terms of expense and human life than an invasion and forcible occupation. If the steps of the agreement could be carried out, all the administration's goals would be achieved. While it was clear that neither party was intending to abide by the agreement, it was argued the presence of U.S. and UN troops on the ground could be enough to keep the parties honest.

Organizational Model

Not surprisingly, the organizational model was much more active in decision two than decision one. The key organizations involved were the Defense Department, the State Department, the NSC staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Organizationally, each favored supporting the Governors Island agreement, and it is not surprising that they did.

The Defense Department definitely wanted an end to the Haitian refugee flow. Handling refugees had stressed naval training cycles, adversely impacted Guantanamo Bay and was costing the department money. At the same time, DOD, with its reliance on the Powell doctrine and a post-Vietnam aversion to the use of combat forces when clear threats to national security were not evident, was not in favor of an invasion. Although battle plans were quickly developed and no one doubted a rapid U.S. victory, there was a concern about taking casualties and what was clearly going to be a massive nation-building effort. While supporting the Governors Island agreement would not eliminate some of these concerns and uncertainties, it would lessen them. For one thing, the accords called for an unopposed entry of small numbers of U.S. forces. Once ashore the task of nation-building would belong to the UN and minimize the role of the U.S. military.

While the State Department had a much smaller stake in Haiti than DOD, it had crafted the blueprint laid down in the Governors Island agreement. Success of the agreement would be a success for the State Department. Furthermore, implementing the accords would allow State to return to normal operations in Haiti as soon as possible.

The small NSC staff, heavily comprised of political appointees and loyal to Clinton, Lake and Berger, actively supported the Governors Island agreement. The accords offered a solution to the Haitian problem without engaging in combat. The NSC staff had taken the de facto lead on Haiti via the IWG process and due to its ability to keep Haiti on the presidential agenda.. A success would be a triumph for the NSC staff.

There is no doubt that there were elements within the CIA that did not want to see Aristide returned to power. The attempt to portray Aristide as deranged stands as evidence to this. Furthermore, the fact that Cedras and others in the junta had once been CIA informers was potentially embarrassing to the organization. The potential for such embarrassment would increase dramatically if Cedras and the others were arrested and tried. As part of the accords included pardons and safety for the coup members, there was less chance of organizational embarrassment. The fact that, through CIA efforts, the U.S. already knew that both sides were planning to renege on the agreement may have increased the belief that the CIA would be able to remain fully aware of what was happening within both the Aristide and Cedras camps. CIA raised no objections.

Thus, the majority of organizations involved with Haiti were supportive of the solution offered through the Governors Island agreement. The agreement reduced risk to the organizations and allowed the use of existing SOPs.

Government Politics

By the time of the Governors Island agreement, the stars in the various constellations of advisors that orbited the President had changed substantially. Few of the purely political advisors remained. Replacing them was a much more varied and multi-focused group. The most powerful members of this group were Les Aspin, Warren Christopher, Tony Lake, Sandy Berger Larry Pezzullo, Colin Powell and Madeline Albright.

Each of these individuals could support the Governors Island agreement. The agreement would be a triumph for Pezzullo, Lake and Berger. They had clearly been the most engaged in the attempts to resolve the Haitian issue and would reap the lion's share of credit. The agreement would have restored democracy in Haiti and demonstrated viable proof that Lake's policy of engagement and enlargement was sound. Success would also visibly prove Lake and Berger's foreign policy expertise and leadership in the eyes of the president and demonstrate that the NSC staff could handle lead responsibilities for such major taskings.

From Aspin and Powell's perspective the agreement was far preferable to an invasion. Powell's doctrine for committing the military to combat only when the united States could field an overwhelming level of force would not be violated, while at the same time the Secretary of Defense could point to a successful rheostatic use of

military forces.¹²¹ Furthermore, within a relatively short period of time, the problem of Haiti would be one for the UN, the State department and developmental agencies.

Madeleine Albright would also receive personal credit if the Governors Island Agreement led to success. She would gain praise for not only a theoretical understanding of foreign policy, but also its practical execution. Haiti would be a UN victory as well as a U.S. success. Ambassador Albright's belief that the UN could be more effective would also be justified. Success in Haiti could also facilitate more ambitious UN efforts elsewhere.

Warren Christopher, as Secretary of State, had little choice but to support the Governors Island agreement. Although it would be a victory for Lake and the NSC staff, Christopher was a staunch proponent of diplomatic solutions. After all, his department had crafted the Governors Island agreement. Success in Haiti, would therefore be, to some extent, a success for State. Furthermore, there was no point in opposing such a powerful coalition such as Lake and Berger, especially when several of Christopher's recent diplomatic initiatives had not fared especially well and the Caribbean was not an area of special interest to Christopher. Thus, for disparate reasons, the Clinton foreign policy inner circle all supported the Governors Island accords.

Human Factors Model

This was probably the easiest decision for President Clinton to make during the entire Haitian confrontation. For starters, the members of his inner circle were all in favor of the idea. This was strong confirmation that the Governor's Island

¹²¹ However, an invasion would not be in keeping with other aspects of the Powell doctrine.

agreement was the best road to favorably resolve the Haitian issue. In turn, this would placate the Congressional Black Caucus, result in a foreign policy victory for the administration and mute criticism from Florida democrats. It would also stop a rising tide of complaints from well-known liberal entertainers and members of his party. Also, once Aristide returned to Haiti, he would no longer be a source of political irritation. Each of these events would make the president's life easier.

It is also worth noting that the Governors Island Agreement was what the Clinton Administration had been working toward all along. The president would have seen it as the culmination of his plan. This was something he had been frequently briefed on; it was expected. Furthermore, approving the plan would mean that there would be no need to use the military in a combat role. This was something that the president was reluctant to do for reasons that will be discussed.

Integrated Analysis

By the time of the Governors Island agreement, the Clinton Administration had filled key positions on the NSC staff and established appropriate Interagency Working Groups (IWGs). Mechanisms to generate alternatives and perform cost-benefit analyses were in place. While political leaders and academics will undoubtedly continue to debate whether or not the Haitian situation posed a threat to U.S. national security, there is clear evidence of the influence of a rational process on this decision. The Governors Island accords offered a much faster solution to the Haitian problem than continuing the embargo, with substantially less human suffering. The accords also avoided the potentially high loss of life and fiscal cost of a military invasion. As long as it were possible to compel Aristide's and Cedras'

adherence to the agreement, the Governors Island process offered the most cost-effective solution to the problem of Haiti.

There was also strong organizational pressure against mounting any kind of combat military operation. The Defense Department and the military services had one non-traditional operation underway in Somalia. Another potential mission was brewing in the Balkans. At the same time, the blockade and processing of refugees was an on-going problem that DoD and the services would have welcomed ending. Organizationally, the Governors Island accords offered the least risk, and the services had the required forces and capability to execute their role. CIA was also in favor of the accords, for this path offered the least chance of exposure of past missions and operations and, again, the least risk to the organization. The State department had nothing to lose and potentially much to gain from a successful implementation of the agreement. Finally, such a success would be a victory for the NSC staff. The organizational model does then shed light on the source of some of the influences impelling the United States and its president to embracing the Governors Island accords.

The forces of Government Politics also pressed toward acceptance of the agreement. Lake, Berger, Albright and Pezzullo were strongly in favor of such a decision. To varying degrees, their credibility, ideology and influence were at stake. Warren Christopher was in no pressure to offer serious resistance. Aspin and Powell were against the accords, but were even more opposed to a full-blown military invasion. For them, accepting the accords was a lesser of two evils, a classic government politics compromise.

From a human factors perspective, the agreement must have seemed extremely positive to the president. It promised an end to the refugee problem and to the suffering of the Haitian poor. Aristide would be off his hands, Aristide's lobbyists would move on to other clients and the Congressional Black Caucus would be placated. This solution not only appeared relatively straightforward and was consistent with the president's belief in political solutions and his administration's foreign policy, but would also result in a foreign policy win that the president could use. It must have been very easy to accept assurances that victory could be delivered, despite less than total honesty on the parts of Aristide and Cedras. Thus, in this decision, all the perspectives propelled the decision making process toward embracing the agreement. The government politics inputs were likely dominant. Cognitive inputs would be the next most important. Organizational and rational inputs were less powerful but still propelled the decision-making process toward embracing the accords.

Decision Three - Use force to oust Cedras and restore Arisitde.

Rational Model.

A rational model process was also evident in the decision to commit U.S. military forces to combat in Haiti, although not as strongly as in decision two. To begin with, there was a menu of alternatives. These again ranged from maintaining the status quo, to tightening the embargo, to seeking a diplomatic solution to a show of force, to using force. However, while these alternatives had been used, they were not as fully explored or re-examined as they could have been.

In part this was because many of the alternatives had been tried and failed. Efforts at a diplomatic solution, whether initiated by the OAS, UN or United States had come to nothing. The embargo had been progressively strengthened and expanded without any apparent of weakening the Cedras regime. Several demonstrations of force had been conducted without success. Furthermore, while U.S. casualties could not be predicted with complete precision there was universal agreement that they would be light. Given that an invasion would cost only \$247 million - only \$47 more than had already been spent on the Haitian crisis, invasion could easily cost less money than continuing the status quo.

A deeper look raises some doubts concerning the degree of rationality inherent in this decision. Although the embargo had previously been unsuccessful, the UN had only recently begun to monitor illegal commerce across the Haitian - Dominican Republic border.¹²² Had the border truly been sealed, the Haitian military and the ruling elites might have actually begun to suffer. Nor was it certain that lack of success in earlier efforts to gain a diplomatic solution were proof of future failures. Finally, it could be argued that nothing had happened since the decision not to land the *Harlan County* to warrant changing the U.S. strategic calculus. The Cuban refugee flow had been dealt with and the Haitian flow was being managed. Although an earlier attempt at a political settlement had failed, this alone was not proof that a second attempt would meet a similar fate. Indeed, if there were merit to the argument that the presence of US/UN troops on Haitian soil would compel Haitian compliance, it still might be able to do this. In view of this and other

¹²² "Dominicans To Allow Patrols On Border With Haiti," *Los Angeles Times*, 3 August 1994, A8.

arguments the rational impetus for invasion seems to have been less prominent than it was in accepting the Governors Island accords.

Organizational Model

By the time President Clinton ordered the invasion of Haiti, the U.S. military had finalized plans to conduct the operation. The earmarked forces had all been trained and practiced in their various missions, in addition to being well experienced in general. All required supplies and logistics were in place. The invasion would also be an opportunity for Atlantic Command to validate new warfare concepts. The large size of the invading force would be compatible with existing doctrine. UN follow-on forces and NGOs were expected to shoulder much of the subsequent nation-building effort. DOD's readiness to conduct the invasion was the key organizational input into the decision. An invasion of Haiti would relieve the burden conducting the blockade had placed on the Navy and the Coast Guard. Refugee flows could be expected to return to normal levels and the camps at Guantanamo could be closed down. Although DOD remained opposed to an invasion, it was organizationally ready, and invasion would be more acceptable now that it would be carried out with the least possible organizational risk..

The State department also supported the invasion, because once Aristide was back in the presidential palace, diplomatic relations could be fully restored. This would place U.S. - Haiti relations back in the familiar paths of diplomacy. The

invasion also posed no organizational risk to State. Should things go wrong, DOD would bear responsibility.

While the CIA still may have desired to keep its Haitian activities out of public view; the agency had successfully executed its SOPS and compiled extremely good information about the junta leadership and Haiti's military capacity. The CIA's input left no doubt that a U.S. invasion would achieve success at relatively low cost. Embarrassed over the revelations about the Aristide smear campaign, the organization's reputation could also be further damaged through failure to support Aristide's return. As a result CIA offered no resistance to the plan.

The NCS staff was fully in favor of using force to restore Aristide. . Haiti was seen as a NSC responsibility and once Aristide was back in power the NSC staff could claim a victory and move on to other pressing items.

Government Politics Model

By June 1994, significant changes had taken place in the inner circle of Clinton's foreign policy advisors by the time of the decision to invade Haiti. David Gergen, a political columnist and former member of the Nixon and Regan Administrations, had joined the team. Colin Powell had retired and been replaced by John Shalikashvili. In the wake of intense criticism stemming from the firefight in Mogadishu, Les Aspin had been forced to resign. William Perry was now the Secretary of Defense. Larry Pezzullo was also gone. Having lost the support of Aristide and the Congressional Black Caucus he had been replaced by William Gray. Warren Christopher was reported to have been close to losing his job as well. Strobe

Talbot, the Deputy Secretary of State, became more involved with decision regarding Haiti.

As the individuals of the inner circle changed, so did power relationships among them. Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili continued to argue against invasion. However, both were new and coming to grips with their new roles and organizations. However, Lake, Berger, Albright and Talbot were for a use of force.¹²³ So was William Gray, and, by extension, Aristide.

For Lake and Berger, Haiti was an issue that had to be successfully solved if they were to retain personal credibility and professional influence. The fate of Les Aspin was a telling reminder of the potential price of failure. Madeline Albright's endorsement of the engagement and enlargement strategy also gave her a stake in the outcome. Furthermore, once the UN Secretary General ruled out further negotiations with the Cedras regime, the only way Secretary Albright could play a role in the issue as U.S. ambassador to the UN, was if the U.S. invaded.

Aspin and Powell conceivably might have possessed enough power, credibility and influence to withstand the pro-invasion members of the inner circle. Perry and Shalikashvili could not. New to the administration and their jobs, lacking connectivity with the president, in the wake of the failure of both Mogadishu and the Harlan County, and leading a military that was organizationally ready to take on an invasion of Haiti there was little chance of them resisting the mounting pressure to invade. The "Haiti Hawks" simply steamrolled them.

¹²³ Maurice Weaver, "Americans Warn Haiti Invasion is Imminent," *Daily Telegraph*, 31 August 1994, A1.

Human Factors Model

Unlike the decision to embrace the Governor's Island agreement, this was not an easy decision for the president to make. Many factors must have weighed against invasion in the president's mind. First, U.S. public opinion was against the idea.¹²⁴ The reliance of the Clinton administration on polling data as an aid to decision making is well documented and, it was clear a decision to invade was not going to be a popular one. Second, the president's personal history in avoiding military service during the Vietnam conflict, the handling of the issue of gays in the military and initially poor relations between members of his personal staff and senior military leaders placed the president at a political disadvantage when dealing with military matters.¹²⁵ Third, the Mogadishu firefight and the death of the 18 Rangers cast a long shadow. Although there was every reason to expect that U.S. casualties would be light, there was also every reason to expect that, if the United States intervened militarily, there would be some U.S. casualties. It is very understandable that the President would want to avoid a second such incident.¹²⁶ Fourth, the President had blamed the Bush Administration for taking excessively unilateral military action in Somalia. The invasion of Haiti would be just as unilateral and carry with it the baggage of more than half a century of U.S. intervention in Caribbean and Latin American affairs. Finally, there was a lack of traditional justifications for U.S. intervention. There was no increased threat to U.S. lives or possessions. The condition of the Haitian populace, miserable as it was, did not appear to be about to

¹²⁴ Maria Puente, "24% of Migrants accepted as refugees," *USA Today*, 23 June 1994, 9A

¹²⁵ Ambassador Robert Oakley, U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia, interview with the author, telephone, Newport, RI, 6 December 2001.

¹²⁶ Shacohis, 33.

significantly worsen, and the Haitian military hardly posed a threat to regional stability. In fact, the invasion would assuredly seem to be politically motivated.

There were however, some arguments favoring a decision to invade. First, the problem of what to do with President Aristide had grown more acute since the *Harlan County* had turned back from Port-au-Prince. Aristide had accused the administration of being racist and threatened to repeal the AMIO agreements.¹²⁷ Second, a coalition of powerful lobbyists, noted liberal personalities and the Congressional Black Caucus were putting increasingly intense pressure on President Clinton to end the Haitian crisis. Some of the personalities were friends of the president and the first lady. The lobbyists were connected with several of the president's key advisors and the Black Caucus was essential to the successful implementation of the president's domestic agenda. The ability of this group to embarrass the administration had been repeatedly demonstrated. Restoring Aristide would make this entire set of problems go away. Third, and perhaps most important, it appeared as though nothing the administration had tried to this point had worked in the slightest, congressional elections were approaching, and the issue had dragged on for a long, long time. Fourth, lawsuits aimed at the federal government were being mounted by democratic supporters. The potential for these lawsuits to grow in number and severity was extremely high. Fifth, the U.S. military promised an invasion could be successfully mounted and that casualties would be low. Finally, based on the president's background, political statements and policies, it is reasonable to believe that, at some level, he wanted to end the rule of the Cedras regime and restore Aristide to power because William

¹²⁷ John M. Goshko, "Deposed Haitian Leader Ends Agreement Not to Criticize Clinton, *Washington Post*, 9 February 1994, A17.

Clinton personally felt it was the right thing to do, just as it is reasonable to believe that he felt a military invasion was the wrong way to do it.

The president was beset by conflicting personal desires. The ability to use an invasion as a sword to cut the Gordian knot of Haiti was surely tempting. However, it was clear that the president was not fully comfortable with using force and the loss of life, however small, that decision would entail. The president's willingness to turn to Jimmy Carter, Colin Powell and Sam Nunn for one last try at diplomacy is evidence of this desire, for the use of these envoys entailed significant risk. In a worst-case scenario the envoys might have been killed or held hostage by the junta. If successful, credit would likely go to the envoys for saving the situation.

In the end, the president obviously authorized the invasion. But this decision seems to have been in spite of his personal desire to find a different answer to the Haitian problem.

Integrated Analysis.

If, one accepts that solving the Haitian dilemma was in the national security interests of the United States, as the Clinton National Security Strategy would argue, then the decision to invade was influenced by a rational actor process. Every tool of statecraft which had previously been applied had not been successful. The Cedras regime was more entrenched than ever. The cost of the embargo was already equal to the cost of an invasion. There was no question of a U.S. victory; only how many U.S. and Haitian casualties would be incurred achieving that victory. Furthermore a display of U.S. resolve would indicate to other world leaders that not only was the Clinton Administration prepared to use force but also that U.S. opponents could not

expect taunts to U.S. power to go unanswered. Successfully using force in Haiti might well lessen the possibility of having to use force elsewhere. However, as discussed earlier, there was also no overwhelming reason why different diplomatic or economic initiatives might not work, nor were there any developments to suggest that an invasion had to be mounted by a certain date or the cost benefit calculus would move in a direction unfavorable to the United States. Thus the degree to which the decision to invade can be said to have been derived in a method consistent with the Rational Actor Model is debatable.

Organizationally there was still resistance to the use of force from DOD and the military services. However this resistance was to a large extent negated by the Defense's own analysis which indicated an overwhelming U.S. victory was inevitable. Furthermore, within DOD there were sub-units, such as USACOM, which were in favor of invasion. DOD was also organizationally prepared to conduct the invasion. All forces were in place. Plans had been rehearsed. There were no structural impediments to action and everything DOD had done to get ready for an invasion had progressively reduced the organizational risks of an invasion. Indeed, DOD feared invasion far less than the nation-building effort that would follow it. No other organization offered any resistance to a U.S. invasion.

It is in the realm of Government Politics where the most obvious changes took place between the decision to embrace the Governors Island agreement and the decision to invade. The most potentially powerful opponents of an invasion — Les Aspin and especially Colin Powell — were gone. Although Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili apparently did offer some opposition to the proposed invasion,

this was not enough to overcome the coalition of Gray, Albright, Berger and Lake. Gray was even more hawkish than Pezzullo and the remaining three members had acquired a vested interest in resolving the problem of Haiti. David Gergen had moved into the inner circle of policy advisors and was also in favor of invasion. Warren Christopher could have potentially added his voice to those opposing an invasion, but he had barely survived Mogadishu and was clearly not going to expend any political capital arguing with his peers who clearly had the upper hand. The new power relationships that were created with the removal of Powell and Aspin from the debate predictably resulted in a strong Government Politics push for invasion.

The combined influences of the Organizational and Government Politics perspectives, and to a lesser degree the Rational Actor Model, overcame the president's reluctance, which was based in human factors, to authorize an invasion of Haiti. As has been noted, there were many factors which would have made a Haitian invasion uninviting to the president. His willingness to risk the Carter mission points to this. However, human factors arguing for an invasion, such as an understandable desire to be done with the issue, made the president's resistance less adamant as it might have been.

This influence was strongly backed by those stemming from government politics. The president's advisors were, if anything, even more strong in their recommendation to invade than they had been in favor of the Governors Island agreement, perhaps due to a perceived exhaustion of options. There were no dissenting voices close to the president's ear. There were no organizational impediments to a go decision; in fact organizationally, the tools that would be used

were more ready than ever. All these factors combined to overcome the president's slight reluctance to use military force.

Role Of the International Political System

The IPS played a major role in three ways. First, an event in the IPS, the overthrow of Aristide, served as a trigger to the confrontation. Second, actors in the IPS continually closed out potential solutions. These actions included the failure of the OAS and the UN to broker an Aristide return through diplomatic means, refusal of third party states to accept Haitian boat people within their borders, and the lack of commitment or capability on the part of the Dominican Republic to seal its border with Haiti. Each of these events represented lost possible solutions to the vexing problem of Haiti and narrowed the menu of options available to U.S decision-makers.

Another IPS event that curtailed and derailed U.S. efforts to solve the Haitian problem was the Mogadishu fire fight, as this gave Cedras and other Haitian leaders a powerful negative analogy to suggest to both their U.S. counterparts and the U.S. public in general. Invoking the image of Mogadishu was primarily responsible for the retreat of the *Harlan County* and U.S. efforts to enforce the Governors Island agreement.

However, the third way in which inputs from the IPS affected the United States was to spur or facilitate action. The refugee flows, both from Haiti and, later, from Cuba played a key role in this regard. Each time there was a renewed surge of boat people heading for U.S. shores, every time a refugee entered the camps at Guantanamo, made it ashore in Florida, or was embarked in a U.S. vessel, pressure to act increased on the U.S. leadership. Additionally the presence of AMIO facilitated

U.S efforts to return refugees and UN Security Council Resolution 940 provided required international legitimacy for the U.S. invasion. In a similar fashion the inclusion of small number of police and military forces from other Caribbean nations such as Jamaica provided at least a show of regional support for the U.S. use of force.

Role of the Domestic Political System

The Domestic Political System played three main roles in the Haiti crisis. First, it continually put pressure on the Clinton Administration to find a solution to the problem. This pressure was far stronger than any emanating from the IPS. The pressure came about through a combination of a highly successful, well financed and carefully targeted lobbying efforts, the demands of a powerful congressional caucus and the use of legal action by a small number of governors.

At the same time, the inability of pro-Aristide forces to energize public opinion in support of an invasion of Haiti served to prolong the crisis as the president continually sought for a way to oust Cedras without the use of force. The result was to put the president in a bind.

The third role the DPS played was to set a limit on the time available to find a solution. Inputs from the president's own political party resulted in the determination that Haiti would have to be resolved before the November elections, preferably well before November. Members of the administration reacted as though they had been forced to make a choice.

Role of the National Security System

The National Security System served as a powerful conduit through which pro-Aristide forces could transmit their calls for action. The NSS also provided the tools and capabilities to solve the Haitian problem. Eventually, some members of the NSS became another source of advocates pushing for an invasion of Haiti. The NSS was also the locus of planning for an invasion.

Secondary Research Questions.

Impact of duration on the crisis.

The U.S. confrontation with Haiti spanned three presidencies and affected the Clinton Administration for nearly two years. The long duration of the crisis did affect which forces dominated the decision-making process.

The first studied decision, that to maintain the Bush policy toward Haitian refugees, was made in the face of a short deadline. Inputs from DOD and the intelligence community clearly indicated that the new president would be facing a massive Haitian refugee flow from the moment he was sworn in. The short-fuzed deadline, coupled with a lack of procedures designed to impart a rational process to decision making and a lack of organizational inputs led to a decision that was dominated by Human Factors and domestic inputs.

By the time of the decision to embrace the Governors Island agreement the decision-making process became more susceptible to influence by pro-Aristide forces within the United States. Greater time also allowed organizations time to develop the SOPs needed to mount an invasion at reduced risks to the organizations involved. This process effectively decreased the effectiveness of organizational resistance

toward the use of force as the crisis dragged on. The duration of the crisis also resulted in increasing 'ownership' of Haiti by certain of the president's closest advisors and the creation of Haiti hawks and doves. Time was also required to increase domestic awareness of the issue, activate the judicial system and energize some level of congressional interest.

When the decision to invade had been reached several events had become incredibly influential because the crisis had been so long lived. One such event was the impact of Mogadishu. Had the Haitian situation been more rapidly dealt with, either through the use of military force or an approach along the lines of the Governors Island agreement, the battle of Mogadishu would have had far less of an impact. As it was, since Haiti was still an on-going issue, the aftermath of Mogadishu effectively added months to resolving the Haitian crisis.

There were two other major impacts associated with the duration of the crisis. One was in the shifting power bases among President Clinton's advisors, leading to an increase in the role of government politics. Early in the crisis, Colin Powell and Les Aspin had enough influence to block any efforts at the use of military force. By the time of the Governors Island agreements they were still powerful enough to have a major impact on the process. Their removal from the inner circle left the hawks with no significant opposition. Indeed, it could be argued that once Powell had retired, no advisor could have successfully blocked a recommendation to invade that had been endorsed by Lake, Albright, Gray and Berger. The second impact was rooted in the human factors perspective, leading to a greater willingness to consider the use of force. As the crisis dragged on, the president grew more and more tired of it. It

became a progressively larger burden. Aristide was an ever larger source of frustration and criticism. The linkage of domestic concerns and domestic political support to Haitian issues grew. Over time the president grew more willing to accept any proposal which offered a way out.

Which elements of the International Political System had the most effect on the decision-making process?

From the U.S. perspective of the Haitian crisis, three international inputs stand out in the case of Haiti. The first is the impact associated with the arrival of Haitian refugees on U.S. soil. Had Cedras locked down the Haitian coastline, or had Haitians fled to the nearest safe haven, vice the most promising in terms of building a new life, it is quite possible that there would have been no Haitian crisis. Throughout the crisis, refugees or impending waves of refugees clearly provided pressure to act.

The second input was the effect of the battle of Mogadishu. The desire to avoid a 'second Mogadishu' was clearly evident in the decision to turn back the Harlan County, effectively abandoning the Governors Island accords. The collapse of the accords dramatically changed the course of the crisis. Power relationships among the president's advisors changed, eventually leaving the hawks with no significant opposition. A political solution no longer seemed possible. Development of contingency plans accelerated. It is not possible to say with certainty that the Clinton Administration would have ordered the Harlan County pierside had the battle of Mogadishu not occurred, but that possibility cannot be discounted. Had such a decision been made the course of the crisis would have been very different and it is quite possible that the third most important input might not have mattered.

The third input was the release of a Cuban refugee flow by Fidel Castro. Perfectly timed, the Cuban flow caught the Clinton administration unprepared. The disparate treatment of the Haitian and Cuban refugee groups caused domestic political headaches for the President; and increased the strain on forces trying to interdict the Haitians. Above all it helped create the impression that the Clinton Administration was failing and flailing when it came to refugees and immigration.

Which elements of the Domestic Political System had the most impact on the decision-making process?

Five major domestic inputs stand out. The first is the increasingly proactive demand by the Congressional Black Caucus that President Clinton restore President Aristide to power. The Clinton Administration needed the Caucus to support and enact its domestic political agenda. Collectively, although still a minority on Capitol Hill, the Caucus simply could not be ignored, or placated with anything less than a return of Aristide to power.

The second input was Randall Robinson's hunger strike. Due to his personal and professional connections with senior members of the NSC staff, Robinson successfully caused the administration to reverse its policy with regard to Haitian refugees. This put more strain on the organizations dealing with the refugee flows and, in turn, increased the pressure to find a solution. The hunger strike also showed that the administration was accessible and susceptible to pressure, reassuring the Black Congressional Caucus and pro-Aristide forces that they could eventually attain success, if they could use the right tactics.

The third input was the growing body of anti-government lawsuits being filed by states impacted with large refugee and immigrant flows. Some of these states, such as Florida, were democratic strongholds. The image of democratic governor suing democratic president was not a pleasant one. Nor was the image of a republican governor and potential presidential candidate, such as Pete Wilson of California winning such a lawsuit. In addition to the political fall-out, if these suits were successful, although such an outcome was unlikely, the price tag would be staggering.

The fourth input was the upcoming congressional elections. If Haiti were not resolved before November, it would be a campaign issue in numerous elections. Given the lack of public support for an invasion, democratic incumbents and hopefuls would have to either back the President and risk a loss of votes or distance themselves from the administration. This would give a picture of a White House out of touch with its own party, much less the rest of the nation.

Each of these inputs could be negated if Aristide were to be successfully restored to power. However, the fifth input — a consistent lack of public support for an invasion — meant that the restoration of democracy in Haiti had to be conducted without excessive U.S. casualties. It was impossible to precisely how many casualties would be considered 'excessive,' but in the aftermath of Mogadishu, the number was believed to be small. It is likely that lack of public support acted as a brake on the administration until the fall elections were nigh.

The Role of Situational Factors

The most important situational factor, and the most obvious, in the Haiti case is the geographic proximity of Haiti to the United States. Were Haiti's refugees someone else's problem, U.S. involvement, much less invasion, would likely be minimal. The next most important situational factor was the end of the Cold War. Preserving democracy was now considered to be more in the U.S. national interest than maintaining 'friendly' despots in power. The combined impact of these two situational factors was to ensure the involvement of the United States, while guaranteeing that leaving Cedras in power would not be included in the list of potential solutions.

The Role of Uncertainty

From the U.S. point of view there were two key aspects of the crisis with regards to uncertainty. The first was how determined Cedras was to resist by force if necessary and how much damage could his force inflict? The second was the nature of U.S. public response if U.S. soldiers were killed in conflict with the Haitians. It seems clear that the decision to pull *Harlan County* out of Port-au-Prince harbor was largely influenced by these uncertainties. These uncertainties continued to plague the president and his key advisors, even after it was clear that U.S. military forces would meet no serious opposition and that by any predictions U.S. casualties would be light. However, Mogadishu has shown under some circumstances, light casualties would be enough to adversely affect the opinion of key members of Congress and the U.S. public.

Conclusion and Summary

Analysis of U.S. national security decision-making in the confrontation with Haiti indicates that no one model of decision making was preponderant across the duration of the crisis. It suggests that a combination of government politics and human factors dominated in the early stages. By the mid-point of the crisis, all decision-making perspectives were engaged, pushing the decision-maker away from any solution involving the use of force and toward trying to make the Governors Island accords work. At the final stage of the crisis, the decision-making seemed to be best explained through an application of the organizational model, specifically the availability of ready forces and mature battle plans and by the government politics model which would focus on the dominance of the Haiti hawks in the president's inner circle of decision makers. Although there was an effort to employ a rational process, it seems that this effort was not as robust as it could have been and may have been undertaken simply to provide proponents of ammunition with an appearance of rational actor behavior. It also seems clear that the President was personally conflicted about the options facing him, with certain human factors in opposition to others, leaving him reluctant if not opposed to authorizing the use of force. This reluctance was overcome by a combination of other factors best identified and explained through the use of other decision-making perspectives.

It would also appear that the integrated model of decision making can be successfully used to identify key inputs from the domestic and international political systems as well as the role of different decision-making perspectives. It would also appear that this provides the analyst with a much deeper and accurate depiction of

decision-making in this crisis than the use of any single mode of decision-making. It is now time to examine decision-making in the case of Rwanda.

Figure 3-1 Haiti Chronology

- 29 September 1981. E.O. 12324 Alien Migration Interdiction Order issued by President Reagan.
- February 1991. Jean Bertrand Aristide is inaugurated as president of Haiti.
- 30 September 1991. Aristide is toppled in a coup led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras. The United States and the OAS refuse to recognize the Cedras government.
- 2 October 1991. The United States blocks all foreign aid and Haitian export licenses. Additional Coast Guard cutters are assigned to AMIO patrols.
- 3 October 1991. The European Community suspends foreign aid to Haiti.
- 4 October 1991. OAS representatives meet with Cedras. Cedras refuses to surrender power.
- November 1991. U.S. Coast Guard cutters patrolling off Haiti report they are becoming overcrowded with refugees. Refugees are debarked at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay Cuba. *Operation Gitmo* is ordered into effect. The first Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) prohibiting the repatriation of Haitian refugees is filed in the Federal District Court of Southern Florida.
- December 1991. 6,600 Haitians are in Guantanamo. The first TRO is defeated. The second TRO is filed in Miami. The Reverend Jesse Jackson visits Guantanamo.
- February 1992. 12,000 Haitians are in Guantanamo. The second TRO is overturned. Repatriations begin again at the rate of 2,000 a week. By the end of the month only 3,500 Haitians are in Guantanamo.
- April 1992. The OAS endorses a voluntary embargo of Haiti. The numbers of Haitians intercepted at sea climbs. By the end of the month more than 12,500 are in Guantanamo.
- 24 May 1992. The President signs Executive Order Nr. 12807, ordering the direct repatriation of Haitians intercepted at sea. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is alerted to begin standing down Operation Gitmo.
- June 1992. The Government Accounting Office reports that the embargo of Haiti was a failure.

- 29 July 1992. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York voids Executive Order Nr. 12807. Candidate William Clinton publicly attacks the Bush Haiti policy.
- August 1992. The Supreme Court upholds Executive Order 12807. Direct repatriations resume.
- October 1992. It is estimated that more than 150,000 jobs had been lost in Haiti. Haitian commerce was down by 67%. 38,000 Haitians were have estimated to have fled the country.
- November 1992. Candidate Clinton pledges to overturn the Haitian repatriation policy if elected. Clinton wins the election. Coast Guard analysts predict as many as 200,000 Haitians are preparing to flee the country by sea. President-elect Clinton's team begins receiving transition briefs from DOD and other federal agencies.
- December 1992. President-elect Clinton announces the Bush policy toward Haitian refugees will remain in effect.
- January 1993. William Jefferson Clinton is inaugurated President of the United States.
- March 1993. Presidents Clinton and Aristide meet for the first time. Haitian detainees riot in Guantanamo. Jesse Jackson is arrested in a rally in New York protesting government policy toward Haiti. UN and U.S. diplomatic efforts aimed at convincing Cedras to step down continue. The embargo is again evaluated as a failure. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff orders planning to begin on a nation assistance program for Haiti.
- 21 June 1993. The Supreme Court settles the question of direct repatriations, finding such actions to be constitutional.
- 27 June 1993. The Governors Islands talks between the Cedras and Aristide factions begin.
- 3 July 1993. The Governors Island Accords are signed.
- 18 August 1993. In keeping with the Governors Island Accords, the Haitian parliament names Robert Malaval Prime minister. Sanctions on Haiti are subsequently suspended.
- September 1993. Violence in Haiti increases. A U.S. congressional delegation led by Re. Rangel (D-NY) visits Port-au-Prince. The first group of UN "trainers" arrives.

- 3 - 4 October 1993. A firefight in Mogadishu, Somalia leaves 18 U.S. Army Rangers dead.
- 11 October 1993. U.S.S. *Harlan County (LST-1185)* arrives in Port -au-Prince and is prevented from landing.
- 14 October 1993. Sanctions on Haiti are reimposed.
- 23 October 1993. A CIA report claims President Aristide has a history of mental illness. The report is later revealed to be false.
- 27 January 1994. Tighter economic measures are taken against Haiti by the United States.
- 8 February 1994. President Aristide criticizes U.S. policy. He threatens to abrogate the AMIO agreement.
- 26 February 1994. The U.S. Department of Commerce reports that Haitian imports and exports actually rose during 1993.
- 19 March 1994. President Aristide denounces U.S. policy toward Haiti as racist. Within days the Congressional Black Caucus calls for the removal of Larry Pezzullo as U.S. special envoy to Haiti. Full page ads are taken out in the *New York Times* in support of Aristide.
- 7 April 1994. President Aristide serves formal notice of his intent to cancel AMIO. The cancellation will become effective in six months.
- 12 April 1994. Activist and lobbyist Randall Robinson embarks on a hunger strike in protest of U.S. policy toward Haiti.
- 21 April 1994. Six members of the U.S. House of Representatives chain themselves to the White House fence in protest of U.S. policy toward Haiti. Photos of their subsequent arrest are front page news.
- 27 April 1994. Larry Pezzullo resigns as Special Envoy to Haiti.
- 1 - 10 May 1994. Randall Robinson is hospitalized. USACOM begins planning an invasion of Haiti (Oplan 2370). The UN Security Council tightens sanctions on Haiti. President Clinton stops the policy of forcible repatriation. William Gray is named special envoy to Haiti. Randall Robinson ends his hunger strike.
- 10 - 22 May 1994. The number of Haitians intercepted at sea begins to climb. Robert Dole (R-KS) submits proposed legislation requiring congressional

authorization of any military force used in Haiti. The motion is subsequently defeated. Bob Graham (D-FL) publicly supports an invasion of Haiti by U.S. forces.

- 1 June 1994. President Aristide, for the first time, endorses a U.S. invasion of Haiti as an acceptable way to return him to power.
- 10 June 1994. President Clinton further increases sanctions on Haiti.
- 23 June 1994. Only 28% of the U.S. public favor an invasion of Haiti.
- 28 June 1994. Coast Guard vessels are now intercepting more than 1300 Haitians a day.
- 29 June 1994. President Clinton orders the refugee camp at Guantanamo reopened.
- 2 July 1994. The *Washington Post* reveals that U.S. units have been preparing for military operations against Haiti since 4 June.
- 5 July 1994. President Clinton announces that Haitian refugees will be resettled in third party countries. Amnesty International attacks this new policy. Only Panama agrees to this and later refuses to accept more than a small number of refugees.
- 10 July 1994. General Cedras orders all UN and OAS human rights observers out of Haiti.
- 18 July 1994. Nearly 19,00 Haitians are in Guantanamo.
- 28 July 1994. The U.S. 10th Mountain Division is ordered to begin planning for a permissive intervention in Haiti (Oplan 2370).
- 31 July 1994. The UN Security Council authorized the United States to utilize "all means necessary" to restore President Aristide to power.
- 2 August 1994. The Dominican Republic permits an international force to patrol the Haitian - Dominican Republic border.
- 3 August 1994. The U.S. Senate passes a non-binding resolution stating a UN Security Resolution was not justification for the use of U.S. troops in combat.
- 10 - 19 August 1994. Fidel Castro allows a mass exodus of Cuban refugees. More than 2,000 a week enter the United States. The former U.S. policy declaring all Cubans fleeing the Castro regime political refugees is struck

down, but not before unfavorable comparisons between the treatment of Cuban and Haitian refugees are made.

- 24 August 1994. The U.S. Navy begins evacuating U.S. civilians and dependents from Guantanamo. Plans to house as many as 40,000 refugees in Guantanamo are announced.
- 25 - 31 August 1994. Four Caribbean states pledge token forces to participate in any U.S. invasion of Haiti. The UN sends a high level delegation to Haiti, but General Cedras refuses to meet with them.
- 7 September 1994. At a meeting of the National Security Council, President Clinton authorizes a military invasion of Haiti.

Sources: Compiled by the author from: Contemporary press accounts, primarily *The New York Times*, memoirs and autobiographies from participants, official after action reports and case studies. All are listed in the bibliography.

Chapter 4: Rwanda: A Case of Non-intervention

In April 1994, the renewal of long-standing civil conflict in Rwanda and the ensuing genocide presented the Clinton Administration with one of the most perplexing and difficult decision-making situations with which the U.S. President can be asked to deal. Should the Armed Forces of the United States be committed to combat operations when U.S. values, but not U.S. interests, are at stake?¹ The Clinton Administration answered this question with a resounding "no." Although a decision to deploy military forces to the region was made in late July of 1994, the deployment occurred after the civil war and genocide in Rwanda had ended. This study contends this decision cannot be classified as an intervention but rather a permissive deployment of troops on a humanitarian mission.

The Clinton Administration's actions in regard to Rwanda continue to be hotly debated within the NGO, academic, and political communities. Given the continuing possibility of genocidal violence not only in the Great Lakes region of Africa, but also in other parts of the globe, a study of the events leading to the President's decision could be of significant utility to both practitioners and scholars of decision-making.

This chapter will focus on the events leading up to the 22 July 1994 initiation of a U.S. humanitarian relief mission to Rwanda. In particular the study analyzes three decisions made by the Clinton Administration, beginning with those in the early days of the genocide in April 1994 through 22 July 1994. In order to place the Clinton

¹ Interview with Dr. Anthony Lake, former Assistant to the President for National Security, by the author, via telephone, Newport, Rhode Island 18 October 1999.

Administration's decision-making process in context an abbreviated synopsis of Rwanda's history will be provided, followed by a more detailed chronological history of the genocide and the reactions it provoked, both within the United States and internationally. Three major decisions by the Clinton Administration will be highlighted. The first decision, reached shortly after the genocide erupted in April 1994, was to block any attempt to involve U.S. forces in the Rwanda crisis. This decision remained in force until the genocide had ceased. The second decision, taken in the third week of June 1994, was to support *Operation Tourquoise*, a UN-sanctioned, unilateral deployment of French combat troops to the region with a stated mission of establishing a safe haven for refugees and preventing genocide. The third decision, reached on 22 July 1994, was to authorize "*Operation Support Hope*," the deployment of significant numbers of U.S. military personnel to the surrounding region in order to ameliorate deteriorating conditions in the sprawling refugee camps that had sprung up as a result of the Rwandan Civil War and genocide. With this historical background and empirical data on presidential decision-making to the case, the chapter will analyze the three selected decisions using the Rational Actor model, the Organizational model, the Government Politics model, and the Human Factors model. These decisions will then be analyzed using the Integrated model of decision-making. The study concludes that the decision not to intervene in Rwanda was dominated by forces best explained through the government-politics and human factors perspectives, and not the rational decision-making process. Moreover, the impact of a perceived policy failure in Somalia was a crucial input to the decision-making process

In preparation for addressing the secondary research questions, the chapter will

then discuss the role of the international political system, the domestic political system ,and the national security system in the case of Rwanda, specifically:

- How did the duration of the crisis affect the dominance of forces acting on the decision-maker?
- To what extent did the success or failure of prior decisions affect the decision-making process?
- What elements of the International Political System has the most effect upon the decision-making process?
- What elements of the Domestic Political System had the most effect upon the decision-making process?

Finally, the roles and importance of situational factors and uncertainty will be examined. Having completed this full analysis of the Rwanda case, conclusions will be presented and a summary of the chapter will be provided.

Rwanda - a product of colonialism- background to the crisis²

Rwanda is a small state. Roughly half the size of Maryland, Rwanda was colonized by Germany in 1899. The Germans remained in control until Belgian military forces occupied Rwanda in 1916. Following the first world war, the Belgians officially became Rwanda's colonial rulers and remained in power until 1962.³

Two ethnic groups – the Hutu and the Tutsi - dominate the Rwandan population, with the Hutu comprising the numerically larger group. Both German and Belgian colonists fostered a sense of superiority among the Tutsi and, in time, the Tutsi became the comprador class of Rwanda.⁴ Colonial devices of control, such as the establishment of a national identity card system in 1933, worked toward solidifying Rwandan racial

² There are numerous publications dealing with the history of Rwanda and the genocide of 1994. Some of the better ones include: Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995; Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot, *Soldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons Learned from Rwanda*, (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 1996), 59 – 70.

³ Prunier, 23 - 35.

⁴ Fergal Keane, *Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey*, (New York: Viking, 1995), 16. A *comprador* class is usually comprised of an ethnic minority assigned civil and other responsibilities as a mark of favor by a colonial power.

identities, despite a tradition of intermarriage, common language, diet, and cultural heritage.⁵ In time Hutus found that cultural assimilation and social elevation with the ruling Tutsi regime had become “next to impossible.”⁶

In the aftermath of the second world war, Rwanda was swept up in the tide of independence movements surging across Africa. In the late 1950s as Rwandan independence and national elections drew closer, the Belgian leadership realized that an increase in Hutu power was inevitable. Although Belgian policies had been instrumental in dividing the two Rwandan groups, nothing was done in the run up toward independence to facilitate a new sense of national unity. The Tutsis were essentially abandoned to the tyranny of the numerical majority.⁷ In 1959 open fighting between Tutsis and Hutus broke out, the Belgians made no move to intervene, and the result was a bloodbath. Casualty estimates vary from 10,000 to 100,000. The savagery of the action serves as an eerie precursor to the mayhem of 1994. Not surprisingly, the more numerous Hutus emerged victorious and became the leaders of an independent Rwanda..

The refugee flows begin

Beginning in 1959, large numbers of Tutsis fled Rwanda. Most fled to neighboring countries such as Burundi, Uganda, and Tanzania. Two great waves of Tutsi refugees entered Uganda; the first arrived in 1959, the second in 1962.⁸ The total numbers of Tutsi refugees crossing the Uganda border may have reached as high as 200,000.

Life in Uganda first under the Obote and then the Amin regimes was not easy for

⁵ Ibid., 17.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid, 18 – 19.

⁸ Ibid.

the Tutsi refugees. The hardships and suffering the Tutsi Diaspora experienced only increased many individuals' determination to return to Rwanda. Cross-border guerilla raids began almost at once. Although Rwandan leaders immediately blamed Uganda for sheltering and encouraging Tutsi guerillas, there was no overt action taken against Uganda. Internal reactions to the attacks usually included fierce reprisals and pogroms against Tutsis remaining in Rwanda. Massive purges of Rwandan Tutsis occurred in 1963 and 1967.

Birth of an Army

In time, as a second generation of Tutsi ex-patriots came of age, they found the Ugandan revolutionary Yoweri Museveni would welcome them to the ranks of his army.⁹ The Rwandans were not only welcomed as fighters, but those with leadership potential were also promoted to the non-commissioned and officer ranks.

Museveni's army was, in comparison with other forces in the region, highly disciplined and professional. Participation in military campaigns and the eventual overthrow of Obote in 1986, gave Museveni's Rwandan soldiers significant combat experience.¹⁰ When the war ended, the Tutsi cadres left Museveni's service and formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).¹¹ From this point, they would be fighting for themselves and the goal of taking power in Rwanda.

Hutu governance and the rise of the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National Pour le Developpement (MRND)

While Tutsi refugees were settling and trying to earn a living in Uganda, the one-party Hutu-led state in Rwanda was becoming increasingly corrupt and ruled by

⁹ Ibid., 19 – 20.

¹⁰ Indeed, many of the Ugandan Army's senior leaders were Tutsi.

¹¹ Keane, 19 – 20.

patronage. When democratic structures that had never been provided or nurtured by the colonial powers did not take root, the results were predictable.

In 1973 Rwandan Chief of Staff Juvenal Habyarimana staged a coup under the pretext of restoring social order. Although presenting the appearance of championing positive social change, in reality all Habyarimana's MRND did was to simply replace one corrupt set of Hutu rulers with a new set of corrupt Hutu rulers. These were predominately Habyarimana's friends from the north of Rwanda, traditionally the most chauvinistic of all Hutu nationalists.¹² This elite of this new ultra-nationalistic political party was known as the Akazu.¹³

Once in power, Habyarimana and his cronies set about draining the country's resources while continuing to discriminate blatantly against the Tutsis. For example, Tutsis were purged from Rwandan universities, as part of an overarching program to drive them from all educational institutions. But the MRND party found that the Rwandan Tutsi population was not without value. When their Hutu constituents complained about anything in Rwanda, the Tutsis served as readymade scapegoats. Whatever the complaint, the Habyarimana regime's reaction was to blame the Tutsis, including both those inside and outside the borders.¹⁴

But even the use of such convenient scapegoats had its limits. Eventually, government corruption and incompetence became so bad that the agricultural system collapsed. Western donors who had been generous with aid, only to have it siphoned

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Akazu translates to "Little Hut." Although MRND members did not fill every government office they controlled the Rwandan Army and the Interhamwe militia units.

¹⁴ Ibid., 21.

off in a variety of ways, began to demand more stringent accounting.¹⁵ With funding drying up the Akazu found it increasingly difficult to buy the loyalty of the Rwandan army and civil service. Suggestions by NGO representatives and others that Rwanda should democratize horrified the elites, because this would mean the end of their system of clients and patronage.¹⁶

The Civil War begins in earnest

In 1990 the RPF initiated a significant military offensive. Covertly supplied and supported by Uganda, the RPF attacked into Rwanda with as many as 7,000 troops.¹⁷ The benefit of the RPF's battle hardening and combat experience was immediately apparent. RPF victories were common. The Habyarimana regime reacted predictably. Rwandan Tutsis were officially denounced as fifth columnists and blamed for any and all government setbacks. Fear and hatred of Tutsis was actively and intentionally fomented by the Rwandan government in order to direct the people's anger and frustration away from the government.¹⁸ A civilian militia was formed and physical attacks on Tutsis escalated, although this violence did not reach the level of genocide.¹⁹ However, the violence was not one-sided. Tutsi armed groups were also targeting some members of the Hutu civilian population for death. Selective killings had, for all purposes, "become part of the common coinage of politics."²⁰

Another Rwandan government response to RPF success was to dramatically

¹⁵ Keane, 23.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ United Nations Department of Information, *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993 – 1996*, (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 12.

¹⁸ Lee Ann Fuji, *The diffusion of a genocidal norm in Rwanda*, Unpublished paper presented at the March 2002 Annual International Studies Association Convention, New Orleans, LA, 27 March 2002.

¹⁹ Keane, 23.

²⁰ Glynne Evans, *Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes*, (Trowbridge, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997), 23.

expand the size of its army. Between 1990 and 1992 the Army of Rwanda grew from a force of 5,000 soldiers to one of 30,000. In addition, the Coalition pour la defense de la Republic (CDR) - an offshoot of the MRND - was formed. The CDR, a violently Hutu extremist party, was vehemently opposed to any political dialogue with the RPF.²¹ Such calls were being made by a growing number of international actors.

Lurching to a cease-fire

However, the twin elements of RPF military success and growing international pressure for a peaceful resolution eventually forced Habyarimana to embrace compromise. On 26 October, with the aid of Belgium, a cease-fire was brokered between the Rwandan government and the RPF. Known as the Gbadolite agreement, it was short lived.²²

In 1991 further political concessions were extracted from Habyarimana when he was forced to authorize a multi-party political process.²³ Several new political parties sprang into existence, including the Mouvement Democratique Republicain (MDR), which was a true Hutu challenger to the Akazu party and the President.²⁴ Some socialist and moderate parties also emerged. But greater political diversity did not spell an end to Tutsi persecution. Government and right-wing controlled radio stations and newspapers began an increasingly virulent hate campaign aimed against the Tutsis.

The Arusha Accords

On 12 July 1992 UN sponsored efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement to the Rwandan Civil War seemed to make significant progress when both sides signed a set of

²¹ *The United Nations And Rwanda, 1993 - 1996*, (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996, 12.

²² *Ibid.*, 14.

²³ Keane, 22.

agreements known as the Arusha Accords. An associated cease-fire went into effect on 31 July. A buffer zone between the RPF and Rwandan Army was also established in keeping with the accords.²⁵ The Organization of African Unity (OAU) agreed to provide a “Neutral Military Observer Group” to monitor the buffer zone. The accords also called for a Joint Political Commission to help implement the cease-fire and a mutual pledge to reach a final peace agreement within twelve months. A transitional government would take over at that time until new elections could be held.²⁶

A return to fighting

The cease-fire held, more or less for nearly seven months, until 8 February 1993, when a new outbreak of fighting occurred. The RPF rapidly seized several objectives in the buffer zone, alleging that they were only responding to human rights violations against Tutsis committed by the Rwandan government. As before, any time forces of the Rwandan Army clashed with the RPF, the RPF almost always emerged victorious.

The first French intervention

The RPF also moved on Kigali airport and seemed certain to gain control of this strategic asset; however, at the last moment, they were thwarted. The French government, seeing Rwanda as part of Francophone Africa and being partial to the Habyarimana government, deployed military forces to Kigali. Among the more dramatic moments of the French intervention was a parachute jump into Kigali by elements of the Foreign Legion. The French troops proved more than a match for the RPF and the Kigali airport remained in Hutu hands. Having prevented the capture of Kigali, the French

²⁴ Ibid., 22 – 24.

²⁵ "Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General transmitting the Peace Accords signed at Arusha on 4 August 1993, the

maintained a military mission and detachment of officers in Rwanda.²⁷

Enter UNOMUR

By this stage of the conflict an estimated 600,000 Rwandans had become "Displaced Persons", prompting calls for help from the UN. In response to requests from the governments of Rwanda and Uganda, a UN Chapter VI observer mission (UNOMUR) was authorized to deploy along the countries' mutual 150 kilometer-long border.²⁸ UNOMUR was tasked with reporting and verifying any cross-border assistance to the RPF from Uganda. The potential efficacy of this force was doubtful from the beginning. Consisting of only 55 personnel, UNOMUR forces were not armed.²⁹ The UNOMUR forces also lacked significant surveillance and transportation assets, and therefore never possessed the ability to adequately monitor the border.³⁰ Nor did Uganda's part in requesting UNOMUR have any effect on lessening that country's support for the RPF. Whether acting from a sense of obligation, or simply a desire to ensure the RPF fighters did not return, Uganda continued to provide arms and supplies to the RPF in Rwanda.³¹

UNOMUR becomes UNAMIR

On 24 September 1993 Kofi Anan presented an expanded Rwandan peacekeeping proposal to the UN Security Council. UNAMIR, a new peace force, would not only absorb UNOMUR, but would also bring in an additional 2,458 military personnel in four

N'sele cease-fire agreement and the related Protocols of Agreement," reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993 - 1996*, 169 - 201.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Keane, 26.

²⁸ "Interim report of the Secretary-General on Rwanda, recommending the establishment of a United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMOR)," reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993 - 1996*, 162 - 164.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Keane, 36.

phased increments.³² On 5 October the Security Council approved Anan's proposal, but instructed the Secretary-General to "seek economies." The UN Security Council requested that a Canadian General command the operation.³³ The Canadian government agreed to this request and the first UNAMIR troops landed in Rwanda before the end of October. The UN force's headquarters would be located in Kigali. By December 1993, 1,260 UN peacekeepers were on the ground.³⁴ UNAMIR's mandate was to assist with the delivery of food supplies to the Rwandans who were internally displaced and expatriated. In addition, UNAMIR was to monitor the Ugandan border and a newly established RPF - Rwandan army Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).³⁵ Cease-fire violations would be investigated and the activities of the Rwandan gendarmerie and civilian police monitored. Other UNAMIR activities would include mine awareness training, assisting with resettlement initiatives as well as disengagement, disarming and demobilization efforts that would follow the end of the war. Because UNAMIR was on the ground, it was believed that all French troops would be gone within a month.³⁶

As UNAMIR was getting established, a Tutsi-led military coup overthrew the government of Burundi, which initiated a refugee flow of more than 375,000 Burundian Hutus moving into neighboring Rwanda. As a result of this new refugee flow, UNAMIR extended its monitoring patrols. By November 1993, UNAMIR was already receiving

³¹ Ibid.

³² "Report of the Secretary-General on Rwanda, requesting establishment of a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the integration of UNOMUR into UNAMIR." reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996*, 221 - 231.

³³ Romeo Dallaire and Bruce Pullin, "Rwanda: From Peace Agreement to Genocide," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 3, Spring 1995, 7.

³⁴ "Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR S/26927 30 December 1993," reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993 - 1996*, 237 - 240.

³⁵ "Report of the Secretary-General on Rwanda, requesting establishment of a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the integration of UNOMUR into UNAMIR," reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996*, 221 - 231.

³⁶ *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993 - 1996*, 30.

and investigating reports of mass killings.

The Secretary-General realized that UNAMIR was going to require more troops and more time if it were going to carry out its assigned mission. He asked for a six-month extension of the mandate and more peacekeepers. On 6 January 1994 the Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 893 approving the request.³⁷

UNAMIR during the pre-Genocide period

Despite some criticisms to the contrary, UNAMIR forces were not inactive in the time between their arrival in Rwanda and the commencement of the genocide. Nor were they reluctant to gather and report intelligence. As early as 11 January UNAMIR had uncovered plots by the Interhamwe and other elements of the Hutu government to kill large numbers of Tutsis.³⁸ This information was quickly reported to the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UNDPKO). At the same time UNAMIR requested guidance from higher authority on how to proceed.

UNDPKO responded to UNAMIR's request the same day. President Habyarimana was to be informed of UNAMIR's discoveries and told that he should fully investigate the charges and prevent any killings. UNAMIR was reminded that while it could "assist" in arms recovery operations, it was forbidden from "entering into a course of action which might lead to the use of force and to unanticipated repercussions."³⁹

The next day saw a flurry of activity in Kigali. The UN Special Representative to Rwanda had a personal audience with Habyarimana. The Ambassadors from the United States, France, and Belgium were also briefed by both the UN Special Representative and

³⁷ "Security Council resolution establishing UNAMIR for a six month period and approving the integration of UNOMUR into UNMAIR S/RES/872 (1993), 5 October 1993, reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993 – 1996*, 231 – 233.

³⁸ *The United Nations and Rwanda*, 31.

the UNAMIR force commander. The Ambassadors were asked to request their governments to encourage the Habyarimana Administration to grant the UN/UNAMIR request. In New York, the UN Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Rwanda briefed the Security Council.⁴⁰

Despite these actions, the situation in Kigali continued to grow increasingly tense. On 3 February UNDPKO authorized UNAMIR to engage in a deeper level of participation on arms recovery operations on a case-by-case basis. Seeing an increased potential for violence, General Dallaire, the UNAMIR commander, brought an additional 200 UNAMIR troops to Kigali from the Northern DMZ.⁴¹

As violence continued to escalate, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali continued to pressure President Habyarimana to get the transitional government in operation, as agreed to in the Arusha Accords.⁴² The UN Special Representative on Rwanda continued to meet with President Habyarimana on a regular basis.

A Glimmer of Hope

By late March 1994 both the RPF and the Rwandan government had agreed to the establishment of a transitional government. UNAMIR was approaching its peak manning level of 2,539 troops and an additional component of 60 UN police personnel.⁴³ The additional UN forces did not stop outbreaks of violence in Kigali or other disturbing developments. For example, despite UN protests, Rwandan government forces mined

³⁹ Ibid., 32.

⁴⁰ Ibid. 33.

⁴¹ UN, 32.

⁴² "Letter dated 27 January 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of Rwanda expressing concern over delays in establishing a transitional government and national assembly in Rwanda," reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996*, 242.

⁴³ "Second progress report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR for the period from 30 December 1993 to 30 March 1994, requesting an extension of its mandate for a period of six months, S/1994/360. 30 March 1994, reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996*, 244 - 251.

key roads leading out of the capital and weapons were being stockpiled by Rwandan militias.⁴⁴ The Secretary-General and the Security Council was apprised of each of these developments.⁴⁵ On 5 April 1994 the Security Council extended the duration of UNAMIR. The mission would now run to 29 July. The vote for extension was unanimous.⁴⁶

Genocide Unleashed

On 6 April 1994 Rwandan President Habyarimana, Burundi President Cyprien Ntaryamira, and Rwandan Army Chief of Staff Deogratias Nsabimana were returning to Kigali from the latest round of the Arusha negotiations. Their aircraft was on final approach to the landing field when it was struck by two surface-to-air missiles. All aboard were killed. Members of Habyarimana's Presidential Guard most likely fired the missiles.⁴⁷

Following the downing of the presidential aircraft members of the MRND/CDR/Akazu parties in the Rwandan government acted with great speed and well-planned precision. State radio immediately blamed the RPF for the death of the presidents. Rwandan Militia and Army units moved out of their barracks, carrying lists

⁴⁴ "Letter dated 14 March 1994 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium to the Secretary-General expressing concern that the worsening situation in Rwanda may impede UNAMIR's capacity to fulfil (sic) its mandate." Reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996*, 244.

⁴⁵ "Second progress report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR for the period from 30 December 1993 to 30 March 1994, requesting an extension of its mandate for a period of six months, S/1994/360 30 March 1994, reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996*, 244-251. The specific national contributions to UNAMIR were: Austria, 15 soldiers, Bangladesh, 942 soldiers, Belgium, 440 soldiers, Botswana, 9 soldiers, Brazil, 13 soldiers, Canada, 2 soldiers, Congo, 26 soldiers, Egypt, 10 soldiers, Fiji, 1 soldier, Ghana, 843 soldiers, Hungary, 4 soldiers, Malawi, 5 soldiers, Netherlands, 9 soldiers, Nigeria, 15 soldiers, Poland, 5 soldiers, Romania, 5 soldiers, The Russian Federation, 1 soldier, Senegal, 35 soldiers, Slovakia, 5 soldiers, Togo, 15 soldiers, Tunisia, 61 soldiers, Uruguay, 25 soldiers, and Zimbabwe, 29 soldiers.

⁴⁶ "Security Council resolution regretting the delay in implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement and extending UNAMIR's mandate until 29 July 1994," S/RES/909 (1994), 5 April 1994, reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996*, 251-252.

⁴⁷ Keane, 27.

of enemies and maps to their houses. In some cases roadblocks were established and manned by Interhamwe gunmen in less than half an hour following the shoot-down of the presidential aircraft.⁴⁸

Thus began 100 days of genocidal fury and renewed civil war. In those 100 days as many as one million people were hacked, shot, strangled, clubbed and burned to death.⁴⁹ As might be expected the majority of this number was comprised of non-combatants.⁵⁰ Although the genocide began in Kigali and for a time was contained there, it soon spread across the country.

With twenty-four hours of the presidents' assassination, the civil war had been renewed with full fury. It was soon apparent that the RPF had lost none of its professional capabilities and military discipline during the cease fire. Moving rapidly, RPF forces in the field engaged elements of the Rwandan Army and resumed their advance.

Key Killings

Among the hundreds of deaths that occurred in the first 24 hours, several were of extreme importance. The leaders of three Hutu opposition parties were killed. The moderate Hutu Prime Minister, Ms. Agathe Uwilingiyimana, and the ten Belgian UN peacekeepers who were serving as her bodyguards were also assassinated.⁵¹ The destruction of rival political leaders and Ms. Uwilingiyimana, the country's most well-known political moderate, essentially decapitated any potential Hutu resistance to the genocidal movement. The death of relatively well-known Hutus in the first hours also

⁴⁸ Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, (New York: Columbia Press, 1995), 221 – 224.

⁴⁹ An exact number of the casualties of the Rwandan Civil War and attendant Genocide will never be known. Estimates range from 800,000 to just over a million

confused some western observers who were trying to determine whether genocide was occurring. Finally the death of the Belgian peacekeepers was enough to convince more than one western power that Rwanda was far too violent and dangerous a place in which to become involved. The death of the Belgians also resulted in orders for UNAMIR being ordered to take a defensive posture. This was not what General Dallaire had intended for his UNAMIR forces.

General Dallaire had tried to create a “Quick Reaction Force” from his UNAMIR forces, which would be trained, equipped and ready to respond rapidly to a variety of situations. Unfortunately, due to a combination of training and equipment problems, the Quick Reaction Force was not ready when the genocide was initiated.⁵²

Initial U.S. Reactions

News of the violence in Rwanda traveled rapidly and it was not long before the first U.S. reactions were being heard. On April 7, the day after the initial killings, President Clinton publicly condemned the murder of Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana, and called for the RPF and the Rwandan Army to resume the cease-fire.⁵³

Any U.S. military operation that would have been mounted in Rwanda or neighboring countries would have fallen under the overall command of the United States European Command (EUCOM). Realizing that it might become necessary to deploy a Joint Task Force (JTF) to the area, EUCOM had been paying attention to Rwanda before the violence of 6 April. EUCOM had even gone so far as to create a Rwanda Working

⁵⁰ Keane, 29.

⁵¹ Prunier, 230 – 231.

⁵² Asemble Nationale, *Mission d'information commune, Enquete sur la tragedie rwandaise 1900 – 1994*, (Brussels: Assemble Nationale, 1998), 138 – 139.

⁵³ Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 30, Nr. 14, 737.

Group.⁵⁴ As Rwandan forces put their genocidal plans into motion and the Civil War broke out with renewed vigor, EUCOM immediately asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether contingency planning for a Rwandan intervention should begin. The answer was an emphatic "no" for any planning, with the exception of a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) to get U.S. citizens out of Rwanda. EUCOM was ordered to simply monitor the situation in Rwanda.⁵⁵ EUCOM obeyed orders, but expanded the Rwanda Working Group. The spring of 1994 was a busy period for EUCOM, as five Joint Task Forces (JTFs) were already in operation.⁵⁶ That EUCOM was prepared to field a sixth task force and divert extra manpower to plan for a contingency operation that had yet to be authorized is an indication of how seriously the situation in Rwanda was viewed at the time.

Initial Actions in Kigali

As genocide engulfed Rwanda, UNAMIR commanders in Kigali immediately realized that it was no longer possible to conduct operations in accordance with their UN mandate. Instead, the blue helmets concentrated on establishing safe havens for Rwandan non-combatants. Not surprisingly, the demand for such havens was high as civilians flocked to the protection offered by UN peace forces.

Initial Responses in New York

The Secretary-General has stated that he kept the Security Council appraised of all Rwanda developments of which he was aware. On 7 April the Special Assistant on

⁵⁴ Interview 6 July 2000 with Commander Douglas Hancher, USN, at Newport, Rhode Island. Commander Hancher was the former EUCOM J-5 Action Officer and EUCOM Crisis Action Team watch stander, 1994 – 1996.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid. Most of the five JTFs involved operations in Bosnia.

Rwanda personally briefed the Security Council on the situation in Rwanda.⁵⁷ At the same time, the OAU reported that it was fully ready to completely cooperate with the UN.

Belgium was among the first countries to call for action. Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes initially pressed for armed intervention by the UN in Rwanda. This proposal met with strong U.S. and French opposition⁵⁸ Nor, should it be noted, did Claes have unanimous domestic support. Lacking an internal consensus and facing stiff resistance from two members of the Security Council, Claes abandoned the attempt.

Western Powers Evacuate

The United States moved with alacrity at this stage of the crisis. 225 U.S. personnel were evacuated from Rwanda via road convoy on 10 April. U.S. Ambassador David Rawson and a reduced number of embassy personnel remained on station. This is not to imply the situation in Kigali had become less dangerous. Indeed, the fighting was so fierce that the ambassador was effectively trapped in his residence for several days. Although the United States had moved quickly to ensure the safety of its citizens, other western states quickly followed suit. On 11 April French and Belgian troops landed in Kigali to assist in the evacuation of their nationals.⁵⁹

More Woes for UNAMIR

As Europeans and Americans began to evacuate Rwanda, UNAMIR struggled to respond to a rapidly worsening situation on the ground. More UNAMIR forces were shifted, as Ghanaian troops deployed from the DMZ to Kigali. This increased the

⁵⁷ *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993 – 1996*, 39.

⁵⁸ Alison Des Forges, *Leave None To Tell The Story: Genocide In Rwanda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 605.

number of troops available to establish and guard UNAMIR safe havens, which were, as has already been noted, filled with refugees as soon as they were established. General Dallaire's attempts to bring some order to Kigali then suffered a major setback when the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, noting a lack of international support for armed intervention, announced that Belgium was withdrawing from UNAMIR. On 13 April, Belgium, noting that UNAMIR was incapable of carrying out its mandate, formally recommended suspending the Rwandan operation altogether.⁶⁰ Dallaire's efforts received a further blow when all the remaining parent governments of UNAMIR personnel, with the exception of Ghana, made it clear to their UNAMIR contingents that self-protection was the highest priority.⁶¹ General Dallaire immediately sought to reverse the defensive orientation of the national contingents and tried to obtain additional reinforcements. He argued that, with enough force, he could stop the genocide and bring the parties back to the negotiating table. While decisive UN action might have stopped the genocide, it is doubtful whether the RPF would have returned to the negotiating table. Once back on the offensive, the increasingly victorious RPF was simply not inclined to talk because RPF leaders knew that they possessed a markedly superior fighting force than the Rwandan Army and that victory could be theirs.⁶²

Rhetorical Concern from the United States

⁵⁹ John A Berry and Carol Pot Berry, *Genocide in Rwanda: A Collective Memory*, (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1999), xxii.

⁶⁰ "Letter from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting similar letters dated 15 April 1994 to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General from the Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium recommending the suspension of UNAMIR and conveying the decision of the Belgian Government to immediately withdraw the Belgian battalion," S/1994/446. 15 April 1994, reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996*, 261 –262.

⁶¹ Scott R. Feil, *Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1998), 3.

⁶² Prunier, 270 – 271.

The Clinton Administration's response in getting U.S. nationals out Rwanda had been rapid and decisive; such characteristics were less apparent in other U.S. actions. For example, there was an initial call to shift the authority for the UNAMIR mission from Chapter VI of the UN Charter to Chapter VII, which would have enabled the UNAMIR commander to take bolder and potentially more dangerous actions, including engaging in acts of combat, to carry out the assigned mandate. By 7 April U.S. representatives to the United Nations had clearly stated U.S. opposition to shifting UNAMIR's source of authority. This would seem to indicate that the United States was backing away from any involvement in Rwanda. Yet, a strong rhetorical posture was immediately assumed. As U.S. representatives worked to keep UNAMIR a Chapter VI operation, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake became the first western political figure to demand a stop to the killing in Rwanda and to place the blame for that killing squarely on Hutu leaders.⁶³

On 7 April President Clinton stated that he was "shocked and deeply saddened" upon learning of the deaths of Habyrimana and Ntaryamira. He also stated that "elements of the Rwandan security forces had sought out and murdered Rwandan officials, including the Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana."⁶⁴ On 8 April, during an exchange of remarks and questions with reporters in Minnesota. President Clinton again spoke about Rwanda.

I called today the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and my National Security Advisor and had extended conversations with all three about the situation in Rwanda ...there are a sizable number of Americans there, and it is a very tense situation ... we are doing everything we possibly can to be on top of the situation, to take all appropriate steps to try and assure the safety of our citizens.⁶⁵

The president's talk was backed up by U.S. military movements. Three days after

⁶³ Lake Interview with the author, 18 October 1999; Assemble Nationale, 532.

⁶⁴ Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 30, Nr. 14, 737.

the president spoke to the press in Minnesota, 275 U.S. Marines had been flown to Bujumbura, Burundi to assist with the evacuation of more than 240 U.S. citizens in Rwanda. Before the Marines could move into Rwanda, U.S. evacuees exited Rwanda to safety via land caravan. With the majority of U.S. personnel safe, the Marines returned to their ships in the Indian Ocean. The president praised Ambassador Rawson for his part in the evacuation efforts.⁶⁶

In Washington, the Defense Department established a Rwanda Task Force.⁶⁷ The task force was assigned responsibility for collecting and forwarding intelligence on the situation in Rwanda. Among the many data collected was a daily estimate of those killed.⁶⁸

Kigali - The Nightmare Deepens

In Kigali UNAMIR was faced with a significantly deteriorating security situation. It was clear that Dallaire believed Kigali airport was the one position that had to remain in UN hands. The strategic importance of the airfield was not lost on any of the combatants. In order to ensure that UN aircraft could continue to get through, General Dallaire began to re-deploy his forces to the airport. On April 11 these reinforcements included troops that had been guarding a school housing 2,000 refugees. When the UN soldiers left, the refugees remained behind. Shortly thereafter, Rwandan military and paramilitary forces entered the school and killed nearly all of the persons sheltering there. Although this was a particularly heinous example, it was but one component in a mosaic of mass violence and widespread killing that UNAMIR forces were observing at first

⁶⁵ Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 30, Nr. 15, 752.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 771 - 72.

⁶⁷ Yael S. Aronoff, "An Apology Is Not Enough: What will happen in the next case of genocide?", *Washington Post*, 9 April, 1998, A25.

hand. There was also no doubt that while some moderate Hutus were being killed, the majority of the violence was being directed against any Tutsi who was unfortunate to fall into the hands of the Rwandan Army, the Interhamwe, or their allies.⁶⁹

Dallaire remained convinced that UNAMIR could restore stability if the requested reinforcements could be provided. In addition to an extra five infantry battalions, Dallaire now wanted armored personnel carriers (APCs). Whether or not the requested force would be capable of doing what Dallaire claimed could be done was the subject of debate from the moment the request was made. Yet, it was clear, even at the time, that an augmented UNAMIR could save many Rwandan lives. Despite highly cautious rules of engagement and only limited numbers of troops at his disposal, Dallaire was already providing safety and security for tens of thousands of Rwandans.⁷⁰

The end of UNAMIR?

As concerns for the safety of the member nation's own citizens in Rwanda began to fade, the central question facing the Security Council was what to do with UNAMIR. The ensuing debate was not without emotion. Belgium, having seen earlier proactive efforts defeated, pressed hard to withdraw the UN force.⁷¹

Events in Kigali intensified the argument. Initially the Rwandan Army had adopted an apparent "hands off" policy towards UN safe havens. This policy remained in effect slightly less than a week. However, the Rwandan Army remained unwilling to

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Des Forges, 623.

⁷⁰ Feil, 8; ABC News Frontline Transcript #1710, "The Triumph of Evil," Air Date 26 January, 1999, 9. This statement was confirmed by Karel Korvanda of the Czech Republic on the same show.

⁷¹ "Letter from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting similar letters dated 15 April 1994 to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General from the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium recommending the suspension of UNAMIR and conveying the decision of the Belgian

engage UN forces with direct attacks, but opted to use indirect mortar fire instead, bombarding several UNAMIR havens on 19 April.⁷² On 21 April Uganda formally requested that UNAMIR be retained and reinforced, while Bangladesh threatened to withdraw its forces from UNAMIR.⁷³ That same day the Security Council unanimously voted to authorize the reduction of UNAMIR forces in Rwanda.⁷⁴ UNAMIR troops began leaving almost at once. However, at no stage during the Rwandan crisis did less than 444 UN soldiers remain in Kigali, principally to ensure that the airport was secure.⁷⁵ Despite their small numbers these troops also managed to provide sanctuary for as many as 20,000 displaced persons.⁷⁶ Yet they could not protect all the people whom UNAMIR had been sheltering on 18 April. Whenever UNAMIR forces left, death inevitably followed.⁷⁷

Did senior, key officials in the UN and the United States know genocide was taking place?

In the years following the Rwanda crisis the question, “Did senior leaders of UN and the United States and their key advisors know genocide was being conducted in Rwanda?” has been frequently asked. Obviously the answer is “yes”, although when these individuals became aware of the “genocide” is a tougher question. It was immediately clear that widespread killing was going on in Kigali and that civilians,

Government to immediately withdraw the Belgian battalion. S/1994/446. 15 April 1994, reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993 – 1996*, 261 – 262.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 42.

⁷³ “Letter from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council, conveying an appeal by the President of Uganda that UNAMIR maintain its presence in Rwanda,” S/1994/479, 21 April 1994, reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda*, 267; “Letter from the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, addressing the risks to Bangladeshi troops serving in UNAMIR,” S/1994/481 21 April 1994, reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda*, 265-266.

⁷⁴ “Security Council resolution adjusting UNAMIR’s mandate and authorizing a reduction in its strength,” S/RES/912 (1994) 21 April 1994, reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda*, 268 – 269.

⁷⁵ Feil, 30.

⁷⁶ Dallaire and Poullin, 9.

primarily Tutsi civilians, were being targeted for death. It was also clear that the Rwandan civil war had once more erupted. Independent confirmation of these conditions came from evacuated civilians, UNAMIR soldiers, and NGOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC eventually reported that, by 21 April, “tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands were dead.”⁷⁸ On 23 April the killing campaign intensified, reaching into the countryside and rural areas that had previously been unaffected.

However, there is a difference between mass killings and genocide. Did the senior members of the UN understand that genocide was on-going in Rwanda? Michael Barnett, a member of the U.S. mission to the UN in 1994, has stated:

By mid to late April, people in the Security Council knew it (the killing in Rwanda) was genocide, but refused to call it such because, ultimately, one understood that if you used the term genocide, then you might be forced to act. And when someone suggested that maybe they should call a genocide a genocide, they were quietly reminded that perhaps they should not use such language.⁷⁹

Within the U.S., while some participants differ as to why the term “genocide” was not used, all of those interviewed for this study agree that a decision was made to not call the widespread killing “genocide.”⁸⁰ The fact that this discussion was held early in the crisis indicates that senior U.S. leaders had general knowledge of the level and purpose of killings occurring in Rwanda that might warrant the label of genocide.

A Call for More Troops

On 29 April Boutros Boutros Ghali went before the Security Council and

⁷⁷ Feil., 16.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 15.

⁷⁹ Nightline, 17.

⁸⁰ Lake Interview, Interview between Ambassador Richard Bogosian, Special Assistant to the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative and former Ambassador to Somalia, and the author, telephone, Newport, RI, 6 June 2000; Interview with Mr. George Taft, Attorney, U.S. Department of State, Office of Legal

requested consideration be given to sending reinforcements to Rwanda.⁸¹ Such a force, if approved, would have to be “well equipped, very mobile and able to protect itself.” The Secretary-General admitted that he was not sure if such a force would be able to bring about an end to the massacres.⁸² The council had been debating the issue for several days. Some members, such as China, were opposed to any recommendation of strong action, while other members, such as the United States, did not want the term “genocide” used.⁸³ Whether or not the Secretary-General's plea had an impact is debatable, but on the 29th, outgoing Security Council President Colin Keating of New Zealand took matters into his own hands. Keating informed the council that unless they reached agreement he would declare the meeting an open session.⁸⁴ Such action would have revealed the exact wording and positions of the opposing members to public scrutiny. Keating's threat of exposure was apparently a powerful incentive to action. The council rapidly passed a resolution recommending "strong action" be taken, but refrained from the use of the word genocide.⁸⁵

The next day, 30 April 1994, President Clinton made a radio address. He said he was speaking to the leaders of both the RPF and the Rwandan Army, to urge them to stop the killing. The president did not use the word genocide, nor was there any intimation of potential U.S. or UN action.⁸⁶

Affairs/Africa, and the author, telephone, Newport, RI, 5 April 2000. In addition to confirmation provided by those interviewed the author has yet to encounter any source that offers evidence in refutation. .

⁸¹ “Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council requesting that the Council re-examine the revised mandate given to UNAMIR in resolution 912 (1994) and consider what action it could take in order to restore law and order in Rwanda and end the massacres,” S/1994/518, 29 April 1994, reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993 – 1996*, 270 – 271..

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Taft, interview with the author.

⁸⁴ Des Forges, 639.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Weekly Compilations of Presidential Documents, Vol. 30, Nr. 18, 984.

Developments in Washington - the Rwanda Interagency Working Group (IWG)

The Rwanda IWG was an ad hoc group formed in response to the on-going deterioration of conditions in Rwanda. Participants in these conferences included representatives from the State Department, the National Security Council Staff, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense (DOD), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Office of the Ambassador to the UN.⁸⁷ The IWG, as part of the NSC staffing process, would be responsible for reviewing the on-going situation in Rwanda and forwarding recommendations on future courses of action to higher levels. The multi-agency make-up of the IWG was designed to ensure that multiple sources of information were utilized by the group, preventing a single government agency from dominating the process. By May, IWG videoconferences on Rwanda had become a daily event in Washington.

Although these meetings were supposed to focus on generating rational policy recommendations, on at least one occasion the issue of potential policy impacts on the 1994 elections was specifically raised.⁸⁸ Some IWG participants saw Rwanda as a failed state; that had collapsed from an excess of tribalism, while others thought the strife was of a permanent nature and endemic to the region.⁸⁹ According to one participant, it was clear that none of the represented agencies and organizations had the slightest desire to become involved with troops on the ground in Africa.⁹⁰

While no agency had wanted U.S. troops to get involved in Rwanda, it was not long before the subject was broached. Perhaps this was inevitable, given U.S. logistic

⁸⁷ Miskel and Norton, 227.

⁸⁸ Des Forges, 624.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Nightline, 19. Interview with Tony Marley, U.S. State Department Military Advisor, 1992 – 1995.)

and combat power. Over the course of the crisis the option of committing U.S. forces either unilaterally or in conjunction with the OAU or UN was repeatedly raised. It has also been reported that when the French were launching *Operation Tourquoise*, there was even discussion of the U.S. military providing logistic support for that effort.⁹¹ Yet, it was clear that the memory of the perceived failure of U.S. policy in Somalia hung heavy over these discussions, as indeed it did over most U.S. foreign policy deliberations involving Africa.⁹²

Higher Level Involvement

Discussions about Rwanda among U.S. government officials were not confined to the working group level level. Rwanda became a standard topic of discussions at informal luncheons of Defense Secretary Perry, Secretary of State Christopher, and NSA Tony Lake. These gatherings were referred to as PCL or “pickle” meetings.⁹³ However, there was no formal NSC Principals meeting held to discuss Rwanda during the first two months of the crisis.⁹⁴ Given the difficulty in choosing a course of action in Rwanda and the political sensitivity of the issue, it seems highly unlikely that Rwandan questions were being resolved at the level of the Deputies Committee. Thus, it seems that the inputs from the Rwanda IWG did not become part of the formal NSC process. As will be later discussed, this has significant implications concerning the U.S. decision-making process in conjunction with the Rwanda crisis.

Less than overwhelming U.S. domestic support

Regardless of the level of official discussion, one component of the crisis clearly

⁹¹ Miskel and Norton, 227.

⁹² Bogosian Interview with the author.

⁹³ Miskel and Norton, 227.

⁹⁴ Aronoff, A25.

stood out. There was a near total lack of U.S. public support for intervention or involvement in Rwanda. Special interest groups, such as the Congressional Black Caucus that had been so influential in the Haiti case, produced no unified call for action. This fact was not lost on President Clinton who specifically asked if the Congressional Black Caucus was showing a strong interest in the issue.⁹⁵

Nor was the media urging involvement on the ground. The *New York Times* twice ran editorials cautioning against providing more than logistic support and financial aid to Rwandan relief efforts.⁹⁶ The point was also made that the United States has no vital interests at stake in Rwanda. Both the *Washington Post*, the *Chicago Sun-Times* and *USA Today* took similar positions.⁹⁷ There were, of course, some calls for intervention, but these tended to come from international interest groups.

On 3 May President Clinton appeared on the Cable Network News (CNN) program "Global Forum with President Clinton." In the course of the show the President was asked what to do about Rwanda. He replied that he, like everyone, was shocked at the "slaughter," but hoped that the recognition of military and political dimensions of the crisis would lead to avoiding the problems of Somalia. There was no discussion of intervention.⁹⁸

Despite the President's appearance on the CNN news show, Rwanda was by no means the "hot" story of 1994 as far as the U.S press was concerned. Events in Haiti and Bosnia dominated U.S. stories about the international scene as potential health care and

⁹⁵ Des Forges, 624 – 625.

⁹⁶ "Cold Choices in Rwanda," *The New York Times*, 23 April 1994, 1, 24; "Look Before Plunging Into Rwanda," *The New York Times*, 18 May 1994, A22.

⁹⁷ "One, Two, Many Rwandas?" *Washington Post*, 17 April 1994, C6.; Otis, Pike, "Be Realistic About U.S. Foreign Policy," *Chicago Sun-Times*, 4 May 1994, Editorial, 43.; "Massacre in Rwanda; where's the outrage?," *USA Today*, 2 May 1994, 10A.

⁹⁸ Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 30, Nr. 18, 974.

crime bills did the domestic. In part, this lack of coverage was due to a paucity of media assets in Central Africa and the difficulty in getting news crews and reporters into the country. Neither the Rwandan Army, nor the RPF wanted the scrutiny of the world press on their activities.

PDD-25

On 5 May 1994 Ambassador Albright testified before the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. When the subject of Rwanda came up, she took the opportunity to brief the committee on Presidential Decision Directive 25, which had only recently been signed into force. As Ambassador Albright put it, PDD 25 was seen as a way to “make multilateral peace operations more selective and more effective.”⁹⁹

The intent behind PDD-25 was to make U.S. participation in U.S. peacekeeping operations more difficult to undertake. PDD-25 established criteria concerning command and control, funding and the selection of which operations to support. Critics of PDD-25 claimed that the president had effectively shut the United States out of the peacekeeping business. Many within the government traced the origin of the PDD-25 back to the battle of Mogadishu and the failure of the Clinton Administration’s Somalia policy. It was, in the words of one Ambassador, “emblematic of the times.”¹⁰⁰ But PDD-25 would also make it easier for those government organizations that were opposed to a particular intervention to advance their position.¹⁰¹

Ambassador Albright testifies about Rwanda to Congress

⁹⁹ Ambassador Albright testimony, “Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations for 1995, Part 4: Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives One Hundred Third Congress Second Session,” 5 May 1994 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994) 553.

In discussing Rwanda, Ambassador Albright stated that the OAU had volunteered to contribute forces, but that funding for those forces would have to be provided. The UN did not have the money that was needed and was starting a voluntary fund for Rwanda. She noted that the Secretary-General hoped the United States would pay a portion of that voluntary funding. The ambassador referred to the dilemma as a “chicken and egg situation.”¹⁰² When asked for specifics regarding the killings in Rwanda, Ambassador Albright answered that it was “hard” to get information out of Rwanda, but that while the exact numbers of the dead were unknown it seemed that the victims were mostly Tutsi and some moderate Hutus. The UNAMIR troops in Kigali were said to be “trying to help with negotiations, protect the UN negotiators there, and trying to provide some protection to Rwandans who sought protection under the UN force.”¹⁰³ Ambassador Albright also noted that the prospect of putting more forces into Rwanda was complicated by the fact that the RPF did not want additional peacekeepers in the country. Albright also voiced doubts as to whether the Rwandan peace operation had “started out properly.”¹⁰⁴

Growing congressional interest

By May 1994, other voices were being heard in Congress on the subject of Rwanda. Kofi Anan, then the Under Secretary-General of the United Nations, was invited to speak before the subcommittee on Africa on the Senate Foreign Relations on 2 May 1994. Anan focused his comments on the extent of the crisis. He noted that the situation was so bad that NGOs with a reputation for being undaunted in the face of danger, such

¹⁰⁰ Bogosian Interview with the author.

¹⁰¹ Des Forges, 625.

¹⁰² Albright testimony, 603.

¹⁰³ Ibid,

as Doctors Without Borders and the ICRC, had either suspended operations in Rwanda or confined their personnel to the relatively safer environs of Kigali. He noted that Rwanda was “the most violent and virulent of all African challenges, “ and that the UN was doing everything within its power to respond to the devastation that was occurring. He stated that within 14 days the casualty figures had reached 100,000 dead and more than two million displaced, when Senator Simon (D-IL) asked what the United States could or should do, Anan replied that the United States had the logistic lift, military hardware, and speed of action that was desperately needed. Furthermore, he added, that even if the United States was unwilling to commit ground forces, it could “lead the international community in mobilizing resources.”¹⁰⁵ When Simon asked about the capability of the OAU to be of greater support in helping answer the Rwanda problem, Anan replied “At least they tried.”¹⁰⁶

A lack of public support

Although it took some time, the international media began to carry images of the devastation and genocide that was sweeping Rwanda began to appear internationally. In the United States, many congressional representatives reported themselves horrified at what they were seeing. However, while there was support for increased aid for NGOs and UIN agencies in Rwanda, there were no calls to send U.S. troops.¹⁰⁷

More congressional hearings - the word genocide is used

Although the Clinton White House was still not using the term genocide to describe what was happening in Rwanda, others in the United States were. On 4 May

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Anan Testimony, 3.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Weekly compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 30, Nr. 18, 978..

George Moose, Assistant Secretary, Department of State appeared before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Congressional representatives used the terms “genocide,” and “holocaust” to describe the killings in Rwanda. Furthermore, Representative Johnston (D-FL) made it clear there was no doubt that Congress understood genocide was being carried out by Interhamwe and elements of the Rwandan Army. He further noted that the killing had been carefully planned and deliberately executed. In response, Moose explained the killings had begun in Kigali, then spread to the countryside. The victims were moderate Hutu opposition leaders and Tutsis of every type. Casualties were estimated at 100,000 dead and more than 300,000 refugees.¹⁰⁸ After running down a long list of actions the United States was taking to address the situation, Moose noted

In the end only the Rwandans can bring peace to their country. And no outside effort can succeed without commitment to peace by the combatants themselves. The influence of the international community on internal conflicts of this type is limited.¹⁰⁹

The Committee was hard on Moose. One of the more telling points they raised was that although UNAMIR forces had been ordered removed out of concern for the soldiers’ safety, the remaining troops in Kigali had been unharmed since the second day of the fighting. Moose admitted that this was so. He also made it clear that U.S. and UN fact-finding missions that were being dispatched to the region were not actually planning to enter Rwanda. Moose downplayed the chance of French or Belgian capabilities to “influence the current situation” due to “historical baggage.”¹¹⁰

However, despite the committee’s willingness to put Moose on the spot, only Alcee Hastings (D-FL) called for U.S. armed intervention. Others, such as

¹⁰⁸ Moose testimony, 1.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 4.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

Representative Burton (R-IN), were willing to support a multi-lateral intervention as long as U.S. troops were *not* part of the operation.¹¹¹

Other congressional personalities tried a more direct approach. Personally contacting General Dallaire, Senators Paul Simon (D-IL) and Jim Jeffords (D-VT) were told “if I can get 5,000 to 8,000 troops here quickly we can stop the whole thing.” Accordingly, both Senators wrote President Clinton urging rapid action.¹¹²

More delays at the United Nations

In New York the Security Council continued to wrestle with the problem of Rwanda. On 1 May Tanzania formally protested the decision to drawdown UNAMIR. This act, it was argued “demonstrated that the tragedy in Rwanda was of no concern to the international community, and stood in sharp contrast to the peace-keeping efforts of the organization elsewhere.”¹¹³ Unnamed Clinton Administration officials stated that they were considering helping organize and fund an African intervention in Rwanda, but that the idea of any direct U.S. intervention has been rejected.¹¹⁴ This was reinforced by Ambassador Madeline Albright the next day during an interview on CNN.¹¹⁵

On 3 May Kofi Anan blamed the lack of support for direct action in Rwanda on two major factors. One was the fear of placing national military forces at risk.¹¹⁶ This fear was fueled by past events in Somalia and current events in Bosnia. The other factor

¹¹¹ Italics by the author.

¹¹² Testimony of Senator Paul Simon, Congressional Record 8 August 1994, 103rd Congress 2nd Session, 140 Congressional Record S10941, Vol. 140, Nr. 8, S10941.

¹¹³ “Letter from the Charge d’affaires, a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting a statement by the Tanzanian President, dated 1 May 1994, on the situation in Rwanda,” S/1994/527. 2 May 1994, reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993 – 1996*, 272 – 273.

¹¹⁴ Paul Lewis, “U.S. Examines Way To Assist Rwanda Without Troops,” *The New York Times*, 1 May 1994, 1,1.

¹¹⁵ Ralph Begleiter, “Albright Says U.S. Action Possible in Haiti,” *Cable Network News*, 2 July 1994, Transcript #600-3,

¹¹⁶ “Many countries ‘reluctant’ to send peacekeepers,” *The Vancouver Sun*, 3 May 1994, A4.

was the lack of a feeling of kinship by the populations of western states for the people of Rwanda.¹¹⁷ On 4 May Boutros Boutros Ghali referred to the killing in Rwanda as “genocide.”¹¹⁸ So too did David Breyer, Director of the Non-Governmental Organization Oxfam, who reported that as many as 500,000 Rwandans might have been killed.¹¹⁹

UNAMIR II: Of troops and transports

On 13 May the Security Council was prepared to vote on restoring UNAMIR strength in Rwanda, but Ambassador Albright delayed the vote for four days.¹²⁰ On 17 May the Council passed Resolution 918 authorizing UNAMIR II, an expanded UNAMIR. UNAMIR II would consist of 5,500 personnel, with a mandate to provide protection to displaced persons, refugees, and civilians at risk while supporting relief efforts.¹²¹

Although UNAMIR II had an authorized strength of 5,500, the required soldiers could not be found. Ghana immediately volunteered to provide enough soldiers for the first of four phased installments, but made it clear their troops would need Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs). The UN requested the United States provide the vehicles on 19 May.¹²² In mid-June the United States publicly agreed to provide the requested APCs.¹²³

RPF Victories Continue

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 51.

¹¹⁹ “Aid group on Rwanda: It’s ‘genocide’ on a horrific scale; Kigali battered by heavy shelling as fighting surges,” *The Gazette* (Montreal), 4 May 1994, A10.

¹²⁰ Nightline Transcript, 4.

¹²¹ “Security Council Resolution expanding UNAMIR to 5,500 troops and mandating UNAMIR II to provide security to displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk and to support relief efforts, and imposing an arms embargo on Rwanda,” S/RES/918 (1994) 17 May 1994, reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda*, 282–284.

¹²² Frontline Transcript, 8-9.

¹²³ Ibid.

Meanwhile, the RPF was collecting an impressive string of military successes against the Rwandan Army. RPF leaders were not keen on a UN intervention and possible interruption of their campaign.¹²⁴ Despite the arms embargo, both forces were being resupplied throughout the campaign, but the greater war-fighting skill and discipline of the RPF was credited as the most important elements of their victories. However, RPF professionalism only extended so far behind the battle lines. They were “less than precise” when it came to observing the Geneva protocols invoking the noncombatant status of hospitals and so on.¹²⁵

The tardy APCs

UNAMIR II continued to be plagued by trouble. The transfer of the APCs came to be seen as an essential component of a successful deployment. The United States possessed the required vehicles and had publicly agreed to transfer them to the UN for UNAMIR. U.S. leaders portrayed the United States as being fully committed to helping resolve the situation in Rwanda. But when it came to action, there were serious doubts about both Washington’s commitment to the APC agreement and to resolving the Rwanda crisis.

In the best of cases, the bureaucratic processes of the UN are cumbersome. Things happen slowly and paperwork is extensive. When faced with a crisis, this process can be speeded up, but only with the intervention and oversight of an interested, powerful party.¹²⁶ In the past the United States has often played such a role. This time the United

¹²⁴ Paul Lewis, “U.N. Chief Seeks an African Peace Force for Rwanda,” *The New York Times*, 2 May, 2000, A3.

¹²⁵ Keane, 123 – 124.

¹²⁶ Bogosian Interview; Interview with Dr. Ronald Senykoff, Country (Rwanda) Program Officer, Office of Food for Peace, United States Agency for International Development, with the author, Newport, RI, 5 July 2000.

States did not.¹²⁷ Disagreements over the terms of the APC contract were frequent and often focused on such details as tail lights and painting the vehicles white.¹²⁸ At least one editorial accused the White House or the NSC as being responsible for the delay in turning over the APCs.¹²⁹ The end result of this slow and cumbersome process was that the APCs would never be transferred from U.S. custody and, partly for this reason, UNAMIR II would never become an effective force.

The genocide goes on and the RPF advances

The killing continued, so that by mid-May the ICRC estimated that 500,000 people had been killed in Rwanda. The RPF held half of Rwanda and were tightening their hold on the outskirts of Kigali. Hutu refugees were “streaming” from the capital to areas still dominated by the Rwandan Army.¹³⁰ On 21 May the RPF gained control of the Kigali airport and refused to turn it over to UNAMIR.¹³¹

Within the zone controlled by the RPF, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Program (WFP) and the ICRC were able to provide what amounted to systematic humanitarian assistance.¹³² This fact would appear to strengthen the argument that the RPF’s aversion to an increased UNAMIR presence was the fear of being forced to give up their offensive short of total victory, rather than reluctance to deal with the UN and other actors.

¹²⁷ Aronoff, A25.

¹²⁸ Ibid; Keane, 124; Prunier 275.

¹²⁹ “Shameful Dawdling on Rwanda,” *The New York Times*, 15 June 1994, A24.

¹³⁰ *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993 – 1996*, 48.

¹³¹ “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Rwanda, reporting on the political mission he sent to Rwanda to move the warring parties towards a cease-fire and recommending that the expanded mandate for UNAMIR be authorized for an initial period of six months,” S/1994/640, 31 May 1994, reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993 – 1996*, 290 - 297.

¹³² *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993 – 1996*, 49.

In late May the Secretary-General began an increasingly anguished cry for support in stopping what he was publicly labeling genocide in Rwanda. While recognizing a “general fatigue on the part of the international community regarding peacekeeping,” the growth of peacekeeping missions and the difficulties with past operations such as Somalia, Boutros Boutros Ghali called Rwanda “a failure of the entire international community.”¹³³

No U.S. troops

During the same time period, President Clinton addressed the topic of U.S. intervention while giving the annual commencement address at the United States Naval Academy. The president’s remarks made it clear that it was unlikely sufficient national interests were at stake in Rwanda to warrant U.S. intervention.¹³⁴ The next day the President signed Executive Order 12918. Arms sales and transfers to Rwanda were now embargoed.¹³⁵

President Clinton made this point again to the French press on 7 June.¹³⁶ The United States was willing to help, but would not commit troops. The President pointed out that the United States already had forces committed to Korea, to Europe, and the blockade of Haiti. Developments in Bosnia and Haiti could place additional demands on the armed forces of the United States. The United States would provide financial assistance and armored support. The President thought that a modest-sized force, fielded by several African states, offered the best hope of success.¹³⁷

On 8 June the Security Council passed Resolution 925, which endorsed the

¹³³ Ibid. 50.

¹³⁴ Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 30, Nr. 20, 1161 .

¹³⁵ Ibid., Nr. 21, 1171.

¹³⁶ Ibid., Nr.23, 1252.

immediate of two Battalions to Rwanda and extended the UNAMIR mandate.¹³⁸ Troops for the battalions were not forthcoming. The APCs had yet to be delivered and it was increasingly becoming apparent that no major deployment of UN forces was in the cards.

Enter the French

On 19 June 1994 the Secretary-General announced to the Security Council that the French had informed him of “their willingness to undertake with Council authorization, a French-commanded multi-national operation to assure the security and protection of displaced persons and civilians at risk in Rwanda.”¹³⁹ The U.S.–led United Nations Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF) was cited as a precedent.¹⁴⁰

On 20 June the French put their case before the Security Council. France and Senegal would both deploy troops into Rwanda. French forces were reported to be ready to move “without delay,” and France wanted Chapter VII authorization for the mission.¹⁴¹

As the Security Council debated the French offer, the RPF continued to make headway against the Rwandan Army, giving an increased sense of urgency to the discussion. As the RPF advanced the numbers of Hutu refugees continued to grow. At this time, UNAMIR’s troop strength in Rwanda was only 503.

Operation Turquoise

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ “Security Council resolution extending the mandate of UNAMIR until 9 December 1994 and authorizing deployment of two additional battalions,” S/RES/925 (1994), 8 June 1994, reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda*, 300 – 301.

¹³⁹ “Letter dated 19 June 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, suggesting that the Council consider France’s offer to undertake a multinational operation to assure the security and protection of civilians at risk in Rwanda until UNAMIR is brought up to strength,” S/1994/728, 20 June 1994, reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda*, 304 – 306.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ “Letter dated 20 June 1994 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, requesting adoption of a resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter as a legal framework for the deployment of a multinational force to maintain a presence in Rwanda until the expanded UNAMIR is deployed,” S/1994/734, 21 June 1994, reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda*, 307.

On 22 June 1994 France's offer was accepted by the Security Council. Resolution 929 authorized the French to intervene in Rwanda under UN auspices. The operation was to conclude on 21 August.¹⁴² This was only the sixth time that a UN operation had been approved under Chapter VII of the charter. The first elements of what would be known as "Operation Tourquoise" deployed into Uganda that very day. By early July more than 2,000 French and Sengalese troops were on the ground in Rwanda.

On 27 June President Clinton addressed the members of the White House Conference on Africa. He pointed out that the United States was already involved in seven peacekeeping efforts in Africa.¹⁴³ U.S. financial, material, and "statistical" support was being provided for the efforts in Rwanda, including more than \$100 million in humanitarian relief.¹⁴⁴ The President also expressed support for French intervention and affirmed that the United States was committed to bringing the genocidaires to justice.

Internal U.S. government politics

The ever-growing numbers of cross-border refugees resulted in a shift in the relative position in the power and influence of the various agencies attempting to come to grips with the problem in Washington. From the beginning of the crisis, USAID had been anxious to do whatever was possible to alleviate the suffering in Rwanda and in neighboring refugee camps. In fact, it was acknowledged by some participants that

¹⁴² "Security Council resolution, invoking Chapter VII of the Charter, authorizing Member States to conducting a multinational operation for humanitarian purposes in Rwanda until UNAMIR is brought up to strength," S/RES/929 (1994), 22 June 1994, reprinted in *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993 – 1996*, 308-309. Ten Council members voted for the action, none voted against. Brazil, China, New Zealand, Pakistan and Nigeria abstained.

¹⁴³ Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Nr. 26, 1365.

¹⁴⁴ To date, the author has been unable to discover just what the President meant by "statistical" relief.

USAID was probably the most “out in front” of all the U.S. foreign policy community.¹⁴⁵ But USAID had not been able to advance its position significantly. As the numbers of Rwandan refugees crossing into Tanzania and Zaire increased, the State Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugee and Migration (PRM) became progressively more involved, but only in regard to the cross-border refugees. Refugees who had escaped into the French humanitarian zone were classified as “displaced persons,” and not of comparable interest to PRM.¹⁴⁶ Prior to this point, USAID had been consistently urging strong action, and there was a sense that the NSC was listening with a sympathetic ear. Whether this was true for everyone on the NSC is debatable, but Anthony Lake has confirmed that he had a desire to “do something.”¹⁴⁷

As the refugees flooded across international borders and pooled in huge, increasingly unhealthy, camps, NGOs rapidly found themselves overwhelmed. Reporters who had previously found it difficult to enter Rwanda had no such problems in entering the camps. The appalling conditions, death and suffering were the substance of powerful news stories and media coverage increased dramatically.¹⁴⁸

At the Rwanda IWG meetings there was an increasing sense that the State Department, and Warren Christopher, were deferring more and more to the NSC and Tony Lake. Christopher was not an “Africa hand” and was having other diplomatic difficulties.¹⁴⁹ In contrast, Tony Lake was very interested in Africa.¹⁵⁰ Defense

¹⁴⁵ Miskel and Norton, 228.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Lake Interview, 18 October 1999.

¹⁴⁸ Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot, *Soldiers To The Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons Learned from Rwanda*, (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996), 15, 111; Hancher interview. In EUCOM, it was only half-jokingly said that the appearance of CNN reporter Christiane Amanpour usually presaged an impending military operation. Informally referred to as “the angel of death,” Amanpour always seemed to be where the most compelling stories were to be found.

¹⁴⁹ Bogosian Interview.

Department representatives were extremely reluctant to support any initiatives that might require the use of military forces in the Great Lakes region of Africa. Importantly, there was a general agreement that there were no U.S. national interests were at stake.¹⁵¹ The military services also had concerns with any deployment's effect on their readiness and budgets, as well as potential combat risks to U.S. personnel.¹⁵²

The RPF takes Kigali

In Rwanda, the RPF continued its string of victories. RPF troops were closing in on Rwandan Army strongholds in both the southwest and north-central portion of Rwanda. Several refugee flows, each numbering more than a million people, moved away from the fighting. Fear of the RPF, fear of being caught up in the general conflict, and the urgings of Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines, all incited Hutus to flee.¹⁵³ Ostensibly in reaction to these developments, the French felt compelled to establish a safe haven in the Cyangugu-Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle in southwestern Rwanda. French-led forces deployed into the zone on 9 July.¹⁵⁴ Five days later the RPF had taken full control of Kigali and captured Butare, Rwanda's second largest city. Neither the leaders of the RPF or the Rwandan government, were interested in discussing a cease-fire agreement. In the United States, an RPF victory was being increasingly seen as the most likely way to stop the genocide.¹⁵⁵

Refugees swamp Zaire

By 14 July approximately 1.5 million Rwandans, mostly Hutus, had crossed the

¹⁵⁰ Lake Interview

¹⁵¹ Ibid; Also, see President Clinton's remarks on "CNN's Global Forum With President Clinton, 6 May 1994, as recorded in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 30, Nr. 18, 974.

¹⁵² Ibid.; Bogosian Interview.

¹⁵³ *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993 – 1996*, 55.

¹⁵⁴ Initially *Operation Tourquoise* was carried out by French and Senegalese troops. They were later joined by forces from Chad, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Niger. Minear and Guillot, 96.

border into Zaire. Included in this flow were significant numbers of Rwandan Army, government and Interhamwe personnel. Zaire was completely unable to deal with such a sizeable flow. The Security Council called on the international community to mobilize all available resources to provide urgently needed humanitarian assistance, while U.S. based humanitarian NGOs began to marshal their forces to assist with the situation.

Enter U.S. lobbyists

Among the more active of these groups was the Capitol Hill Hunger Consortium. In addition to serving as a lobbying group for humanitarian programs, the Consortium also provided consulting services to several NGOs and UN agencies.¹⁵⁶ Art Eugene, who directed the Consortium, was a former senior official in both the UN and the State Department. He was well connected on Capitol Hill. On 14 July he phoned contacts on the NSC staff, stressing the need for U.S. leadership. Nor did he stop with entreaties. Mr. Eugene also drafted an action plan that he provided to his contacts on the NSC and certain influential Congressmen, such as Tony Hall (D-OH).¹⁵⁷ Eugene claims that his proposals were actually presented to the NSC.¹⁵⁸ As a result of this lobbying effort, several members of the Congressional Black Caucus sent letters to the President, asking that he increase aid for Rwanda. Black Caucus chairman Donald Payne (D-NJ) penned the strongest of these letters. Sources within the NSC have confirmed that the Eugene proposal was among several plans made available to NSA Lake and other key figures.¹⁵⁹

Atwood to Goma

On 15 July President Clinton dispatched USAID's Brian Atwood to Goma in

¹⁵⁵ Des Forges, 670.

¹⁵⁶ Miskel and Norton, 226.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

order to assess the severity of the humanitarian crisis. There he met with General Dallaire and Charles Petrie, Deputy Director of the UNAMIR Emergency Office. At the meeting Petrie “begged” for additional UNAMIR forces. According to Petrie, “It was fascinating to see how much support, compassion and willingness to give help there was at the time.”¹⁶⁰ Shortly after Atwood’s return, he personally briefed the president.¹⁶¹ For the first time in the crisis, the United States was seriously considering sending military forces into the African Great Lakes region.

However, relatively little information was being shared with the theater commander. In EUCOM the initial indicator that something more than “monitoring” was likely to be needed came in the form of a White House press release.¹⁶²

Victory in the time of cholera

On 18 July the RPF reached the Zairian frontier and declared a unilateral cease-fire. With the exception of the French “humanitarian zone,” the entire country of Rwanda was under RPF control.¹⁶³ The victors quickly formed a “government of national unity.”¹⁶⁴ Representatives of all parties named in the Arusha Peace Accords were represented with the exception of the MRND and the CDR.

On 19 July an outbreak of cholera broke was reported in the refugee camps of Goma. The disease spread like wildfire. An outbreak of virulent dysentery followed hard on its heels.¹⁶⁵ The UNHCR urgently appealed for assistance as its stockpiled relief supplies, which were capable of answering the needs half a million people, had run

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Berry and Berry, eds., 151.

¹⁶¹ Miskel and Norton, 225.

¹⁶² Hancher Interview.

¹⁶³ *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996*, 57.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 121.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 74.

out.¹⁶⁶ The nature of the disease placed additional pressure upon the U.S. decision-making apparatus. Cholera is extremely virulent and infectious. It had broken out in the camps as a result of contaminated water supplies and a lack of sanitation facilities. Water purification equipment and associated hygienic items were needed immediately. Only the United States had the ability to lift the required materials into the theater fast enough to have a chance of dealing successfully with the epidemic.¹⁶⁷ On 21 July Brian Atwood personally saw the president for the second time and briefed him on the situation in Goma.¹⁶⁸

A shift in attitude

The end of the Civil War dramatically changed the relative influence among the members of the Rwanda IWG. In part this was due to the fact the Defense Department representatives lost one of their most compelling arguments against the deployment of U.S. forces into the Great Lakes region. With the RPF victorious, the Rwandan Army hiding in refugee camps or in the French controlled portion of Rwanda, U.S. personnel would be at little or no risk of being involved in combat. The Somalia analogy no longer seemed as applicable.¹⁶⁹ Technically, intervention was no longer even being discussed. What was now on the table would be better classified as a permissive humanitarian operation. However, PDD-25 could still be cited as a barrier to operations, given that there was still no perceived national interest at stake. Yet, the new situation on the ground made it possible to identify “clear objectives and endpoints” for a humanitarian

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 120.

¹⁶⁷ Lake Interview, Hancher interview.

¹⁶⁸ Weekly compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 30, Nr. 29, 1533.

¹⁶⁹ Lake interview, Hancher interview.

mission to Rwanda.¹⁷⁰ The diminished physical risk to U.S. forces also translated into less political risk for the administration.

President Clinton orders in the troops

On 22 July, President Clinton publicly announced a major increase in U.S. aid and directed the Department of Defense to commit troops to the relief effort.¹⁷¹ He noted that prior to making this decision he had met with Brian Atwood to get a first-hand report on the situation in the refugee camps. The threat of cholera was said to have been an important element in the decision. Interestingly, NSA Lake, Deputy Secretary of Defense Deutch, U.S. AID Director Atwood, and General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were charged with conducting the operation.¹⁷² The U.S. decision was unilateral, but was consistent with calls for international action made by the UN.

Once the decision was made, U.S. response was rapid. Initial air drops of food from Special Operations C-130 aircraft were being conducted within twelve hours.¹⁷³ Led by General John Nix, of the European Command, U.S. troops were on the ground and conducting operations within 48 hours.¹⁷⁴ In less than 24 hours, the first water purification unit was in operation.¹⁷⁵

From late July until early October more than 3,500 U.S. personnel participated in *Operation Support Hope*. In addition to water purification, U.S. forces were involved with aid distribution projects, establishing and maintaining airfield operations, and

¹⁷⁰ Interview with Admiral David Jeremiah, former Vice-Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff by the author, via telephone, Newport, RI, 9 November 1999.

¹⁷¹ Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Nr. 29, 1533.

¹⁷² Ibid., 1535.

¹⁷³ Hancher Interview.

¹⁷⁴ Miskel and Norton, 230.

¹⁷⁵ Minear and Guillot, 112.

providing logistic support to UN forces.¹⁷⁶ The total estimated cost of the operation was \$123.9 million.¹⁷⁷ And while Rwanda would continue to attract U.S. observation and concern, the immediate crisis was over.

Analysis of Key Decisions

Decision One - Do not intervene in Rwanda

The Rational Model

From the moment of the first killings on 6 April to the ultimate RPF declaration of victory on 18 July, it was clear the United States would not intervene -- except to conduct a NEO of U.S. citizens. Multiple statements from senior policy leaders in the United States, including the president, made it clear that U.S. military intervention was not going to happen. Every action taken by the United States during the Rwanda crisis backed up the rhetoric of non-intervention. Furthermore, it is the contention of this study that the decision to eventually send troops to the Great Lakes Region (first to Zaire and then to Rwanda) cannot be classified as an intervention because these troops entered African states at the invitation of the host nations and as part of a permissive humanitarian operation.

Can the Rational Actor model account for this decision of non-intervention? At first glance the answer would seem to be a resounding “yes,” especially if one applies a traditional calculus of national security / national interest. According to this calculus, the following logic would apply: the situation in Rwanda, however horrific it may have been, did not pose a threat to the national interests of the United States; Rwanda posed no military threat to the United States; the collapse and destruction of the Rwandan economy

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

would not affect the economic health of the United States; Rwanda occupied no position of great geo-political strategic importance, nor did it command any great following or wield significant influence in the international political system; and Rwanda was not an ally of the United States. Even if events in Rwanda had led to a wider regional conflict, as they in fact did, few, if any, U.S. interests would have been placed at risk. Thus a subsequent application of cost-benefit analysis, according to the Rational Model, would overwhelmingly confirm the wisdom to not intervene in Rwanda.

However, as noted earlier, the Clinton Administration had formally embraced a greatly expanded interpretation of national interests in the president's National Security Strategy. The expanded list of national interests included such items as the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Just as advocates of a traditional security calculus might have come to an immediate decision that any cost-benefit analysis would argue against U.S. intervention, proponents of the expanded definition of interest might, just as rapidly, have reached the opposite conclusion. The supporting logic from would be that human rights abuses were occurring on a scale that had not been seen since the end of World War II, the United States was a signatory to the UN Convention on the Prevention of Genocide, and thus legally obligated to act; and members of the UN were actively attempting to stabilize the situation in Rwanda and stop the genocide. Given the Clinton Administration's view of national security, each of these factors could be seen as providing an interest-based justification for calculating the cost-benefit of a multilateral or unilateral intervention.

Once having ascertained that there was a reason for intervention, a proponent of the expanded definition of interests would need to determine if the United States was

capable of mounting an intervention of Rwanda? Here, the answer is clearly "yes." Sufficient logistic, command and control, and combat power were available for deployment. The rapid response of SOF was indicative of the potential speed of a U.S. force, even one comprised of less elite units. One of the most pessimistic authors concedes that at least tens of thousands of victims could have been spared.¹⁷⁸ Nor would the warring factions have posed much threat to U.S. forces. The Rwandan Army and associated militias carrying out the genocide were no match for the forces of the RPF. The French experience in Kigali had shown that the RPF was no match for trained European troops. U.S. casualties could reasonably be expected to be light. Thus, given the chance to stop genocide, while bolstering international law, a proponent of the published Clinton definition of national security might be as eager to intervene in Rwanda as an opponent would be to stay out.

Regardless of which definition of national interest was dominant, a critical component of the Rational Actor Model is the generation of alternative courses of action and the application of a cost-benefit analysis to each alternative. In the case of Rwanda, alternative courses of action were discussed and even argued for, including supporting a UN intervention, providing support to regional actors that would allow them to intervene, mounting either a multi-lateral or unilateral U.S. effort to restore order in Rwanda, doing nothing, and even preventing or obstructing others from intervening.

From either standpoint, if decision makers were following the Rational Actor Model, then the results of the cost-benefit analysis associated with a Rwandan intervention would be the determining factor in the decision. However, this study can

¹⁷⁸ Allan J.Kupermann "Rwanda In Retrospect," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No.1, January/February 2000, 105 - 110.

find no evidence to suggest that an analysis of the cost/benefit of intervention was ever discussed. To the contrary, the process by which this analysis might have been undertaken was shut down. For example, when EUCOM requested the authority to initiate the planning process that would have provided key data to a cost-benefit analysis, the request was denied. The NSC staffing process, which was created to perform just such an analysis, was also stymied. Without regular Principals meetings, the flow of data, the presentation of alternatives, and a discussion of associated costs and benefits of intervention could not be fully aired. In short, it appears that proponents of both intervention and non-intervention were influenced by pre-existing ideas and not through the rigorous application of a Rational Actor process.

The Organizational Model

The primary U.S. government organizations involved in the Rwanda crisis were the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the United States Agency for International Development, and the staff of the National Security Council. Each of these organizations participated in efforts to keep U.S. forces from becoming involved in Rwanda, although in the cases of the State and Defense departments, some sub-agencies, such as EUCOM initially made preparations for a possible U.S. intervention. USAID remained pro-intervention from the beginning, but was not able to affect the decision.

As described in the chapter, when the crisis erupted, EUCOM, assigned responsibility for the Great Lakes region of Africa, reacted in a predictable manner. EUCOM personnel began informally to develop plans and procedures to rapidly deploy forces into the region, which meant that the EUCOM planners were, in effect, following organizational SOPs. These efforts ceased when the Joint Staff ordered a halt to all

planning activity involving Rwanda. This order marks the point from which the Defense Department and the military services opposed involvement in Rwanda. This opposition included proscribing even the preparation of plans for a hypothetical military activity. There were several reasons for this resistance. First, as discussed in chapter two, there was an organizational fear of losing combat readiness as result of participating in peacekeeping and other military operations other than war. Second, military forces were dealing with other issues including a deteriorating situation with Haiti and an increasing probability of action in the Balkans. Some specialized units, such as military police and civil affairs personnel were in very limited supply and high demand. Deploying such forces to Rwanda would place additional strain upon the system. A third reason for DOD resistance was the high probability that funds expended for such operations would not be replaced within the same fiscal year, if at all. This would cause degradations to training and other programs. The fourth reason was the fear that intervening in Rwanda before the civil war was resolved could lead to a prolonged presence mission of indefinite duration. In addition, Africa was off the beaten path for DOD. Although extremely rapid operations could be mounted, they would not have been planned with the detail and rehearsed with the precision that operations in other areas would have been. Overlying all of DOD's concerns was the worry that involvement in Rwanda might somehow lead to another Mogadishu, with its connotations of mission creep, loss of U.S. lives and reduction in prestige. Although the military capacity to intervene rapidly in Rwanda existed, intervention offered DOD no organizational benefit and could require the organization to expend resources that Congress might not replace.

In contrast, the State Department, as an organization, was not as reluctant as DOD

to intervene in Rwanda. The department's Bureau for Refugees, Population and Migration was in favor of early intervention, and their SOPs had been activated as soon as refugees began crossing the Rwandan border. A successful intervention would increase the leverage the State Department could bring to bear in the region. Many African states, including Nigeria, a key regional ally, were pressing for U.S. participation in an intervention. Thus, U.S. involvement in Rwanda offered some benefits to the State Department at relatively low-levels of risk. However, as will be discussed, the opposition of Secretary of State Warren Christopher to intervention negated any pressure for intervention the State Department might have generated internally.

USAID was consistently in favor of U.S. involvement and intervention in Rwanda. There had been extensive development projects in Rwanda. AID was deeply vested in the Great Lakes region of Africa.¹⁷⁹ However, as in Somalia, the relatively small size of USAID meant that it could not muster the manpower reserves of the larger agencies and departments. Once other departments established a presence in the region, USAID lost further influence to the larger federal organizations, as it was no longer the sole department with on-scene expertise. All USAID could do was continue to press for involvement and wait.

Overall, the organizational model would account for a moderate level of pressure to avoid involvement on the ground in Rwanda. This was primarily due to reluctance on the part of the Department of Defense. DOD had the most to lose if an intervention into Rwanda failed to produce acceptable results or caused U.S. casualties in any number. Africa was not high on the priorities of any senior sub-organization of DOD. Indeed, deploying assets to Africa would have removed them from the list of forces that could be

sent to other theaters of operations that were widely seen as more important.

Rwanda's relative unimportance may have been a contributing factor to the lack of organizational pressure in favor of intervention. Having devoted relatively few resources to monitoring the situation in the Great Lakes region of Africa, few organizations, especially those as small as the NSC staff, had SOPs to deal with a crisis in the region. The resulting uncertainty, which was equated with risk, would be a further impediment to these organizations taking a proactive stand.

The Government Politics Model

The key members of President Clinton's inner circle involved in this decision were: William Perry, Secretary of Defense; Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security; Samuel Berger, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security; Warren Christopher, Secretary of State; General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Madeline Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Each, with the exception of General Shalikashvili, had experience with the Haiti and Somalia crises.¹⁸⁰ Nor was it at all clear that Haiti could be resolved without resorting to the use of force. It was also very likely that the United States was going to have to shoulder some form of commitment to nation-building in Haiti. Somalia was perceived as a major political failure for President Clinton, and several of the advisors, most notably Warren Christopher, had come close to being fired in the wake of that failure. No member of this group wanted another Somalia.

Madeline Albright has stated that she was in favor of the United States becoming involved in the Rwanda crisis, although she has not explicitly stated whether her

¹⁷⁹ Senykoff interview.

definition of involvement included the deployment of U.S. combat forces into Rwanda. Anthony Lake has said that he was inclined to do "something" about Rwanda, but that no U.S. interests were perceived as being at stake. Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili reflected the organizational reluctance of DOD to get involved in Rwanda and were against any form of intervention. Given this relative balance among the president's key advisors, a strong proponent for involvement might have carried the day, especially considering that Anthony Lake and Samuel Berger were, as a rule, receptive to greater U.S. involvement in Africa.

Secretary Christopher, however, played a very different role. It now appears that he was the most adamant opponent of intervention in Rwanda. He clearly saw the conflict as an internal civil war and that past efforts to influence such conflicts had a poor record of success. Later, when it was apparent that genocide was being conducted, Christopher not only ordered his own department not to use the term, but also insisted that the Administration avoid the use of the word genocide. In contrast to the wide latitude Madeline Albright had in dealing with the UN, in the Haitian case, this time she was given direct orders concerning what to do. By virtue of his position and authority Christopher was able essentially to shut down State's standard operating procedures that might have led to a more pro-interventionist policy.

As a result of the disaster in Somalia, and also perhaps because of Haiti competing for attention, the pro-interventionists (Lake, Berger and Albright) among the president's advisors either lacked the clout they normally enjoyed, or chose not to use it to pursue an interventionist policy in Rwanda. Accordingly, anti-interventionists, such as

¹⁸⁰ While the intervention would not occur until October 1994, the *Harlan County* affair had already provided one significant embarrassment to the U.S. government.

Christopher, enjoyed more power. It thus appears that the coalition of Christopher, Perry, and Shalikhshvili were able to prevail and prevent U.S. intervention.

The Human Factors Model

President Clinton had been elected, for a large part, due to his perceived expertise in domestic affairs. He had made it clear that the domestic arena was where his main interests lay and that he expected his foreign policy team to handle international issues. He was not a specialist on African affairs and had no prior connectivity with Rwanda. Somalia had turned out to be a disaster for him, and he felt his foreign policy team had served him poorly. By April of 1994 he was experiencing increasing difficulties at home that were requiring more and more of his attention.

Given all of these factors, it is easy to see why a policy of non-involvement in Rwanda would be appealing. The republicans would be unable to claim that the president was expending resources where U.S. interests were not at stake. Nor would they be able to accuse him of improperly risking the lives of the nation's military personnel. From President Clinton's perspective, staying out of Rwanda meant that his administration would avoid problems ranging from a political squabble that might become an election issue to a full-fledged, Somalia-like debacle. The fact that President Clinton's foreign policy experts were either promoting, or at least not opposing, non-intervention also likely reinforced his reluctance to get involved. In addition, pressure to get involved in Rwanda was coming from the UN, especially Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, whom President Clinton may have still resented for his success in manipulating U.S. foreign policy in regards to Somalia.

Integrated Analysis

The government politics model, combined with substantial aspects of the organization and human factors models, provides the most significant explanation of why the United States avoided involvement in the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The president's key advisors, those most expected to advocate for involvement in Rwanda, were either mute or actively against such actions. The coalition of Perry, Shalikashvili, and Christopher was too powerful to be withstood by the politically weakened Lake, Berger, and Albright. Christopher's ability to exert command over Albright, and his ability to embargo the use of the term "genocide," indicate a significant amount of government political power. The impact of the government politics model was increased because of the President's personal desires to avoid another Somalia, his increasing preoccupation with matters domestic and perhaps, some level of animosity towards Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

The organizational model also provides a modest explanation of U.S. non-involvement. DOD clearly had the most of any of the involved organizations at stake and was highly resistant to any suggestion that U.S. forces be deployed into Rwanda. However, there was no doubt about whether the Defense Department had the requisite SOPs, forces, and expertise to mount an intervention; nor could there be serious doubt if the U.S. military was able to prevail on the Rwandan battlefield. Additionally, there were components of the State Department and USAID that would have favored deeper involvement. In effect, organizational forces supported the decision to remain out of Rwanda, but did not drive it.

While the rational calculus supporting non-intervention may well have seemed obvious to the participants, it seems that the actual analysis to support such a conclusion

was either never performed or presented to senior decision-makers. The organizational process, at least in the case of the State department, was short-circuited, potentially increasing the impact of DOD's organizational response to the crisis. In the end, it appears that the legacy of Somalia and the aftermath of the battle of Mogadishu produced altered power relationships among the president's key advisors, which gave non-interventionists the upper hand. The recommendation to avoid intervention also apparently resonated with the president who, as it has been shown on more than one occasion, cited the need to apply the lessons of Somalia to Rwanda.

The Role of the International Political System

From the first days of the Rwanda crisis, inputs from the IPS demanded attention from the Clinton Administration. The most obvious, yet arguably most important, input was the renewal of the Rwandan Civil War and the instigation of genocide by the Hutu regime. This was the triggering event that set everything else in motion.

Other significant early events included the killing of Agathe Uwilingiyimana and her UN bodyguards and the destruction of many moderate Hutu leaders. The death of the UN soldiers prompted calls in the UN for both decreasing and increasing UN presence in Rwanda. In the beginning, the killing of Hutu moderates as well as Tutsis allowed some observers to interpret the conflict as solely a Civil War, and thereby to overlook the element of genocide.

As with the other cases presented in this study, some potential U.S. action options were closed out due to the impact of inputs from the IPS. For example, pleas by the Belgians for UNAMIR reinforcements could not be ignored by the United States, especially given Belgium's position on the Security Council at that time. Additional

requests from the UN and the OAU also could not be simply ignored because the visibility and legitimacy of these states demanded a U.S. response. The inability of the UN to raise the required manpower to intervene effectively in Rwanda also put pressure upon the United States to act. In many ways this pressure was relieved, at first by the Ghanaians request for APCs, which enabled the United States to appear proactive, and, much later, by the French intervention, which removed any pressure on the United States to act.

The large Rwandan refugee flows that were set in motion by the genocide and the advance of the RPF also triggered international inputs that were felt by U.S. leaders. First, the refugees directly involved neighboring states, which placed heavy strains on their infrastructure. When the Rwandan refugees crossed international borders, they were located, for the first time, where humanitarian NGOs could reach them. As the NGOs were, in turn, overwhelmed by the size of the refugee flows, they too turned to the U.S. government for help.

Although the international press covered the situation in Rwanda, there were very few reporters and camera crews in the country, which meant that the scope and nature of the killing largely went undocumented. With neither the Rwandan Army nor the RPF welcoming reporters, this lack of coverage continued. As a result, at least during the first weeks of the crisis, first hand accounts and images that might have been more effective at engaging world and U.S. opinion did not exist. This made it easier for states to pursue their own agendas and to take actions that might otherwise have to be publicly eschewed or justified.

As refugees began crossing the borders of Rwanda by land, thousands of bodies

were borne across those same borders by rivers and this provided both access to some of the lucky individuals who had escaped genocide and proof that massive numbers of deaths were occurring in Rwanda. Consequently, the media crews were able to increase the immediacy of their reporting. Once media representatives had these images and gained contact with the refugees, the scope and nature of the horror that the Rwandans were enduring became apparent, and this, in turn, increased public pressure on the Clinton Administration to do something.

Role of the Domestic Political System

The U.S. domestic political system had minimal impact on the Clinton decision-making process in the case of Rwanda. The issue of Rwanda failed to take hold with the U.S. population for several reasons. First, the United States did not contain significant numbers of citizens of Rwandan heritage, nor did what Rwandan-Americans there were exercise any special political clout. There was no local Rwandan voice to be heard, nor were there significant economic ties to Rwanda. The lack of constituent demand is the explanation why there was no significant Congressional pressure on the administration to act. Another factor explaining the quiet Congress was that the Congressional Black Caucus has already made Haiti an issue. Had this not been the case, it is possible the Caucus might have taken up the cause of Rwanda.

Finally, the U.S. populace appears to have suffered from what Susan Moeller has termed "compassion fatigue."¹⁸¹ Faced with incipient crises in the Balkans, on-going efforts in Haiti and the recent shock of Somalia, the public may simply have found it easier to ignore the events in Rwanda. This was likely made easier by the initial lack of

¹⁸¹ Susan D. Moeller, *Compassion Fatigue: How The Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death*, (Routledge: New York and London), 1999.

dramatic media coverage.

Role of the National Security System (NSS)

In the history of the Rwanda crisis, the national security system had a substantial impact on the decision-making process. While some elements in DOD and State reacted to the crisis at once and began to respond, other components reacted just as quickly to ensure that no response was made. It is also clear that most of the key advisors to the president and the president himself were predisposed to avoid any further intervention on the African continent. The apparent failure of the Somalia intervention had a profound effect on the NSS and reinforced the desire for caution.

Decision Two - Support French Intervention

On 20 June 1994, the Security Council approved a French initiative to unilaterally deploy forces to Rwanda to try to stop the genocide, protect noncombatants, and restore stability to Rwanda. The United States fully supported the French initiative.

Rational Actor Model

As with the initial decision to stay out of Rwanda, the likelihood of a rational calculus supporting a U.S. endorsement of the French intervention might have seemed so obvious as to not merit discussion. It was clear that the French intervention would put an end to genocide in areas that French forces controlled. This alone would advance the cause of human rights and uphold the UN Convention Against Genocide, which would be in keeping with the interests put forth Clinton National Security Strategy. The combat capabilities of the French armed forces were clearly a match for any opponents they might encounter in Rwanda, as the previous French intervention had demonstrated. Thus, it would be much less likely that additional U.S. support or assistance would be

needed. Nor would French intervention divert French troops from areas where they were directly or indirectly supporting U.S. interests. There would be no military or economic cost to the United States, which would satisfy those with a more traditional view of national interests.

It could also be argued that numerous alternatives had been examined, tried, and failed. Diplomacy had failed; the UN had failed; the OAU had failed; and intervention by the UN or OAU might fail so badly that the United States could well be called upon to rescue UN or OAU forces. It was clear that French military forces would not fail. They would stabilize the situation and U.S. forces would not be required.

But while the conclusions of a cost-benefit analysis may well have been assumed, it appears that, as with the first decision, there is no evidence that this calculus was ever performed. Had such a calculus been performed, issues such as the French government's motivation for an apparently altruistic operation, might have come under closer scrutiny, as might have the potential for further regional instability. More subtle issues concerning regional influence and U.S. interests on the continent of Africa might also have been considered. It is possible that a rational cost-benefit analysis might well have concluded that supporting the French intervention was the most positive course of action available to the U.S. government. However, as there is no evidence that the calculus was considered, there is reason to doubt the power of the rational model to explain adequately this decision.

Organizational Model

The various agencies and departments involved in the Rwandan crisis offered no objection to French intervention. Although DOD might well be asked to provide some

logistic aircraft in support, there were ample resources and SOPs to make this happen.¹⁸² Since the French and U.S. militaries had always maintained close liaison and cooperation would be easy to obtain. Best of all, from DOD's perspective, the employment of French military forces would mean there was no need for the United States to use force in Rwanda. From the perspective of the State Department and USAID, a successful French intervention would stabilize Rwanda, potentially slow or stop the flow of refugees, and create an environment in which diplomatic and developmental activities, themselves supported by routines and SOPs, could operate. Thus, for all organizations concerned, French intervention would either reduce organizational risk or increase organizational opportunities.

Government Politics Model

Support for a UN endorsed, unilaterally conducted, French intervention represented a classic government politics compromise. While perhaps less satisfying to the pro-interventionists than intervention by a U.S.-led, multi-lateral UN force, action by France would at least be a step in the right direction. The presence of the Senegalese would even allow the operation to be described as multilateral. Furthermore, a successful operation would add luster to the UN, something those in favor of engagement, especially Madeline Albright and Anthony Lake, would endorse. On the other hand, those members of the inner circle who wanted nothing to do with military intervention, such as Warren Christopher, could take comfort in the fact that there would be no risk of the United States becoming involved in another Somalia. French intervention was a win-win situation for advisors on both sides of the argument. In general, agreement was fast and easy to obtain.

¹⁸²ome U.S. aviation assets were used in support of the French.

Human Factors

For the president, *Operation Turquoise* might well have seemed a veritable *Deus Ex Machina*. By this time in the crisis, it was clear that Hutu extremists were conducting genocide, and the lack of a U.S. response was becoming increasingly criticized in both international and domestic circles. Supporting the French would be a positive step.

Furthermore, as a western military, it was reasonable to assume that the French were highly unlikely to comport themselves in criminal manner - a real possibility for some of the African militaries that might have eventually intervened. It would be easy to portray a French intervention as a shining example of U.S. allies shouldering their share of international burdens. The United States, through a low level of support, could gain some credit. Perhaps best of all, French intervention would allow President Clinton to forget about Rwanda and return to more pressing domestic and international issues. One should also not discount the pressure that a unified recommendation from his advisors can have on the president.

Integrated Analysis

Basically, a model-by-model analysis indicates, that organizational, government politics, and human factors were all pushing the president and his key advisors to support French intervention. It must have also appeared to be a decision that was intrinsically rational, with an obviously positive cost-benefit analysis. This resulted in a rapid decision, from which the president never wavered. The decision was so rapid, and received such broad support that several questions that might have been raised were never considered. As examples, apparently there was never any serious questioning of French motives. French statements of altruism, a desire to preserve human life and

human rights, and the responsibility of a former colonial power to act were evidently taken at face value. There was no serious discussion of underlying French motives or the impact that French actions could have on the entire Great Lakes region. Nor did anyone raise the question whether some other form of intervention, for example a French - OAU action, would have offered a better chance for long-term success. The alignment of the different decision-making forces examined by the different models was so strong as to simply overwhelm any other considerations.

Role of the International Political System

By the time the United States endorsed *Operation Tourquoise*, several significant events had occurred. Most notably, the initial confusion of the international and domestic public as to the nature of the conflict had dissipated. It was now clear, through both diplomatic and media channels, that genocide was on-going. It was also clear that the Rwandan Army was truly worse than the RPF when it came to failing to respect human rights. The impact of these changes was two fold. First, as it was clear that because Rwandan authorities were engaged in genocide, signatories to the UN Convention against Genocide were required to take some form of notice and action. Second, it became easier for states to choose between the combatants and to create a sense of urgency in the decision-making circle.

At the same time it was also clear that UN, OAU, and regional actions to resolve the situation had failed. Furthermore, U.S. resistance to providing African troops with the requested APCs was becoming increasingly overt and obvious. The result was increasing pressure from the international community to act, either by expediting the transfer of the APCs or by taking a more active role in a potential UN intervention.

The most important input ,however, was the French request for a UN endorsement of their intervention. This provided an out for the Clinton Administration; one, as has been demonstrated, that found universal acceptance within the national security system.

Role of the Domestic Political System

While not as important to this decision as inputs from the international political system, some domestic aspects of the Rwanda case deserve mention. First among these was the growing coverage of Rwanda and the greater clarity concerning events in that country. The administration's initial declaration that genocide was not being conducted in Rwanda became untenable. Efforts to find a middle ground, such as referring to "genocidal acts," did not satisfy administration critics. While there was no groundswell of public support for intervention into Rwanda, the questions of the press were becoming more pointed. It was increasingly difficult for the Administration not to look hypocritical when their public and published position, which held that the promotion of human rights was in the national interests of the United States, was contrasted with the administration's efforts to prevent UN or U.S. involvement in Rwanda.

Decision Three. Initiate *Operation Support Hope*

The Rational Actor Model

If one uses the Clinton Administration's interpretation of U.S. national interest /national security, then the Rational Actor model has significant explanatory power for analyzing the decision to initiate *Operation Support Hope*. On 22 July the situation in the Great Lakes region was radically different than it has been 3 months earlier. In the states bordering Rwanda vast numbers of refugees were crowded into camps. The civil war was over and the genocide had been halted. Private volunteer organizations, non-

governmental, and inter-governmental organizations were active throughout the region, but the scope of the problem, limited transportation assets, and inadequate logistics hampered efforts to stabilize the situation. An increasing number of important regional and international allies were involved in these efforts. Becoming involved in a humanitarian effort would advance the cause of human rights, reassure U.S. allies, and potentially increase U.S. influence in both the region and the UN.

At this point the options open to U.S. decision-makers included: doing nothing; allowing humanitarian efforts to be managed solely by NGOS; letting regional organizations or the UN take the lead; participating in a multi-lateral effort; or conducting a unilateral humanitarian operation. Any U.S. operation could also be short or long-term in nature.

At this time, a policy of doing nothing presented some drawbacks. The United States had been increasingly criticized as both genocide and the U.S. refusal to act against it became undeniable. Continued failure to act would potentially damage U.S. influence in Africa, and to a lesser extent, on a worldwide basis. Allowing the NGO community to handle the situation would not result in a satisfactory outcome, because these organizations were finding and reporting their resources were inadequate to the task at hand. The same was true of regional and UN efforts that did not involve the United States. The key factor behind this situation was the outbreak of cholera. It was possible that a massive pandemic could destabilize the region. Only the United States could move with the rapidity and on a large enough scale to effectively deal with the disease. Thus, the primary question became: Was the cost of mounting a humanitarian intervention less than the expected gain derived from that intervention? The answer was

"yes" and what had most changed in the equation since April was the end of the civil war. U.S. forces that participated in this operation would face little risk of becoming embroiled in a regional conflict. There was little doubt that U.S. forces would be able to significantly improve the situation, and potentially save tens of thousands of lives. Unlike some African maladies, the troops could be vaccinated against cholera, which would further reduce risk. By the same token, the required steps to bring the outbreak under control were already known to medical science. If the United States acted quickly, the odds of success were high. If the United States delayed, the death toll would mount rapidly. Given this likelihood of success and the reduced risk to U.S. forces, potential gains now outweighed the probable risks. It should also be noted that, unlike earlier decisions in the Rwanda case, principal meetings were being held when the subject of a humanitarian relief operations came up. EUCOM was able to generate several alternative courses of action and forward those options forward for review. For these reasons, it seems likely that cost-benefit calculations were being performed.

Organizational Model

The same factors which changed the calculus at the heart of the rational model also impacted the organizational process upon which this model is focused. The primary organizations involved in this decision were the Department of Defense, USAID, and the State Department. However, due to external factors, significant changes had taken place within and between these departments.

The most significant external factor was the cessation of both the genocide and the Rwandan Civil War. When this occurred, there was less to threat to both the State Department and the Department of Defense. As refugees crossed international borders,

the State Department's office of Population, Refugees, and Migration became increasingly involved in the Rwanda crisis. SOPs, routines, and the organizational bias of this portion of the State Department were all oriented toward involvement. The end of the war also presented an opportunity for the SOPs and routines of statecraft to once more become operational in Rwanda. As the pro-intervention components of State gained power, organizationally the State Department became more inclined to support a humanitarian intervention. This inclination was supported and perhaps accelerated as U.S. ambassadors reported on the size of the refugee flows, the swamping of NGO efforts to provide relief, and the potential consequences of a pandemic upon populations and political stability of the region.

Although USAID was to some degree becoming overshadowed by the State Department, it remained pro-interventionist. As with State, the cessation of hostilities further reduced the level of risk facing USAID. It could even be said that a failure to respond to the crisis might pose a threat to USAID, for if the agency did not act, questions about the reason for its existence might well have been raised.

The calculus of threat to the organization had also changed for DOD, although not to the degree to which it had for the other organizations. It was true that the threat of combat casualties had all but vanished. Yet, from an organizational perspective this would not seem to be DOD's prime concern. If the United States had become involved in combat within Rwanda, anticipated casualties would not have significantly impacted combat ability, but political damage was another matter.

Far more serious, from the perspective of DOD and the military services, was the potential for any commitment to become open-ended and for such operations to place a

strain upon rather small numbers of specialized troops. Resistance to the use of U.S. military forces in humanitarian and non-traditional operations still remained strong within much of DOD and deployment into Rwanda would be one more such mission. But DOD clearly had the capacity to execute such a mission, because the required material, personnel, and SOPs were at hand. As the level of organizational risk changed it was becoming clear, even before the outbreak of cholera, that DOD' ability to successfully resist such a mission was in doubt.

Once cholera did break-out, State and USAID became even more inclined to intervene which even more sharply reduced DOD's ability to resist, especially after it became clear that the operation was to be as small in size as possible and of short duration. These conditions answered DOD's concerns about stress on specialized units, mission creep and open-ended commitments. At this point, the only grounds for DOD resistance were rooted in an organizational reluctance to conduct humanitarian assistance operations and that would not be enough to oppose deployment.

Government Politics Model

Just as changes were occurring in the orientation and relative power of those organizations, a power shift was occurring within the president's inner circle. Three of these shifts are especially important: the increasing power and influence of Anthony Lake, the simultaneously smaller role played by Warren Christopher, and the addition of Brian Atwood to the ranks of influential advisors with President Clinton's ear.

Warren Christopher had been instrumental in keeping the United States, and to a large extent, the UN out of the Rwandan Civil War. However, his efforts also ensured that no concrete action had been taken to stop the first case of genocide since the Second

World War. As the full scope of the genocide and of the U.S failure to respond became more clear, the level of international and domestic opprobrium increased. With the war over, Christopher had lost the most compelling part of his argument. Conversely, it seemed that Anthony Lake's instinct to be more proactive in Rwanda had been right all along, and this logic also applied to Samuel Berger and Madeline Albright. A change in the situation on the ground in Rwanda had resulted in a change in relative positions of power in the White House.

The addition of Brian Atwood as a significant presidential advisor was also important. Atwood, having been on the scene, possessed expert power. He had personally briefed President Clinton and was a strong addition to the Lake-Berger-Albright faction. Thus, by the time of the cholera outbreak, the most influential members of the president's inner circle were pressing for intervention and Warren Christopher was silent. The result was a strong push for intervention.

Human Factors

By July, the scope of the Rwandan tragedy was fully known. The president had been briefed on the immensity of the problem, the failure of other avenues of aid and comfort. There was an increasing level of criticism directed at his Administration for not only failing to stop the Rwandan genocide, but also barring other actors from making the attempt. That such acts appeared to run directly counter to the president's own National Security Strategy was not lost on his critics.

Then, when cholera erupted, the pressure on President Clinton increased. This time there could be no doubt about what was happening. It would be possible to complete a successful operation in a limited time as potentially hundreds of thousands of

people could be saved. Since only the United States could mount such an operation the credit would be his. The Black Caucus and other U.S. special interests groups were becoming increasingly vocal in lobbying for proactive U.S. effort. The operation, as presented to the president, would be short in duration and involve relatively small numbers of U.S. forces. The risk of combat action or being embroiled in a Mogadishu-like situation was low. Authorizing the intervention would reassure his supporters, eliminate one source of political - and personal - criticism, and would be consistent with beliefs the president had long professed were deeply held. It is also worth noting that the decision whether to authorize a unilateral effort to stop a cholera epidemic reflected a greatly simplified Rwandan situation. Analysis of this decision using the human factors model would suggest that the President personally was in favor of *Operation Support Hope*, and all he had to do in order to act in a manner consistent with both his personal values and published policy would be to say "go."

Integrated Analysis

The Rational Actor model, the Government Politics model and the Human Factors model all support a positive decision to mount a humanitarian intervention in Rwanda. The forces depicted by the organizational model, due primarily to DOD's reluctance, pushed for a continuation of non-involvement, but were not strong enough to overcome other forces impacting the decision-making process. However, there were still organizational aspects to the decision to initiate *Operation Support Hope*. One was determining the duration of the mission, while a second was the criteria selected to define success. By identifying what success would look like, in this case a reduction of deaths from cholera to a certain extent, DOD was able to reduce organizational risk and increase

the probability of success.

Of the other three models, it would seem that the Rational Actor Model provides the greatest explanatory power - as long as one uses the Clinton Administration view of the national interest. Faced with a potentially tremendous human tragedy and all other alternative courses of action not being able to achieve success, employing small numbers of U.S. forces on a short term operation was the most cost-effective option available. As the pro-interventionists regained power and influence in the Clinton inner circle the forces examined through the use of the Government Politics model, grew more strong and more important. The forces depicted by the human factors model also worked in conjunction with the other pro-intervention model. The problem was simplified, and a "yes" decision would allow the president to achieve internal stability and consistency.

Role of the International Political System

Three changes within the IPS were the most powerful influences on this decision. The most important was the RPF victory over the Rwandan Army and the subsequent cessation of combat in Rwanda. This fact affected every aspect of the decision-making process. Formerly closed areas of Rwanda were now accessible; the risk of combat related casualties dropped to near zero; and a much larger cast of actors would soon be in the region. Even greater public awareness and scrutiny would occur and greater special interest involvement would result. The end of the war also removed the primary argument of those who would stay completely out of the situation.

A second important international factor was the size and number of refugees and the great difficulties NGOs and IGOs experienced in responding to their needs, which eliminated many potential alternatives. The presence of refugees also increased requests

for assistance from regional organizations and allies.

The third factor was the outbreak of cholera. In effect, the virulence of the disease imposed a deadline on the decision-making process, while at the same time presented a relatively simple problem to solve. As it became apparent that only the United States possessed the capability to adequately respond to the situation in sufficient time to prevent an epidemic, international pressure and scrutiny increased.

The combination of these international inputs dramatically affected the U.S. decision-making process, because these altered the cost-benefit calculations associated with a U.S. intervention. The risks to DOD, and to a lesser extent State and USAID, were also reduced. The impact was that Warren Christopher and others who opposed intervention lost their most persuasive argument. Finally, just as the genocide and the war were ending, the outbreak of cholera imposed a new deadline upon U.S. decision-makers. The cumulative impact of these changes was to generate tremendous pressure for a U.S. intervention.

Role of the Domestic Political System

By the time of the third decision, there had also been changes in the inputs coming from the domestic political system, which also pressed for intervention. The most significant change in this regard was the increased activities of Mr. Eugene and the Hunger Consortium. As Eugene created an increasingly powerful issue network, pressure on the Clinton Administration increased. As the Haiti case has shown, the Congressional Black Caucus was not taken lightly by the white house. Members of the Caucus calling for increased U.S. participation in the Rwanda relief efforts would not go unnoticed. The efforts by Eugene and other lobbyists were made easier by increased

media coverage of the refugee camps and situation on the ground within Rwanda.

However, this pressure was not strong enough to achieve the desired result, as domestic inputs played a supporting role in this case.

Role of the National Security System

There was more influence on the decision coming from within the national security system than from the domestic political system. As Warren Christopher became less involved with the issue and Brian Atwood's role increased, there was greater consensus among the President's advisors that some form of intervention was required. Additionally, greater awareness of the scope and nature of the refugee problem brought different sub-organizations into action. Finally, the proficiency and capability of the U.S. military to achieve a successful operation was a significant input to the decision.

Secondary Research Questions

Role of Duration on the Decision-Making Process

Rwanda was a rapidly moving crisis of very short duration, which affected the degree to which different forces influenced the decision-making process. Specifically, because events in Rwanda were moving so fast, powerful presidential advisors, notably Warren Christopher, achieved a position of special power and influence. From this position anti-interventionists were able to describe the situation in Rwanda as they perceived and so to advance their preferred course of inaction. The fast-moving crisis also meant that there was relatively little time to question whether analogies comparing the situation in Rwanda with that of Haiti were appropriate. It is interesting to note that in order to dominate the early decisions in the Rwanda case, some organizational responses, both within DOD and the State Department, had to be checked. These

included EUCOM's readiness to begin contingency planning at the first sign of renewed fighting in Rwanda and the readiness of some elements of the State Department to declare that genocide was on-going.

The short duration of the crisis also meant that there was little time for the president to absorb information that would cause him to change his initial view that the Rwandan conflict was a civil war and not genocide. As long as this depiction of the conflict prevailed, the president could feel satisfied that non-intervention was not only the appropriate course of action, but also one that he was consistent with his own stated policy. This view of the conflict was apparently so strong that it persisted after U.S. spokesmen were forced to acknowledge that genocide had occurred in Rwanda. Eventually both the view of the violence in Rwanda as a facet of civil war, and Warren Christopher's influence could not be maintained.

Which elements of the International Political System had the most influence on the decision-making process?

The international media and the United Nations had the most influence of all the various actors and elements in the international political system upon U.S. decision-making. The international media, with its steady and eventually undeniable documentation of genocide in Rwanda, together with the plight of the refugees and scale of human suffering, made it impossible for the Clinton Administration to maintain that what was happening in Rwanda was solely a civil war. This increased pressure upon the administration to act or be open to charges of hypocrisy. The UN also served as a conduit of information and the source of continuing requests for U.S. support and action. This the United States was loath to do, but the administration could not display their opposition to these requests publicly. As a result, U.S. decision makers embarked on a

series of actions designed to prevent UN intervention in Rwanda, while at the same time making it seem that the United States was fully supportive of such an effort. Later in the crisis, the UN provided the forum through which France requested support for a unilateral intervention, a request which, at that time, the United States was all but forced to honor.

What elements of the Domestic Political System had the most influence on the decision - making process?

Although never having the impact of the UN or the international media, the Congress and the Hunger Consortium were the most influential actors within the domestic political system. In the earlier part of the crisis, there was little or no input from any actor within the DPS. However as awareness of the human disaster in Rwanda grew, so did Congressional interest and the lobbying efforts of NGOs such as the Hunger Consortium. This was an additional source of pressure for the administration to do something that would at least have the appearance of contributing to a solution to the Rwanda crisis. To some degree the influence of these actors was mitigated by a lack of public support. There was no support for a U.S. intervention in Rwanda. As long as the killing in Rwanda was seen as the result of civil war and not genocide, in the U.S. public's attitude toward intervention in Rwanda was not likely to change.

Role of Situational Factors

Three situational factors had a significant impact on U.S. decision-making when in the case of Rwanda. The first was the U.S experience in Somalia. The fear of another Mogadishu drove many key advisors to the president to see Rwanda as an analogous situation, with similar risks. That this analogy was flawed did not lessen its power.

A second situational factor was how quickly the Rwandan government carried out their planned genocide and equally, how fast the RPF advanced across Rwanda. Both

happened at such a pace that the international media was slow to understand and report just what was happening, which meant that the general public relied upon government provided explanations and descriptions of events in Rwanda.

The third situational factor was a lack of U.S. - Rwanda connections. Many, if not most, Americans had never paid much attention to Rwanda. There were minimal economic, social, or political ties.¹⁸³ There were no indigenous Rwandan special interest groups within the United States to lobby for involvement and few private citizens who could contacting local and state elected officials seeking information and help and there was no expatriate community to make Rwanda an issue. The cumulative effect of these situational factors was to keep Rwanda a low profile event as far as public awareness was concerned for much of the crisis.

Role of Uncertainty

There was great uncertainty about the readiness of only African armed forces to successfully carry out operations in Africa. The historical record was not good in this regard. Nor was it clear how long the civil war would last, or, at least at first, which side would win. It was also not clear how long any interventionist force would have to stay in Rwanda. Taken together these uncertainties resulted in the U.S government "going slow," postponing, delaying, or negating initiatives that could have potentially involved the United States in the civil war.

Conclusion

An analysis of the Rwanda case indicates how forces which dominate the decision-making process can shift over the course of the crisis. As this chapter has

¹⁸³ It could even be argued that the most commonly fact about Rwanda known to the U.S. public was that it was the site of the late Dian Fossey's gorilla research station.

shown, the forces best examined by the Government Politics model clearly dominated during much of the crisis. However, over the course of the crisis, the factors which supported the dominant role of these forces shifted. As a result, more rational and analytic decision-making processes were able to come into play. Rwanda is unique in that it is one of the few cases containing a decision where a near ideal rational-making process was utilized and which was supported by organizational routines and procedures.

An analyst applying only one model of decision-making to the decisions in the Rwanda case, would be plagued by several important gaps. The integrated approach suggested by this study helps produce a better depth of understanding the decisions in this case. For example, forces best examined through the use of the Organizational Process model of decision-making in the Rwanda crisis were active in each decision.

Furthermore this model explains why once the RPF gained victory, calculations of uncertainty and organizational risk changed dramatically. Not only was there far less chance of combat, but the new situation also allowed the employment of existing organizational routines. In a similar way, organizational fears of open-ended commitment were mitigated by the fact that there were large numbers of NGOs "on the ground," which could perform their usual function once the U.S. forces assured a safe water supply and beat down the cholera epidemic. While not dominating the decision-making process, these forces none-the-less played an important supporting role.

The Rwanda case also showcases the relative fragility of the rational decision-making process, and how easy it is for other actors and forces to sidetrack efforts to engage in classic rational decision-making. This case also shows how the combination of a determined member of the decision-making inner circle, in this case Warren

Christopher, can use events from the past - the Mogadishu firefight - to advance their preferred position.

This case also adds to the evidence which suggests that such documents as the national security strategy and even Presidential Decision Directives may have relatively little utility in predicting U.S. national security decision-making outcomes. If one were simply to go by the Clinton NSS, a logical assumption would be that the United States was going to intervene in Rwanda in an effort to stop the genocide. Yet, not only did the United States fail to intervene, but its leaders also impeded the intervention of others. Later, it would appear that PDD-25, as a policy document, was all but ignored in the decision to initiate *Operation Support Hope*. As these examples suggest, for these types of cases, existing plans, guidelines and perhaps even organizational SOPs affect decision-making much less than do the forces of government politics and human factors.

Figure 4 - 1 Rwanda Chronology

1959 - As independence looms, fighting breaks out in Rwanda between Tutsis and Hutus. Large numbers of Tutsis flee Rwanda. The first great wave of Tutsi migration reaches Uganda.

1962 - Rwanda gains independence from Belgium. Hutus assume power. A second major wave of Tutsi refugees arrives in Uganda.

1963 - A major pogrom is carried out by Hutus against Tutsis living in Rwanda.

1967 - A second major pogrom is carried out against Tutsis living in Rwanda.

1973 - A coup brings Juvenal Habyarimana to power in Rwanda. He founds the *Mouvement Revolutionnaire National Pour le Developpement* (MRND) party.

1980s - Significant number of Tutsi refugees join Yoweri Museveni's rebel army in Uganda.

1986 - Museveni's forces are successful, overthrowing Ugandan leader Obote. Tutsi cadres form the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

1990 - The RPF initiates a major offensive, moving into Rwanda. The RPF makes significant gains against the 5,000 man strong Rwandan Army. The Habyarimana regime immediately blames Rwandan Tutsis for their setbacks on the battlefield. RPF success provokes the most virulent ant-Tutsi propaganda the Rwandan government has ever produced. A civil militia known as the *Interhamwe* is formed.

26 October 1991 - Belgium brokers a cease-fire between the RPF and Rwandan Army. Known as the Gbadolite agreement, the cease-fire is short-lived. By the end of the year Habyarimana is forced to authorize a multi-party political process. Among the parties that come into existence is the *Mouvement Democratique Republicain* (MDR), a true moderate Hutu challenge to Habyarimana.

1992 - The Rwandan Army now numbers 30,000 strong. An extremely violent, ultra-nationalistic party, known as the *Coalition Pour la Defense de la Republic* is formed.

12 July 1992 - UN sponsored efforts to broker a cease-fire appear successful as both sides sign a set of agreements known as the Arusha Accords.

31 July 1992 - The Arusha Accords go into effect. A buffer zone between the warring factions is created. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) provides a neutral observer group to monitor the cease-fire. The Accords call for a final peace agreement to be reached in 12 months. A transitional government is supposed to assume power until

new elections can be held. The cease-fire goes into place and the parties continue negotiations on the other elements of the Accords.

8 February - April 1993 - Fighting is renewed. The RPF moves quickly, seizing several key objectives in the DMZ. An RPF attempt to seize Kigali airport is prevented at the last minute by a deployment of the French Foreign Legion paratroopers.

July 1993 - In response to a request from Uganda, the UN authorizes a Chapter VI Observer Mission (UNOMUR) along the Uganda - Rwanda border. Despite the UN presence, Uganda continues to provide arms to the RPF.

24 September 1993 - Kofi Annan requests an expanded UN peace-keeping force for Rwanda.

5 October 1993 - The UN Security Council approves Annan's request, and authorizes the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR).

30 October 1993 - UNAMIR's initial contingent; led by Canadian General Romeo Dellaire, is on the ground at Kigali.

November 1993 - A coup installs a Tutsi government in Burundi. 375,000 Burundian Hutus flee into Rwanda. UNAMIR receives reports of mass killings in Burundi.

December 1993 - UNAMIR now numbers 1,260.

6 January 1994 - The UN Security Council approves UNSC Resolution 893, extending UNAMIR's mandate by six months and Increasing the assigned number of peacekeepers.

11 January 1994- UNAMIR uncovers an Interhamwe/Rwandan government plot to kill large numbers of Hutus. The UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations is immediately informed. UNAMIR is directed to inform President Habyarimana of the discovered plot in order that he might investigate the charges and prevent any killings.

12 January 1994 - The UN Special Representative to Rwanda meets with Habyarimana. Ambassadors from the United States, France and Belgium are also briefed by both the Special Representative and General Dellaire. In New York, the UN Special Advisor to the Secretary General on Rwanda briefs the Security Council on the deteriorating situation in Rwanda.

3 February 1994 - UNAMIR is authorized to perform arms recovery operations on a case-by-case basis. Fearing an eruption of violence, Dellaire redeploys 200 peacekeepers from the DMZ to Kigali. Although the level of violence does increase, there is no mass killings by the Rwandan Army and Interhamwe.

March 1994 - The Rwandan government and the RPF agree to a transitional government. UNAMIR reaches a peak strength of 2,539 peacekeepers and 60 UN police personnel.

Rwandan Army units mine roads leading out of Kigali and the Interhamwe begins stockpiling weapons.

5 April 1994 - The UN Security Council extends the mandate of UNAMIR to 29 July.

6 April 1994 - President Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira are killed when their aircraft is struck by two surface to air missiles while on final approach to Kigali airfield. Rwandan state radio immediately blames the RPF for the attack. Within 30 minutes of the shoot-down, Rwandan military and Interhamwe units carry out pre-planned operations against Hutu moderates and Tutsis in general. The Civil War breaks out in full force. One hundred days of genocide are set in motion.

7 April 1994 - the leaders of three moderate Hutu parties, Prime Minister Agatha Uwilingiyimana and ten UN bodyguards are all killed by Rwandan military personnel. President Clinton publicly condemns the murder of the Prime Minister. He calls on the RPF and the Rwandan Army to resume the cease fire. U.S. European Command begins preliminary planning for contingency operations in Rwanda. The Joint Staff orders this effort halted. In New York the Special Assistant on Rwanda again briefs the Security Council on the situation in Rwanda. Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security publicly blames Hutu leaders for directing the killing.

7 April 1994 - Belgium Foreign Minister Willy Claes presses for UN armed intervention in Rwanda. This motion is opposed by France and United States.

10 April 1994 - The United States evacuates its embassy in Rwanda.

11 April 1994 - French and Belgian troops land in Kigali to evacuate French and Belgian citizens.

13 April 1994 - Belgium recommends suspending the Rwandan operation entirely.

18 April 1994 - UNAMIR is now sheltering 20,000 Tutsis in Kigali.

21 April 1994 - Uganda formally requests UNAMIR be retained and strengthened. Bangladesh threatens to withdraw its forces from UNAMIR. The Security Council votes to reduce the size of UNAMIR.

23 April 1994 - Genocide is extended to the Rwandan countryside.

29 April 1994 - UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali asks the Security Council to send reinforcements to Rwanda. Security Council President Colin Keating of New Zealand threatens to conduct discussions of Rwanda in open sessions, exposed to public scrutiny. The Council recommends "strong action" be taken in Rwanda, but, at the insistence of the United States, refrains from using the word genocide to describe the killings.

30 April 1994 - President Clinton again appeals to the leaders of the RPF and the Rwandan Army to stop the fighting.

May 1994 - In Washington, the Rwanda IWG is holding daily video teleconferences.

1 May 1994 - Tanzania protests the decision to draw down UNAMIR.

2 May 1994 - Kofi Annan speaks before the subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He states casualties have risen above the 100,000 mark and begs the United States to lead an international effort to put an end to the violence.

4 May 1994 - George Moose, Assistant Secretary of State testifies before the House Foreign Affairs Committee about Rwanda. Moose states that only the Rwandans can bring peace to Rwanda. In the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali calls the killing in Rwanda "genocide." Oxfam reports as many as 500,000 Rwandans may have been killed.

5 May 1994 - Testifying before Congress, Ambassador Albright briefs the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on Presidential Decision Directive 25. She casts doubt on the ability of a peacekeeping operation to be mounted in Rwanda.

13 May 1994 The UN Security Council prepares to vote on fully restoring UNAMIR. Ambassador Albright delays the vote for four days.

17 May 1994 - The UN Security Council passes UNSC Resolution 918, authorizing UNAMIR II, an expanded UNAMIR with an authorized end strength of 5,500. Ghana immediately volunteers to send enough troops to fill the first of four planned troop installments.

19 May 1994 - The UN requests the United States provide Armored Personnel Carriers for Ghana's military forces.

Mid-June 1994 - The United States agrees to provide the requested APCs.

21 May 1994 - The RPF gains control of Kigali airport.

7 June 1994 - President Clinton states that the United States will not commit troops to Rwanda.

8 June 1994 - The UN Security Council passes UNSC Resolution 925, endorsing an immediate deployment of two battalions to Rwanda and extending UNAMIR II's mandate.

19 June 1994 - The Secretary General announces to the Security Council that the French are willing to undertake a French commanded, multi-lateral intervention in Rwanda under UN auspices.

20 June 1994 - The French put their case before the Security Council.

22 June 1994 -The Security Council accepts the French offer. UNSCR 929 authorizes the French intervention under Chapter VII of the UN charter. The same day lead elements of *Operation Turquoise* arrive in Rwanda.

27 June 1994- President Clinton expresses support for the French intervention.

9 July 1994 - French forces establish a safe haven in the Cyangugu - Kibuye - Gikongoro region.

14 July 1994 - the number of Rwandan refugees - primarily Hutus - in Zaire number more than 1.5 million.

15 July 1994 - President Clinton sends Brian Atwood of USAID to Goma to assess the severity of the humanitarian crisis in the Great Lakes region of Africa.

18 July 1994 - The RPF reach the Zairean border. With the exception of the French safe haven, the RPF control all of Rwanda. A unilateral RPF cease-fire is declared.

19 July 1994 - Cholera breaks out in the refugee camps of Goma,

21 July 1994 - Brian Atwood personally briefs the president on the situation in Goma.

22 July 1994 - President Clinton announces a major increase in aid to Rwanda and directs that the U.S. military become involved in the relief effort.

24 July 1994 U.S. forces were on the ground in Goma as part of *Operation Restore Hope*.

25 July 1994 - The first U.S. water purification plant was in operation.

Sources: Compiled by the author from: Contemporary press accounts, primarily *The New York Times*, memoirs, and autobiographies from participants, official after action reports and case studies. All are listed in the bibliography.

Chapter Five:

Cross-Case Analysis and Conclusions:

Introduction:

The purpose of this study is to understand and evaluate U.S. national security decision making processes involved in approving the use of force in post-Cold War complex humanitarian emergencies and military operations other than war. In order to explore these processes, a set of research questions and hypotheses were developed to test the relative explanatory power of five alternative models used for understanding U.S. national security decision-making. These decision-making models include: the Rational Actor model, the Organizational Process model, the Government Politics model and the Human Factors model. A fifth model, titled an Integrated model of decision making, is presented an alternate method to understand U.S. national security decision-making. A total of eight separate decisions drawn from three different cases provided the empirical evidence for testing the explanatory power of these models.

Earlier chapters in this study provided the theoretical frameworks, associated hypotheses, historical background, and empirical evidence pertaining to the case studies and their decisions. This chapter will briefly review these decisions and their associated cases, and the primary and secondary research questions and associated hypotheses. Once this summary has been provided, an analysis of the eight decisions will be conducted in order to examine the explanatory power of the various decision-making models. The model that most completely describes the decision -making process will be identified for each decision.

The study will then examine whether the integrated approach offers a better understanding of the complex decision-making process than the traditional models. Having then discussed the primary research questions, the comparative evidence pertaining to the five secondary questions will be examined as well as the significance and limitations of this study. This discussion will include potential criticisms and policy implications of the study's findings, and consider a set of questions for future study and exploration. Finally, a set of conclusions relating to this chapter will be presented.

Review of the Study: the Cases, decisions, and questions

The cases used in this study were all drawn from the early 1990s, which was a time of tumult and uncertainty following the stability imposed by the Cold War. Old security paradigms were challenged, national and international leaders believed that radical and positive changes could be made in the international political system, and that military force could, and should, be used in complex humanitarian emergencies. While throughout its history the U.S. military has occasionally been used in such situations, the post-Cold War period saw a dramatic increase in the level of involvement of the United States in non-traditional military operations.

Concurrently, studies of U.S. national security decision-making conducted during the past 45 years have usually dealt with decisions made within a well-understood national security calculus framed by the Cold War, but with the end of the Cold War, this traditional calculus was called into question. The three cases chosen for this study represent the first three instances involving the use of force by the United States when a traditional calculus was not evident. The first case - Somalia - occurred from January 1992 to December 1992 and achieved peak intensity in the final months of George

Herbert Walker Bush's time as president of the United States. The first decision examined is the initiation of Operation *Provide Relief*, which used military forces to deliver humanitarian supplies to the region from 14 August 1992 to 4 December 1992. The second decision is the authorization of *Operation Restore Hope*, which granted U.S. combat forces the authority to use all means necessary, including, if required, deadly force, to ensure that humanitarian relief supplies reached intended recipients in Somalia.

The second and third cases both occurred during the Clinton Administration. President-elect Clinton began to grapple with the Haitian confrontation in November 1992 and the situation was not resolved until 1994. For the purpose of this study the second case is the U.S. confrontation with Haiti, which lasted from November 1992 to September 1994.¹

Three specific decisions are analyzed: President-elect Clinton's decision to reverse a campaign pledge and continue the Bush policy of interdicting Haitian boat people at sea and returning them to Haiti; the Clinton Administration's pursuit and endorsement of the 3 July 1993 Governor's Island Agreement that was supposed to result in the peaceful return to power of the democratically elected Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide to power, and President Clinton's order to use military force to invade Haiti and restore the Aristide government.

The third case involves the U.S. government's reactions and responses to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda from April 1994 to July 1994. The first decision analyzed in this case is the U.S. government's choice to not take action in order to stop the genocide that had erupted in Rwanda. The second decision is U.S. support for a French military

¹ As indicated in Chapter Three, the beginning of the Haitian - U.S. confrontation can be traced to the days of the Regan Administration.

intervention, known as *Operation Turquoise*. In order to carry out *Operation Turquoise* French troops occupied a significant portion of southern Rwanda, and restored stability in their region by providing a safe haven for Rwandans displaced by civil war and genocide. *Operation Turquoise* was not without subsequent controversy as it either inadvertently or deliberately provided an escape route for Hutu genocidaires. The third decision in the Rwanda case is the initiation of *Operation Support Hope*, which was made after both the civil war and genocide were over, authorized the deployment of U.S. military forces to help stem a rising cholera outbreak among Rwandan refugees in Zaire.

Primary Research Questions and Hypotheses

The study addresses two main research questions. The first question centers on a long-standing question of interest and lively debate to both scholars and practitioners in the field of U.S. foreign policy, namely how best to understand and explain U.S. national security decision-making. In doing so, the study enters the debate as to which, if any, of the four main models of U.S. foreign policy decision making consistently provides the greatest explanatory power for understanding decisions made during the Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda crises. An important methodological and analytic point in this study is that no one model is likely to provide the best explanation.

The second key research question is that, if no one model routinely provides the majority of explanatory power for understanding U.S. national security decisions, then how might one better explain the decision making process? Here, the study offers and then assesses an alternate approach, using an integrated model of decision-making, which, as depicted in Figure 1-1 (page 21), incorporates each of the four main decision-making models previously discussed. The associated hypothesis is that this integrated

approach will provide a better tool for understanding not only of the decision making process, but also the eight decisions associated with the three cases.

Secondary Research Questions and Hypotheses

In addition to the two main research questions, the study also addressed five secondary research questions, each with its own related hypothesis. These questions all relate to aspects of the on-going debate about how best to understand, under different conditions, U.S. national security decision-making,

The first question focuses on the duration of the crisis. There has long been interest in exploring whether the length of a crisis affected the explanatory power of the different models. It is appropriate therefore to ask, "To what extent did the duration of the crisis affect the dominance of forces acting upon the decision-making process described by the various models?" It is hypothesized that duration has a significant impact upon the decision-making process because long-lasting crises will show a different pattern of dominant forces than short-lived crises.

Another issue that has been of interest to both scholars of international relations and participants within the U.S. national security system is to what degree did the success or failure of a previous crisis affect the next national security decision? Put another way, did the outcome of the previous decision affect subsequent decision-making processes? Thus, this study asks "to what extent did the success or failure of the decision making process in the previous crisis affect the decision making process in the current crisis?" The associated hypothesis in this study is that decision makers and their key advisors will try to replicate past successes and avoid past failures.²

² Other works which also examine this issue include Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longarm, 1999); Richard E. Neustadt

The cases in this study all involve aspects of both the International Political System and the Domestic Political System. Since each system generates inputs that affect the national security system, it is reasonable to ask the following two questions. The first is "Which elements of the International Political System have the most impact on the decision-making process?", and the second is "Which elements of the Domestic Political System have the most impact on the decision-making process?" The study's hypotheses associated with each of these questions are the same. It is anticipated that it will be possible to identify a limited number of inputs from both the International and Domestic Political Systems that had a more powerful impact on the decision making process than other inputs.

The fifth and final of the secondary research questions asks what elements, aside from those specifically targeted for examination, did these cases have in common? The tentative hypothesis is that some common factors will be identified and, as a result additional insights into the nature of these non-traditional security decisions can be obtained.

Comparative Analysis

In previous chapters each individual decision was analyzed in detail to identify whether the Rational Actor model, the Organizational model, the Government Politics model, or the Human Factors model provided the most explanatory power for each decision. A summary of those findings is depicted in Table 5-1. Now we turn to a cross-case comparison in order to answer two questions. The first question is whether one model of decision-making could be considered dominant across all eight decisions when

and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Use of History for Decision Makers*, (New York: The Free Press, 1986); and Yuen Foon Khong, *Analogies At War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992)

it comes to best explaining the decision-making process. The second question examines what common features particular decisions have that might explain why a particular model provided the majority of explanatory power in some cases, but not in others. In order to answer these questions, this section of the chapter will first match each model with the decision or decisions for which that model appears to provide the greatest explanatory power, with a brief summation of the evidence that support these claims.

Which Model dominates?

The Rational Model

As Table 5-1 indicates, the Rational Model provided the greatest explanatory power in only one decision. This was President Clinton's decision to initiate *Operation Support Hope*, which used the armed forces of the United States to provide humanitarian supplies to Rwanda. The cholera outbreak in the overcrowded refugee camps could have quickly become a trans-regional epidemic, an such a pandemic would belong in the menu of threats articulated in the president's National Security Strategy.

Decisions and Dominant Models

Decision	Initiate Operation Provide Relief	Initiate Operation Restore Hope	Reverse Campaign Pledge re Haitian Boat People	Support Governors Island Accords	Invade Haiti	Do Not Intervene In Rwanda	Support Operation Turquoise	Initiate Operati Suppor Hope
Dominant Model	H.F.	H.F.	H.F.	G-P	G-P	G-P	G-P	R

Key:

R = Rational = 1

G-P = Governmental Politics = 4

H.F. = Human Factors = 3

Figure 5-1

A fairly extensive set of alternative options had been tried and failed; they included relief efforts mounted by private organizations, local states, regional organizations and the UN. Although the UN and the OAU might have put together a credible relief effort, it was clear to decision-makers that the spread of the disease was too fast-paced to try these approaches again.

This is also one of the few cases where planners, in this instance on the EUCOM staff, had researched the issue and developed a set of alternatives, which included doing nothing, letting other organizations take the lead in combating the epidemic, or taking part in a multi-lateral humanitarian mission. It was also possible to compute measurable criteria for success. At the same time, the risk of U.S. combat casualties had never been lower during this crisis, and it was possible to estimate with accuracy both when the mission would be concluded, and when the number of U.S. troops involved on the ground could be reduced to the lowest possible number. Put more simply, *Operation Restore Hope* resulted in maximum gain for the United States at minimum cost.

Comparative Analysis

Since only one case was best explained through the application of the Rational Actor model, there is no opportunity to identify common elements across the cases. However, some unique elements to this decision can be identified. The first is that, unlike the other decisions, there is a very clear linkage by the decision-makers between the aims of the mission and the objectives of the national security strategy. Whatever the merits of the conclusion, the Clinton Administration had stated that pandemics were a threat to the national security of the United States. The cholera that had started to sweep the Rwandan refugee camps posed just such a threat. As a result the decision whether to

conduct the humanitarian operation would be more based on considerations of cost and benefit rather than if the operation was in the national interests of the United States.

There is evidence to suggest that the cost-benefit analysis that is central to the Rational Actor model was conducted. Extensive planning for this mission was conducted by EUCOM. This planning carefully weighed several alternative courses of action and eventually recommended one that, at least in the eyes of the EUCOM planners, gave the most positive results for the least cost and risk.³ It is also worth noting that the full NSC staffing process was in operation when this decision was reached.

However, this was not the only decision in which multiple alternatives were either tried or examined through the use of the NSC staffing process. The decisions to initiate *Operation Restore Hope* and *Operation Restore Democracy*, respectively, had been extensively staffed, and multiple potential courses of action had been identified in each of these cases. Why, then, is it not reasonable to claim that the Rational Actor model provided the most explanatory power for those decisions? The answer centers on the question of national interest. As discussed in Chapter One, a basic tenet of the Rational Actor model is that decisions are made in order to maximize gain or minimize risk, commensurate with cost. In the cases examined in this study this translates into maximizing gains in U.S. national security or in minimizing risk to U.S. national security. In each of the other cases, the participants in the decision-making process, including the president stated or indicated that they did not believe the national interest of the United States was at issue. If the decisions did not involve U.S. national security any resources expended in carrying out that decision, were, in effect, wasted. Accordingly, if one is

³ See Chapter Four.

going to explain these decisions through the use of a single model of decision-making, other models do a better job of explaining the decision-making process.

In the five remaining decisions there is no evidence that any serious cost-benefit calculations were ever conducted. Why was this so? In the case of President-elect Clinton's decision to reverse his campaign pledge there was no established method by which such a calculus could be conducted, nor were there individuals in the President-elect inner circle tasked with making such national security considerations. In the case of President Bush's decision to initiate *Operation Provide Relief*, there is circumstantial evidence that the NSC staffing process, operating as it was designed to do had made such a calculations and concluded that any benefits gained from intervening in Somalia would be outweighed by the associated costs. In the remaining cases, the decision by the Clinton Administration to embrace the Governors Island agreement, and the decision to support France's *Operation Turquoise*, there is simply no evidence that any formal cost-benefit calculations were ever conducted.

These observations raise questions for future research. Chief among these is finding out why such calculations, so obviously critical to the ideal functioning of the Rational Actor paradigm, are apparently not routinely conducted. It may be, of course, that such calculations were conducted and are currently classified. If this is so, in time this evidence will surface. However, based on interviews with members of the NSC staff, it seems likely that such revelations will be rare – if ever they occur - because of a reluctance to commit such data to paper, with the attendant risk of leaks and compromise. It may even be that some members of the decision-making circle do not wish to be burdened with data that potentially could point the decision-maker away from their

preferred position. Another potential reason is likely associated with one of the study's secondary research questions, namely the impact of duration on the decision-making process. This aspect of the Rational Actor model will be dealt with later in this chapter. This study also suggests that, at least for cases in which the national security interests of the United States are not formally at stake, the ideal type outlined in the Rational Actor model does not closely conform to reality. If this is the case, it does not automatically follow that no form of the Rational Actor model is ever of utility to the analyst or practitioner, but it suggests that decision-makers may undertake some less rigorous form of cost-benefit analysis, by using an approximation of costs and benefits.

Organizational Behavior Model

In no decision did the Organizational Behavior model succeed in describing the forces that dominated the decision-making process. At no time were organizational routines or SOPs so rigid or automatic as to drive the national security making apparatus to a given outcome. Nor were organizational biases and cultures strong enough to propel national security decision-making to a preferred outcome. An analyst, working from the premise that national security decisions can be explained through the application of a single decision-making model would conclude that the Organizational Behavior model was of limited utility in explaining these decisions. To some degree, the limited impact of organizational inputs is surprising, for in each case the military services and the Department of Defense were not in favor of using U.S. forces to resolve the situation. Yet, while, organizational resistance sometimes contributed to a delay in intervening with U.S. forces, such as in the case of Haiti and Rwanda, in no case was this resistance powerful enough to prevent such a decision from eventually being reached.

Government Politics Model

The Government Politics Model provided the most explanatory power in four of the eight decisions. These decisions all involved the Clinton Administration. They are, in the case of Haiti, the decision to support the Governors Island Agreement and the decision to initiate *Operation Restore Democracy*. In the case of Rwanda, they include the decision to not intervene in the Rwandan genocide and the decision to support the French intervention known as *Operation Turquoise*.

As noted, the Government Politics model provides significant explanatory power for the decisions made in the Haiti case. Once in office, a group of powerful advisors, known as the “Haiti hawks,” and led by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, dominated the decision-making process in the confrontation with the Cedras regime. At the time of the Governors Island agreement, the hawks were focusing on attaining a political solution that would restore the democratically elected Jean Bertrand Aristide to power. In this case, other Clinton advisors, notably General Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin opposed them and were strongly against the use of military force in Haiti. Following the failure of the Governors Island agreement, the influence of the “Haiti hawks” grew tremendously. This was due in large part to the removal or silencing of other presidential advisors who might have argued against *Operation Restore Democracy*. These changes included the resignations of Aspin and Pezzullo, the retirement of General Colin Powell, and the willingness of Secretary of State Warren Christopher to defer to Anthony Lake on issues pertaining to Haiti.⁴ With all opposition effectively removed or neutralized, the “Haiti hawks” dominated the decision-making process, even to the point of gaining presidential authorization for a military invasion.

⁴ A more detailed account of these shifts of power and influence can be found in Chapter Three.

In the case of Rwanda, Warren Christopher was the dominant political advisor. Just as the Government Politics model suggests, the track records of some of his fellow members of the president's inner circle of security advisors had suffered as a result of the failure of the Clinton policy in Somalia. Christopher was not only able to prevent U.S. spokespeople from using the word genocide, but he was also able to muzzle such potential opponents as Madeline Albright. The Secretary of State was also able to capitalize on Anthony Lake's fixation upon Haiti and the general reluctance of William Perry, the Secretary of Defense, and General Shalikashvili, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to get involved militarily in Africa.⁵ Later, as the knowledge of genocide in Rwanda became inescapable and international cries for action grew louder, Secretary Christopher found many allies for argument that the problem of Rwanda should be solved through unilateral French intervention. In addition to satisfying Anthony Lake's desire to "do something," supporting French intervention would be a way of lessening the chance that Ambassador Albright would become a source of resistance. Thus, it was possible for President Clinton's foreign policy team to present a unified front in recommending that the United States support *Operation Turquoise*.

While demonstrating impressive explanatory capability, the Government Politics model still falls significantly short of being able to explain *every* decision in the three cases this study has examined. What do the cases where this model *did* provide the majority of explanatory power for the decision have in common?

The first answer that comes to mind is President William Jefferson Clinton. Compared to George Herbert Walker Bush, President Clinton did not have extensive experience in the realm of national security or foreign policy, and was clearly focused on

⁵ Although Anthony Lake has stated that he wanted to "do something" about Rwanda – see Chapter Four.

domestic and economic issues.⁶ As a result, the president's national security and foreign policy advisors may have enjoyed far more influence and power than those advisors who handled domestic and economic affairs.

Another point of commonality between these Clinton decisions is that, in a strong and senior member of the Clinton national security team took an active and leading role in pushing for a preferred policy. During the Haiti confrontation, Anthony Lake led the administration along a path of engagement, involvement and, eventually, intervention, while for most of the Rwanda case, Warren Christopher filled a similar role.

The third element that these decisions share is that they occurred fairly early in the Clinton presidency - before the second year in office was completed. It may be that, as a president gains experience and confidence and that as the "win/loss record" of key subordinates becomes more apparent, the forces described by the Government Politics model act less strongly upon the decision-maker.

Supporting evidence for some observations may be found, interestingly enough, in the last set of national security decisions reached by the Bush Administration. The Government Politics model provides very little explanatory power where the decision to initiate *Operation Provide Relief* and *Operation Restore Hope* are concerned.

One reason is that President Bush had come to the presidency via a series of assignments that had equipped him to operate in the international political system. It is also clear that the president felt comfortable in this area and was prone to pay more attention to international issues than domestic ones. As the discussion on President Bush's decisions to intervene in the Somalia crisis makes clear, the forces best explained

⁶ This is not to imply that President Clinton did not care about foreign policy issues or that he was incompetent in dealing with these matters any more, or that President Bush was uncaring and incompetent about domestic matters. Rather, both men were clearly individuals of multiple talents and intellect.

by the use of the Government Politics model were pressing for a decision to remain out of Somalia. Also in contrast to the Clinton decisions, no single member of the Bush inner circle was "in front" of recommending against intervention, although there was general agreement that refraining from such action would be in the best interests of the United States. Finally, President Bush dealt with Somalia in the closing days of his administration. He was experienced and practiced in the realm of foreign relations, and even his political enemies admitted his skill in dealing with foreign policy issues. As Chapter Two describes, while the president listened to the advice of his closest advisors, he did not feel bound to act on that advice. The result was a decision-making process that represents an almost complete reversal of that used by President Clinton.⁷

The remaining decision in which the Government Politics model did not provide great explanatory power was President Clinton's decision to initiate *Operation Provide Hope*. How can this be explained, given the apparent dominance of the forces described by the Government Politics model in earlier decisions? The answer would appear to lie in the diminished ability of Warren Christopher to oppose U.S. involvement. The end of the genocide and the concurrent civil war clearly reduced the risk to U.S. servicemen and women who might have been deployed to the Great Lakes region of Africa. The decreased risk of U.S. involvement in an African civil war and the decreased risk to U.S. troops eliminated Christopher's main reason for objecting to U.S. involvement. At the same time EUCOM's cost-benefit analyses of several options and offered a course of action with easily definable and achievable victory conditions. Without a strong opponent to intervention, other forces dominated the decision-making process.

⁷ It is important to again stress that this study does not argue any of these decision-making processes will always result in failure. Each can - and has been used to achieve highly successful outcomes.

These preliminary observations point to several avenues for future research. One approach would be to identify Presidents that were prone not to focus on foreign and security affairs, and thereby left much of that responsibility to key advisors. National security decisions made during those administrations should be analyzed to determine whether the forces described by the Government Politics dominated those decisions. A similar effort should be made to identify presidents with a focus on security issues and foreign policy with a similar analysis of their security decisions.

Human Factors Model

The Human Factors model provides the majority of explanatory power for the remaining three decisions. The first of these decisions is President Bush's initiation of *Operation Provide Relief*, which ordered units of the U.S. military to provide humanitarian relief supplies to help avert a famine in Somalia. President Bush subsequently made the second decision dominated by forces best explained through the use of the human factors model; the initiation of *Operation Restore Hope*, a forcible humanitarian relief operation in Somalia. President-elect Clinton made the final decision in this category when he reversed his own campaign pledge, and continued the Bush policy of direct repatriation of Haitian boat people intercepted at sea.

In the case of *Operation Provide Relief* the evidence suggests the president was personally touched by the images of famine, starvation, and thuggery that were being reported from Somalia in general and Mogadishu in particular. President Bush had a personal touchstone where such events were concerned, having witnessed famine and starvation firsthand in the Sudan. He was also frustrated by what he saw as a lack of engagement on the issue by his NSC staff. Furthermore, he was committed to his vision

of "a New World Order" and saw Somalia as a major test of this concept. All these conditions continued to affect his decision to initiate *Operation Restore Hope*. Since the president had just lost his bid for re-election, Somalia offered a last positive chapter for his legacy. Based on the president's comments, it also appears that the timing of the Somali famine, occurring during a season of thanksgiving and plenty in the United States, may have also increased the personal impact felt by George Bush.

Just as President Bush was under pressure to end the famine in Somalia before the situation worsened considerably, so was President-elect Clinton under pressure from the flow of Haitian boat people. After his victory in November, it was clear that a wave of potential refugees was building boats on the shores of Haiti, which they would launch as soon as the new president was inaugurated. Twelve years earlier, as governor of Arkansas, boat-borne refugees had been the perceived cause of one of Bill Clinton's rare and painful electoral defeats. The fact that such defeats were unique events in the life of Bill Clinton would have made the memory all that much stronger. Now, another wave of Caribbean refugees was posing a threat to Bill Clinton, and a massive influx of Haitian refugees could easily sour what should have been the traditional honeymoon period for the newly elected president. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, key supporters in Florida were demanding that the refugee flows be stopped, because a major landing of Haitians on the Florida coast could damage the party and the president at the polls. Based on his personal experiences and values, it is not difficult to see why President-elect Clinton could conclude, based on human factors alone, that steps to prevent the Haitians from coming must be taken. Furthermore, the president-elect would be able to justify his

decision on the basis of preventing potential Haitian casualties, which would allow him to feel he had acted from humanitarian, versus political, purposes.

What do these decisions have in common? Each involved areas of personal presidential expertise or experience. As has been previously discussed, President Bush had a remarkable understanding of foreign affairs, national security, and international relations, and was clearly comfortable with these issues. As for President-elect Clinton, even his detractors accepted that he had a remarkable understanding of domestic party politics. It is clear that he would have no problem understanding the potential risk waves of Haitian refugees walking across the beaches of southeastern Florida would pose to that state's democrats and the national party. Thus, these decisions involved areas where the decision-makers were knowledgeable and comfortable.

Another common element in these decisions was that they posed a risk to something the decision-maker felt was personally important. For President Bush it was his legacy and the success of the New World Order, while for President Clinton, it was ensuring a smooth start to his presidency that would focus on domestic issues.

Each issue evoked personal experiences on the part of both men. George Bush had seen famine in the Sudan. Bill Clinton's loss of an election could be traced to President Carter's handling of Cuban boat people. As Chapter One discusses, such personal connections may increase the chance that forces best described by the Human Factors model will dominate the decision-making process.

Time, or rather a lack of it, was also a factor in these decisions. President Bush believed he was facing massive starvation in Somalia, and thus action had to be taken soon or as many as 300,000 Somalis might starve to death. President-elect Clinton was

also faced with a deadline. He knew the Haitians were building boats and that they were coming. Whether motivated to keep Haitian refugees off the shores of eastern Florida or a desire to save them from a watery grave, the president-elect had a finite and dwindling amount of time to make a decision.

Advantages of Integration

As has just been demonstrated, for each of the decisions it is possible to identify a particular model of decision-making that provides the most explanatory power. Such information is clearly of value to both the practitioner and scholar alike. Some might even argue that the virtue of parsimony adds power to this approach. This study does not dispute the desirability and value of this characteristic, but seeking only one explanation or fit with a model may mislead analysts and result in an incomplete or incorrect appreciation of the decision-making process. While such an outcome would be disappointing for the scholar, it may be devastating for the practitioner whose failure to understand the forces working on the decision-making process the results can lead to a misapplication of national resources, damage to alliances, harm to national prestige, and most seriously, the loss of U.S. and other lives. Parsimony should be pursued, but not at the expense of accuracy and usefulness. National security decision-making is an inherently complex process, and explanations of that process, once simplified past a certain point, no longer provide useful information.

As this study has shown, while one model of decision-making often provides the most explanatory power for a given decision, forces that are best examined through the application of different models are present in every decision. As this study has shown, the ability of a model to provide the greatest explanatory power may change over the

course of a case and a series of decisions. Dominance is often a matter of timing and the failure to realize this can result in an over reliance on one model.

If one reexamines the eight decisions with an integrated approach, would a deeper understanding of the decision-making process in these cases result? The answer is "yes." These findings are summarized in Figure 5-2.

The cases indicate that there are three major areas where using an integrated approach to understanding national security decision-making is beneficial. The first benefit of the integrated approach is the ability to identify important forces acting on the decision-making process that focusing on a single model might neglect. The second benefit is that the integrated approach captures the interplay of the forces described by the various models within and upon the decision-making process. This more accurately captures the impact of the disparate forces acting in the decision-making process. The third major benefit is the ability to capture shifts in the forces that dominate the decision-making process over the duration of a case.

These benefits significantly because they overcome many of the limitations from using a single model of decision-making as an explanatory device. Scholars are able to gain a more complete understanding of the decision-making process, while practitioners benefit from a similar increased depth of understanding, and can identify these forces when involved in the decision-making process and be able to more accurately probable outcomes. Each of these benefits will now be addressed in greater detail.

Decisions and the Integrated Model of Decision Making

Decision	Initiate <i>Provide Relief</i>	Initiate <i>Restore Hope</i>	Reverse Campaign Pledge re: Haitian Boat People	Support Governors Island Accord	Invade Haiti	Do Not Intervene In Rwanda	Support <i>Operation Turquoise</i>	Initiate <i>Support Hope</i>
Dominant Model	H.F.	H.F.	H.F.	G-P	G-P	G-P	G-P	R
Other model(s) that support the Decision	G-P*	G-P ORG.	G-P R ORG.	R ORG. H.F.	ORG. R	ORG. H.F.	ORG H.F. R	ORG. H.F. G-P
Opposing Model(s)	ORG. R	R			H.F.	R		

* Refers to action of Cohen, Natsios and Kunder.

Key:

R = Rational GP = Government Politics ORG. = Organizational H.F. = Human Factors

Figure 5-2

Presence of Multiple Forces

As most people would agree, as Figure 5-2 shows, relying on only one model to provide a complete understanding of a national security decision-making leaves significant gaps. In every case, no matter what model provides the majority of explanatory power, an integrated approach reveals the presence of other forces acting upon the decision-making process and provides a more complete understanding of the decision. As a detailed description of these different forces is provided for each decision in the appropriate chapter, they need not be listed again here. However, it is worth noting that relying on only the dominant model would have always resulted in neglecting the forces examined through the use of the Organizational model. Since Organizational forces were active in all eight decisions, this would be a significant omission.

In other cases, two or more models provided nearly equal amounts of explanatory power when it came to understanding the decision. These cases included President Clinton's decision to reverse his campaign pledge on the Bush policy of repatriation for Haitian boat people and the role of Human Factors in the decisions to avoid intervention in Rwanda, supporting *Operation Turquoise*, and initiating *Operation Support Hope*. It is these cases, perhaps more than any others, that show the benefits of relying on an integrated approach and some of the pitfalls associated with relying on any single model.

In Chapter One it was suggested that examining each of the models could result in a more complete understanding of the decision-making process. The example of the hologram continues to seem to be appropriate, as it is not merely the use of multiple projectors that create the holographic image, but also the manner in which the images

interact. So is it with decision-making. If one is to more completely understand the decision-making process, then it is important to understand the interaction between the different forces. Using the integrated model of decision-making can provide that understanding.

Interplay of Forces

Perhaps the most significant advantage of using an integrated approach to understanding national security decision-making centers on how the analyst is able to observe the interplay of decision-making forces and the impacts of those factors upon the decision-maker. Understanding this interplay goes beyond merely identifying the presence of forces best examined through the use of different models; it requires one to realize how these forces affected each other. For example, in the case of the decision not to intervene in Rwanda, it is easy to determine that the Governmental Politics model provides the majority of explanatory power in understanding the decision. But a more complete analysis would have also demonstrated how the forces best described through the use of the Organizational model contributed toward the decision. These forces were reinforced by the powerful impact the battle of Mogadishu had on the president. In a similar fashion, a complete understanding of the decision to invade Haiti, and the president's seemingly desperate efforts to pursue a non-military solution until the last minute, is not likely to be obtained without understanding how human factors pushed the decision-maker away from ordering the invasion while all other forces were propelling him to invade.

Shift in Forces Acting on the Decision-making Process

As the case studies have demonstrated, different models may provide different levels of explanatory power for decisions made over the span of a crisis. Even when the dominant model remains constant, the relative explanatory power of other models may shift. Efforts to explain decision-making that rely on solely one model will necessarily miss such shifts in dominance. For instance, in the case of Rwanda, it is possible to see how the changing situation on the ground changed the dominance of forces affecting U.S. national security decision-making. As the conflict stabilized, Warren Christopher's ability to exert influence over the decision-making process lessened to the point where the rational calculus supporting humanitarian intervention overwhelming. Likewise, in the case of Somalia, while the Human Factors model provided the greatest explanatory power during the crisis, there was a discernible increase in the importance of the forces best examined through the use of the Government Politics model. In fact, the decision to initiate *Operation Restore Hope* might not have been reached without the role of Admiral Jeremiah and General Powell in the decision-making process.

Comparative Case Analysis of the Secondary Research Questions

In addition to the main research questions explored by this study, there is also a set of five secondary research questions. Two of these questions have been the subject of some discussion among scholars of decision-making. The remaining three questions have been included as they are deemed to be particularly relevant to the application of the integrated model of decision-making. As discussed in Chapter One these questions are:

- To what extent did the duration of the crisis affect the dominance of forces acting upon the decision-making process described by the various models?

- To what extent did the success or failure of the decision-making process and outcome of the preceding crisis affect the decision-making process under examination?
- Which elements of the international political system had the most impact on the decision-making process?
- Which elements of the domestic political system had the most impact on the decision-making process?
- Given that these interventions were thought by many to be only tenuously linked to traditional notions of U.S. interests, what common elements may be found in the cases?

These questions will now be addressed in turn.


To what extent did the duration of the crisis affect the dominance of forces acting upon the decision-making process described by the various models?

The cases selected for this study range in duration from 23 months (Somalia) to 21 months (Haiti) to four months (Rwanda). In the case of Somalia, critical decision points occurred at the 19th and 23rd months. The decision points in the case of Haiti were reached at one month, seven months and 21 months. Rwanda saw decisions reached at the one month, three month and four month marks. Thus, the study examines cases in which the decisions were reached with great rapidity during a very brief span of time, with great rapidity after an extensive period of no action, and at approximately the beginning, middle, and end of a protracted crisis. The combination of duration, decision-points and dominant and supporting decision-making forces are displayed in Figure 5-3.

Several interesting items come to light when considering this question. The first is that, for these cases, the forces described by the Rational Actor model appear to take at least several months before exerting a strong influence on the decision-making process. In part, this may be due to the fact that it takes time to develop alternate courses of actions and to explore or actually try differing options. Such was the situation in both Haiti and Rwanda. Yet, it also appears that forces best described through other models easily shut down the Rational Actor process. Sometimes, as in the case of Rwanda, powerful advisors can essentially halt the computation of alternatives and the associated costs and benefits. At other times, Human Factors, such as fatigue and frustration, may also shut down the rational process. This certainly seems to be what happened in regards to the decision to initiate *Operation Restore Democracy*.

Another interesting finding is that while the forces examined through the use of the Organizational model never dominated the decision-making process, the use of force was never initiated until an organizational sub-routine, or battle plan, was established. In other words, U.S. military forces were never sent into a situation where they were expected to use force until the U.S. military and the Department of Defense was physically ready to send them in.

FIGURE 5-3



In the case of Somalia, this was achieved fairly rapidly, where, as in Haiti, such plans took a significant amount of time to develop. The case of Rwanda is somewhat different as there was little likelihood that force would have to be used. This may have significant implications for policy makers, as will be discussed later, and certainly warrants further study.

It also appears that the forces described by the Human Factors model are most likely to dominate the decision-making process at the beginning of any crisis or at the end of a protracted crisis. It is easy to offer an explanation of why this should occur at the onset of a crisis. First, no organizational routines or SOPs to deal with the situation may be in existence. Second, there may not be time to fully develop alternatives and identify associated costs and benefits before a decision "must" be made. Under these conditions a decision-maker may be more likely to rely on personal values, beliefs and experiences. This is all the more likely if there is no dominant leader of the decision-maker's inner circle, or if key advisors are uncertain how to respond to the developing situation.

One hypothesis for explaining why human factors may be more influential toward the end of a protracted crisis is that fatigue and personal frustration are likely to be at high levels by this point. Previous efforts are likely to have failed to resolve the issue, and advisors who once seemed to have the answers may have suffered a loss of credibility. Under these conditions a decision-maker may be more likely to make decisions best explained by the human factors model. There is insufficient data to

support more than posing the question at this point and this remains an area for further research.



To what extent did the success or failure of the decision-making process and outcome of the preceding crisis affect the decision-making process under examination?


The hypothesis is that decision-makers will be swayed by the success or failure of the most recent foreign policy and thus will try to duplicate success and avoid failure. At first glance this hypothesis would appear to have some merit because in every decision there were clear indications that the success or failure of previous decisions was a factor in the decision-making process. For example, in the case of Somalia, the success of *Operation Northern Watch* (humanitarian relief and security protection provided to the Kurds of northern Iraq), was cited as evidence of probable success for *Operation Provide Relief*. Subsequently, the failure of *Operation Provide Relief* was cited as justification for *Operation Restore Hope*.

However, as indicated in Figure 5-4, there appears to be no linear correlation between a decision and the most recent decision-making success or failure. Rather than being heavily influenced by the most recent decisions, the decision-making process seems to have been most influenced by the use of historical analogies.

In the case of Somalia, the success of *Operation Desert Storm* (the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation) was cited as justification of the probable success of *Operation Support Hope*, even though the United States had mounted several military

FIGURE 5-4

DECISION	PREVIOUS DECISION/ SUCCESS OR FAILURE	POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE INFLUENCE	MOST IMPORTANT PAST DECISION/EVENT
Somalia <i>Provide Relief</i>	<i>Northern Watch</i> (Iraq) - success	Positive - encouraged Pres to initiate <i>Provide Relief</i>	<i>Northern Watch</i>
Somalia <i>Restore Hope</i>	<i>Provide Relief</i> - failure	Positive - encouraged Pres to initiate <i>Restore Hope</i>	<i>Provide Relief</i>
Haiti Reverse campaign pledge	Bush decision to repatriate Haitians proclaimed failure by candidate Clinton	Negative - would expect to encourage Pres. elect to stick to campaign promise	Marief boat lift/Fort Chaffee riot
Haiti Support Governors Island Agreement	Clinton Administrations determination to restore Aristide to power	Positive - gave clear objective. Diplomatic solution would result in rapid success.	After Mogadishu firefight efforts to impose Governors Island agreement terminated
Haiti <i>Operation Restore Democracy</i>	<i>Operation Support Hope</i> (Rwanda) success	Positive - indicated U.S. forces could be used rheostatically - quickly withdraw...but 	Mogadishu dominates administration concerns.
Rwanda do not intervene	Mogadishu - attempt to capture Aidid and subsequent firefight - failure	Negative - convince key advisors, especially Sec State, Rwanda was another Somalia 	Mogadishu
Rwanda <i>Support Operation Turquoise</i>	Do not intervene- seen as success by senior advisors	Positive - supporting French would allow U. S. to stay unengaged and avoid another Mogadishu	Mogadishu...fears of another Mogadishu encouraged backing any solution w/o U.S.
Rwanda <i>Operation Support Hope</i>	Engage in nation building in Somalia - failure	Negative - showcase risk of open-ended operation	Mogadishu...However end of civil war made this analogy seem less apt

From this point on "avoiding another Mogadishu" will be a primary administration concern


operations since the Gulf War (e.g., *Operation Sea Angel*, which in 1991 provided humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh).

An even more telling example of the influence of historical analogy is the impact that the battle of Mogadishu had on the Clinton Administration's decision-making process. After the Mogadishu firefight, that event was raised in every discussion about the use of the force throughout the remainder of the 1990s. Indeed, virtually every decision made by the Clinton Administration that involved the use of U.S. forces was, at least in part, viewed through the lens of the October 1993 battle. As had been noted, invoking the ghosts of the 18 dead Rangers was enough to convince the Clinton Administration to turn back the *Harlan County*. It helps explain why President Clinton was willing to risk the negotiating team of Carter, Nunn, and Powell in a last attempt to avoid conflict, and why Warren Christopher worked so hard to keep the United States out of Rwanda.

Which elements of the international political system had the most impact on the decision-making process?

As noted in Chapter One, the international political system consists of all states, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental actors with cross border activities or membership. Figure 5-5 depicts the elements of the IPS that had the most impact on each of the eight decisions analyzed in this study. In the decisions to initiate *Operation Provide Relief* and *Operation Restore Hope*, inputs from the IPS could be considered critical. The most important of these inputs was the spread of famine in Somalia, which essentially placed a deadline on the decision-making process. Extremely large numbers of Somalis were going to die soon

FIGURE 5-5
IPS INPUTS

DECISION (CASE)	INPUT (S)	RESULTS	COMMENTS
Initiate <i>Operation Provide Relief</i> (Somalia)	1-Advancing famine (situational factor). 2-Failure of NGO. 3-Documentation by int'l media. 4-Appeal from on Secretary - General & GCC.	Imposed decision deadline. Heightened pressure on D-M system. Kept issue before president.	No state actors. IPS inputs more important than DPS.
Initiate <i>Operation Restore Hope</i> (Somalia)	Same as above.	Same as above, but now involved U.S. prestige.	IPS inputs.
Reverse campaign pledge (Haiti)	Impending refugee flow.	Imposed deadline forced issue onto the decision making agenda.	Serves as trigger, but not as important as DPS inputs.
Support Governors Island agreement (Haiti)	Aristide/Cedras "Acceptance" UN support	Reinforced apparent validity of U.S. approach.	Inputs not as important as DPS inputs.
Initiate <i>Operation Restore Democracy</i> (Haiti)	1-Aristide (Pres. In-exile) threat to suspend AMIO. 2-Increased violence by Cedras regime. 3-Cuban refugee flow.	Imposed deadline direct challenge to Clinton NSS. Forced attention on Haiti - set agenda.	Inputs still secondary to DPS.
Do not intervene (Rwanda)	Rwandan gov't initiates renewal of civil war and genocide. On presence in Rwanda.	Places Rwanda on agenda.	Impact of Mogadishu.
Support <i>Operation Turquoise</i> (Rwanda)	French request for support of support of French initiative.	Sets agenda <u>and</u> offers an attractive alternative to both doing nothing and getting involved.	Impact of Mogadishu.
Initiate <i>Operation Support Hope</i>	Cessation of civil war due to RPF victory. French success. Lack of NGO/IGO/State capacity. Increasing media coverage.	Reduced risk & cost served as some counterweight to Christopher's concerns. Put burden to act on U.S. Increased pressure to act after recent history of obstructing action.	IPS inputs reduce G-P power of sec state.

unless the United States acted. The second most important input from the IPS in both these decisions was the failure of NGOs and other relief providers to mitigate the famine, which removed one option for handling the crisis. The third input was the media coverage that documented the spread of the famine, its effects and the failure of the IPS to deal with the situation. The impact of this input was to ensure that the president was aware of the situation in Somalia, with the subsequent result that Somalia would remain on the U.S. policy-making agenda. The fourth input was the request for U.S. involvement made by both the Gulf Cooperative Council and the UN Secretary-General, which increased pressure on the U.S. to act and kept the issue of Somalia on the agenda. In both decisions, the IPS provided important inputs to the U.S. national security system.

In contrast to the Somalia case, two of the decisions made in the U.S. - Haitian confrontation were not dominated by international inputs to the decision-making process. The first decision was however, dominated by these inputs. In the case of the decision to reverse the campaign pledge, the impending wave of Haitian boat people was critical to the decision. Once the build-up was spotted, the question of the Haitian refugees was placed on the administration's agenda and a deadline for deciding was imposed upon the president-elect and upon Floridian democrats.

In Rwanda, inputs from the IPS set the agenda. The resumption of the civil war and the initiation of genocide by the Rwandan government produced a situation that U.S. policy makers had to consider. These inputs do not, in themselves, explain why the initial U.S. decision was not to intervene, but the issue would not have arisen otherwise. An even more obvious example of inputs from the IPS affecting U.S.

decision-making is that of the French request for support of *Operation Turquoise*. And, the RPF victory over the Rwandan Army with the cessation of the civil war and genocide were vital to the U.S decision to initiate *Operation Provide Hope*. So too was the outbreak of cholera, which, in a manner similar to that of famine in Haiti, imposed a deadline on the U.S. decision-making process.

Examining this question makes it clear that external international actors and forces can significantly affect the U.S. decision-making process. These inputs sometimes set the decision-making agenda, and at other times keep the crisis alive. Furthermore, as the actions of Fidel Castro in timing the Cuban refugee flow during the Haiti crisis and of Mohammed Sahnoun in inviting the international media to Mogadishu demonstrate, astute actors can manipulate these inputs to influence, and sometimes embarrass, the United States.

What elements of the domestic political system had the most affect on the decision-making process?

Chapter one describes the domestic political system as composed of internal U.S. interest groups, legislators, the judiciary system, general public opinion, and all other actors that are to be found within the borders of the United States and which are not part of the National Security System. These actors also include the U.S. domestic media.

As Figure 5-6 indicates, inputs from the domestic political system could be considered critical in three decisions, all of which are found in the Haiti case. These decisions were to reverse President-elect Clinton's campaign pledge to stop the Bush policy of Haitian repatriation, support the Governors Island agreement, and initiate

Operation Restore Democracy, which was the invasion of Haiti. In the first of these decisions, the demands of Florida Democrats to do whatever it took to prevent another major Haitian refugee flow from reaching their shores was enough to overcome any presidential reluctance to reverse a campaign pledge. By the time of the Governors Island agreement, the pressure from the Congressional Black Caucus was being felt by the administration, and increased after the agreement fell apart and General Cedras remained in power. Adding to this pressure was the situational factor of the upcoming congressional elections, which placed a perceived deadline for action upon the administration.

There is also clearly identifiable input from the DPS in the decisions involved in the Somalia case. Congressional inputs, primarily from Senator Kassenbaum and media coverage of the famine, effectively stopped the working of the national security decision-making system that had, up to that time, determined there was nothing to be gained from deeper U.S. involvement. Following *Operation Provide Relief*, the media documented the failure of this effort - presenting the president with compelling evidence that his initial efforts were not working.

Interestingly, in the case of Rwanda, while there was some media coverage, and toward the end the emergence of congressional interest and interest group activity, none of the inputs from the domestic political system seemed to have had a

**FIGURE 5-6
DPS INPUTS**

DECISION (CASE)	INPUT (S)	RESULTS	COMMENTS
Initiate Operation Provide Relief (Somalia)	1-Sen Kassenbaum land Simon calling for greater U. S. involvement. 2-Increasing media (domestic) coverage of Somalia.	Personal friend/reliable source provides direct input to president. Images seen personally by president	Begins to side track rational decision making being conducted by the NSC.
Initiate Operation Restore Hope (Somalia)	1-Increased congressional interest 2-Increased media coverage 3-Loss of election (situational factor)	Demonstrates failure of Provide Relief. Pressure to act increases Frees president to act	Forces of rational actor model overwhelmed.
Reverse Campaign Pledge (Haiti)	1-Florida democrats predict electoral disaster if Haitian refugees reach shore.	Invites use of Fort Chaffee analogy by president - elect Clinton.	Effort to avoid repeat of Fort Chaffee.
Support Governors Island Agreement (Haiti)	1-Congressional Black Caucus CBC is very much in favor.	President is obligated, knows he will need votes the Caucus can deliver.	Haiti becomes test of power for the CBC.
Initiate Operation Restore Democracy (Haiti)	1-Increased pressure from the CBC. 2-Randall Robinson hunger strike. 3- Impending elections(situational factor).	President more in need of CBC votes than ever. Administration is vulnerable to coercion from domestic allies. Sets a perceived deadline.	CBC, others are getting frustrated - want issue to be done with.
Do Not Intervene (Rwanda)	Lack of significant domestic inputs	Removed one source of pressure.	Media caught off stride No Domestic constituency.
Support Operation Turquoise	Growing media coverage. Growing pressure from special interest groups. Greater congressional awareness.	Increased risk administration will be seen as obstructionist. Can no longer claim "no Genocide."	Not as important as DPS.
Initiate Operation Support Hope (Rwanda)	Initial congressional voices for action growing public awareness. Significant media coverage.	Can be easily appeased and dealt with - coverage is likely to be positive.	Not as important as IPS. Sources: Compiled by Author

significant affect on the decision-making process. The most likely explanation for this lack of significant input is that the crisis concluded so quickly.

However, as the case of Haiti shows, there is no doubt that domestic inputs can sometimes have major impacts on the national security decision-making process. And, as the hunger strike undertaken by Randall Robinson demonstrates, those who understand how to manipulate these inputs can manipulate the decision-making process.

Given that these interventions were thought by many to be only tenuously linked to traditional notions of U.S. interests, what common elements may be found in the cases?

The first common element in these cases is that the participants did not seriously question whether the U.S. military could successfully perform any of these missions. Confidence in the capabilities of the military services was uniformly high. It was always clear, as in the decision to initiate *Operation Restore Democracy*, documented in Chapter three, that U.S. casualties would be low; the only question was "how low?"

A second common element is that the Defense Department resisted involvement in every one of these cases. The lukewarm support that DOD gave to the Somalia mission, as discussed in chapter two, was more evidence of a military desire to avoid service in the Balkans than eagerness to help in the horn of Africa. It is also interesting to note that the Defense Department and the military services seemed to have a greater fear of open-ended commitments and nation building than of incurring combat casualties. One likely explanation for this reluctance is that such operations

had the potential to be a drain on organizational resources and have a much greater impact on the military services than a relatively short conflict with an attendant low level of casualties.

The legacy of the Vietnam experience might partially account for the services' attitudes toward these non-traditional operations. It would certainly seem to have been a factor in the military's insistence on being able to shape just how the interventions were to be conducted. In both the decision to initiate *Operation Restore Hope* and *Operation Restore Democracy*, DOD conducted operations in accordance with the Powell doctrine. A large intervention force was fielded, a discrete mission was assigned, and a limited timetable was established. Although the size of the force was much smaller in Rwanda, it had a discrete mission and a finite timetable for operations.

However, in no case was DOD or military resistance powerful enough to prevent an intervention. This inability appears to stem from two factors. The first is that the military culture of obedience is simply stronger than its reluctance to engage in nontraditional uses of force. The second is that in every case by the time the decision to use force was reached, the military either had existing battle plans to hand or had time to develop them. These plans, which can be seen as a form of organizational routines, eliminated uncertainty and reduced risk to the organization.

A third element of commonality, as shown in Figure 5-1, is the degree to which organizational forces and rational actor calculus did not dominate the decision-making process. This may be due to the fact that in none of these cases was organizational survival ever at risk. Or it may be that organizational forces support

the decision-making process, but simply do not dominate it. The apparent lack of the cost-benefit calculus so important to the Rational Actor model is puzzling. Perhaps the rational actor process was so easily short-circuited in the cases because the associated interventions were going to be relatively low cost as opposed to potentially deadly contests involving the use of force. It may also be that the ability to truly identify the costs and benefits of an operation is not sufficiently well developed to generate precise comparisons between options. Whatever the reason, this would seem to be an area for further research.

Significance of this Study and Implications for Policy Makers

Significance

This study is significant for several groups: scholars of international relations and foreign policy, international and domestic participants in these non-traditional crises, such as directors of NGOs, and, of course, the men and women who are actually part of the national security decision making system

The international relations scholar will find that this study contributes to the field in several ways. First and foremost, it strongly suggests that the integrated model of decision-making can indeed be used to derive a more complete and accurate understanding of the national security decision-making process. It lays to rest the empty and sterile debate as to which of the examined models of decision-making is superior, because it reveals that each model provides some degree of understanding and that no one model provides the majority of explanatory power for every decision, in every instance. The study confirms that the forces these models examine evolve over the course of a

crisis or event and that the use of the integrated model is one way in which the changing relevance of these forces can be understood.

The study also adds depth to our understanding of the individual models. For example, it seems that a truly rigorous cost-benefit analysis – which lies at the heart of the idealized Rational Actor model – is rarely conducted. Rather such cost-benefit calculations seem to be approximated. Furthermore, it suggests that the Rational Actor model is more likely to provide the greatest explanatory power for decisions that occur after the initial, often emotional, opening stages of a crisis before frustration and fatigue occur in the decision-making process.

Understanding the Organizational Model is also enhanced through this study. It certainly seems that if a decision may involve the use of force for non-traditional definitions of national interests and security, then a plan, or organizational routine, to carry out the mission must either exist or be created before a decision to use force can occur. This most likely reflects the ability of the involved organization to delay such a decision until the risk to the organization has substantially been reduced. However, in other arenas SOPs that are designed to limit or channel national security decision-making in a certain direction, such as PDD-25, appear to have remarkably little impact in the cases under consideration on the decision-making process. Equally interesting is evidence that the ability of an organization to resist intervention may be less relevant than was previously thought. In decision after decision, this study has shown that organizational bias is simply overcome by other factors that influenced the decision-making process.

It would also appear that scholars, and for that matter practitioners, need to see documents such as the National Security Strategy as more exercises in rhetoric than reliable guides to administration decision-making. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations authorized the use of in Somalia and Haiti that by their own definitions did not fit their concept of the national interest.

Implications for Policy Makers

This study suggests that the integrated model of decision-making appears to offers policy-makers an easily used and rapidly applied tool for identifying the complex combination of forces that operate in the decision-making domain. The study also serves as a warning that there is not “one correct model of decision-making.” Those who persist in thinking otherwise appear to be simply inviting failure.

Other implications for policy-makers dealing with cases of the type examined in this study include:

It would seem to be useful to direct DOD to craft plans for a complete range of contingency options, including armed intervention, at the earliest opportunity. Not only does this potentially decrease the duration of a crisis, but the process of creating these procedures also provides a way to lessen organizational resistance. Furthermore, if such planning requirements are consistently made, the services will be likely to incorporate full spectrum contingency planning as an organizational SOP.

Establishing as early as possible a requirement for rigorous cost-benefit analysis in order to facilitate rational actor decision-making. This would involve establishing consistently weighted values that would be used in determining costs and benefits.

Briefing papers and presentations should contain explicit discussions of these

calculations. As analysis of the decisions examined by this study indicate, even when multiple alternatives are presented to a decision-maker, that there is usually a lack of rigor when it comes to identifying the strengths and weaknesses of these alternatives.

Policymakers should delay, if possible, making decisions in the initial stages of a crisis, especially before there is time for the national security decision-making process to begin generating alternatives and cost-benefit analyses. If delay is not possible, then this study suggests that policy-makers should recognize that decisions under these circumstances are likely to be dominated by preexisting SOPS and the forces depicted by the Human Factors model.

Policy-makers should seek to avoid becoming a prisoner of the past. The Clinton Administration's fixation on the battle of Mogadishu and the associated tendency to see a potential Somalia in every subsequent foreign policy dilemma was not helpful. The risk that such a fixation will facilitate failing to understand the real nature of unfolding crises and encourage the selection of non-productive courses of action is very high.

Policymakers should not automatically discard an alternative course of action simply because it failed the first time that it was attempted. As this study has shown, that was exactly what happened in the case of Haiti once the Governors Island agreement failed to work. The Clinton administration never seriously considered pursuing a diplomatic solution after that point. It may well be that discarding the failed alternative is the right thing to do and policymakers should be aware that such failures also might become powerful motivators for the use of force.

Limitations of the Study's Findings

There are several limitations with this study. The first two involve research sources. First, while primary research material and interviews with key individuals have been used to the maximum extent possible, it is entirely possible that documents that are currently classified or other evidence could come to light that would call into question the study's conclusions regarding dominant forces in the eight decisions. It is important to keep in mind, however, that such revelations would not negate the utility of the integrated model. Second, this study concludes that the forces examined by the Government Politics model are often dominant in cases of this type. This finding may be the result of relying heavily on interviews with individuals who were part of the national security decision-making process. It may be that there is a tendency of the part of these practitioners to overemphasize the role of these forces. Again, if subsequent revelations reveal that the role of government politics has been overemphasized, the study's conclusions regarding the dominance of forces in the various decisions would have to be changed, but the methodology of determining that dominance would not.

As mentioned earlier, the integrated model is inherently more complex than any of the individual models. It requires significant amounts of data about the decision making process, organizations that are part of the national security systems, and the individual character and nature of the decision-maker. It also relies on the ability of the analyst to discern shifting patterns of power and influence among key advisors to the decision-maker.

Another limitation is that the study covers a finite period of time and only two presidential administrations. It may be that the study's findings are applicable only to the 1990s or the administrations of George Herbert Walker Bush and William Jefferson

Clinton. Whether this is truly a limitation will become more evident with the passage of time.

Less a limitation of the study than a potential pitfall associated with the integrated model is the risk that a practitioner might assume that the integrated model can be used to precisely determine the outcome of a decision making process. Nothing could be further from the truth. At best, the use of the integrated model could produce more accurately weighted probabilities of action, but a tiny shift in probability might dramatically affect the rate of success.

Questions for Future Study

The study also raises several questions for the scholar. Is the perceived power of organizational resistance and bias overstated? Why do national security makers seem to discard an avenue of approach, such as diplomacy, after only one failure? Why do decision makers fail to ensure that a truly rigorous cost-benefit analysis and search for alternatives has actually been conducted? Do the conclusions of this study apply to cases of post Cold War decision making that involve more traditional concepts of national security?

Several follow-up research projects are suggested. Chief among these will be to apply this model of decision making to the decisions made by the Clinton Administration during their dealing with Somalia crisis. Not only will this add to the general body of knowledge concerning U.S. national decision-making, but will allow comparative analyses of the Bush and Clinton administrations' decision-making. Another study that should follow is a deeper look at the question of the impact of duration on the dominance of forces acting upon the decision maker. Finally, future decisions involving the use of

force when non-traditional security interests are involved should be rigorously analyzed and the results of those analyses added to those of this study.

Conclusions

This study has confirmed that the Rational Actor model, the Organizational model, the Government Politics model and the Human Factors model all reveal important facets of U.S. national security decision-making. At the same time the study has demonstrated that none of these models consistently provides the majority of explanatory power for national security decisions. The reason is that each of these models examines forces that are present in most national security decisions and do not capture how these forces interact with each other. Forces that are dominant in one decision are not necessarily dominant in others, and these forces propel a decision-maker toward the same alternative course of action. Therefore, relying on a single model to explain decision-making has two intrinsic flaws. The most serious of these flaws is that the model may not be able to provide any explanatory power for the decision or leads the analyst or practitioner to an incorrect conclusion. The second flaw is that, even in cases where the chosen model provides the majority of explanatory power, there will be still be gaps in the analyst's or practitioner's understanding.

These flaws are eliminated through the application of the integrated model of decision-making. Examining a decision through an application of each model and then integrating the results allow for the rapid identification of the dominant forces acting on the decision-making process. Contradictory forces can also be identified. For the analyst the result is a richer, more accurate understanding of a national security decision, and for the practitioner the result is an increased awareness of the different forces that act upon

the decision-making process, and an increased ability to recognize and, if need be, counter these forces during the decision-making process. This understanding is essential because as this study has shown that in cases where traditional national security calculations do not apply and the survival of the state is never in question, the cost in lives, treasure, and national prestige from poorly understood and implemented decision-making can be inordinately high.

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